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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION AND 
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND 
NORTHERN CAPE PROVINCES: A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analysed and compared the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the Eastern Cape and Northern 
Cape provinces. The thesis consists of six chapters. This study is based on 
the assumption that the struggle against corruption is best approached by 
developing a system of laws, institutions and supporting practices which 
promote integrity and make corrupt conduct a high-risk activity. It is 
imperative that a systemic approach is embarked upon in order to address 
the manner in which the major institutions and processes of the state are 
conquered and exploited by corrupt individuals and groups. 
 
With the magnitude in which hurdles exist that hamper the effectiveness of 
the country‟s anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies; South 
Africa is incapable of curbing corruption. With the purpose to determine a 
desired state of affairs, characteristics of effective anti-corruption agencies 
and anti-corruption legislation were presented. These served as a yardstick 
in measuring how effective such agencies and legislation are in South Africa. 
 
Reasons for failure of agencies and legislation are discussed. After 
discussing types of anti-corruption agencies, those that perform better than 
ix 
 
others were identified.  Through literature review, the status quo concerning 
anti-corruption initiatives in South Africa was assessed.  It was revealed that 
the level of the success of South African anti-corruption agencies and 
legislation has been limited. In the case of anti-corruption agencies, 
weaknesses such as fragmentation; insufficient coordination; poor 
delineation of responsibility; and assimilation of corruption work into a 
broader mandate were identified as major causes.  
 
Measures that are needed, such as informed citizens; a need to foster and 
sustain high levels of professional and ethically imbued civil servants; and 
legislation that supports the transition towards a corruption-free society that 
are needed to complement implementation of anti-corruption legislation, were 
also recognised. Ways of addressing such shortcomings that the writers 
identified are also presented.  
 
The methodology and design followed in the study are described. This is 
followed by the analysis and interpretation of the survey. The research 
findings are then presented. Based on the findings a number of 
recommendations that would assist in improving the effectiveness of anti-
corruption agencies and anti-corruption legislation are made. Flowing from 
the discussion of effective anti-corruption models that were identified by 
literature a model that would be ideal for South Africa is recommended. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1. BACKGROUND   
 
Many countries suffer from various degrees of corruption. South Africa is no 
exception. The undeniable fact, therefore, is that corruption cannot be reckoned as a 
mere country- or region-specific problem; it is a far wider phenomenon 
(Mutthirulandi, 2003:1). However, there has been a growing global movement to 
condemn corrupt practices, resulting in the removal of certain leaders from office. 
These are leaders such as the following:  
 
I. Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru, who was removed as being ―morally unfit‖ 
by the Peruvian National Assembly, owing  to corruption charges (World 
Money Watch, 2006: Online);  
II. General Khin Nyunt, Burma‘s prime minister, who was removed from office  
because he failed to take action against corruption (Voice of America, 2007: 
Online);  
III. Shanghai's top leader, Chen Liangyu, who was dismissed for alleged 
corruption (CBS News, 2006: Online); and  
IV. Andrzej Lepper, Polish deputy premier, who was dismissed after his name 
was linked to a major corruption case (PR-Inside, 2007: Online). 
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In South Africa, as in other countries, the challenge of preventing and combating 
corrupt behaviour is common to most societies and is currently being undertaken by 
public and private institutions. 
 
The South African government is paying attention to corruption and its effects, and is 
intent on preserving its economic and democratic transformation (Chipkin, 
1997:349). According to Van Vuuren (2005:8), corruption poses a major challenge in 
the provincial and local government spheres of government, negatively affecting the 
capacity of the public sector to deliver services to the poor. According to the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) (1999:5), corruption poses a 
serious challenge and undermines democracy and good governance by subverting 
formal processes. USAID (1999:5) further explains that corruption in public 
administration results in the unequal provision of services. 
 
International development agencies highlight the struggle against public sector 
corruption as a top priority (Schacter & Shah, 2001:1). The World Bank (2000:2), for 
example, describes corruption as a ―cancer‖ on development and declares ―there is 
nothing more important‖ than the fight against it. 
 
South Africa has followed this trend by embarking on a number of anti-corruption 
initiatives. Within the United Nations system, South Africa has initiated the following 
three initiatives: the adoption of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime (2000); the launch of the Global Programme against 
Corruption (2000); and the work on the preparation of a United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (2002).  
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South Africa also plays a prominent role in fighting corruption within the African 
context, such as the one in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), 
particularly with regard to good governance and in the adoption of the Africa Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Within the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the Protocol against Corruption was adopted in 
August 2001 (which South Africa ratified in 2003) and a number of organisational 
and training initiatives have been undertaken, including the creation of the Southern 
African Forum against Corruption (Country Corruption Assessment Report, 2003:3-
7).  
 
The Country Corruption Assessment Report (2003:4) states that commitment to 
good and clean governance, and thus anti-corruption, has been one of the priorities 
of the democratic South Africa and its government since 1994. The government of 
South Africa has undertaken a number of other important anti-corruption measures. 
These measures range from the adoption of the Public Service Anti-Corruption 
Strategy as the blueprint for anti-corruption work in the public sector (2002), the 
promulgation of an anti-corruption related legislative framework (1997-2004) and the 
development of investigating and prosecuting anti-corruption capacities, to efforts to 
develop partnerships with business and civil society. 
 
Other significant advances that South Africa has made include: international 
agreements to which South Africa has acceded; and the mechanisms and processes 
that have been put in place to fight corruption (The Presidency, 2005:3). The 
international agreements include the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
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the SADC Protocol against Corruption, and the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
 
2. RATIONALE 
 
South Africa is regarded as a country that has produced legislation that is an 
international example of good practice (Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2003:1). 
The ISS (2003:1) further argues that this legislation, if enforced, should equip the 
country‘s anti-corruption agencies with a tool that could effectively be used as both a 
punitive instrument for offenders and a deterrent for those contemplating corrupt 
activities. Such statements are contrary to what the researcher has observed during 
the years of service in the South African public service.  
 
The researcher is currently employed by one of the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Departments. This is the third Eastern Cape Provincial Department in which the 
researcher has worked since the new era. The researcher was motivated to analyse 
anti-corruption legislation and agencies owing to the disappointment and 
discontentment the researcher has experienced over this period. Experience 
gathered by the researcher over these years of service made it evident that such an 
analysis was necessary.        
 
According to Upadhyay (2002:4), anti-corruption agencies are meant to conduct 
inquiries into and investigations of improper conduct or corruption committed by a 
person holding public office; to give direction to the concerned authority to take 
appropriate actions against such person; and to file a case before the court of law 
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against any public official or other person upon investigation of corruption. Anti-
corruption legislation should serve to deter corrupt actions, prosecute corruptors and 
resurrect a sense of justice (World Bank, 2007:4). 
 
However, there is still low public awareness of and high tolerance for corruption, and 
the lack of integrity and accountability in government-business transactions are still 
rife. Moral scruples against bribery are low, resulting in greater incidence of 
corruption. Only small percentages of corrupt officials are disciplined. In most cases 
corrupt officials escape prosecution.  
 
Supervisees seem to be the front line troops who collect bribes and share them with 
supervisors. Bribes are sometimes paid to supervisors in exchange for turning a 
blind eye to the acts of corruption. However, if this kind of bribery is embedded in a 
department, it tends to be a condition of employment, organised by supervisors for 
their own gain. In some instances, authoritative officials collect payoffs and buy the 
silence of subordinates by sharing the gains with them, either through high pay and 
perks or under-the-table benefits.  
 
At times, corrupt supervisors tolerate petty corruption of supervisees as a way of 
assuring their complicity in the maintenance of the system. When major decisions 
are made at the top but supervisees provide essential inputs, supervisors pay off 
supervisees. An example is when major contracts are being awarded which is likely 
to be a domain of top officials. The top officials would need corrupt junior officials‘ 
help in assessing bids and overseeing implementation. Junior officials earn high 
salaries because their superiors are buying acquiescence. 
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The fundamental reason serving to account for the study therefore was to address 
the researcher‘s concern as to whether these anti-corruption agencies are apolitical, 
capable of detecting and punishing corruption or whether they are: only a response 
to international demands and not a reform towards good governance; tools to 
repress political rivals and members of the opposition; and meant to identify 
members of previous governments as targets of investigation. Heilbrunn (2004:3) 
argues that an anti-corruption agency is effective when it responds to national 
consensus and when a broad domestic coalition supports such a reform. The 
researcher also wished to find out whether anti-corruption legislation is being 
effectively enforced. 
 
3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
South Africa faces both real and perceived problems with corruption. According to 
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2005:2), for example, 
the African country perceived to be the least corrupt is Botswana, which rates 31st 
out of the 159 countries world-wide with the most and least public sector corruption.  
 
The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index scores relate to 
perceptions by business people and country analysts. This index ranges between 
ten for (highly clean) and zero for (highly corrupt). South Africa is rated 46th, coming 
third as the least corrupt African country after Botswana (5.9) and Tunisia (4.9), 
according to the perception index. South Africa's score dropped to 4.5 in 2005 from 
4.6 in 2004.  
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Ferreira and Bayat (2005:15) regard the following as visible signs that corruption in 
South Africa appears to be seriously undermining the citizens‘ faith in the very 
foundations of society: ghost employees in the civil service; fraud in hospitals and 
school meal schemes; corruption in the police force; and the leaking of examination 
papers. Ferreira (2005:4) asserts that, despite the evidence available, corruption is 
substantially less visible than many other forms of crime and this is perhaps the 
reason why it has not been addressed with the appropriate vigour. Ferreira (2005:4) 
further argues that corruption involves fewer conscious victims and witnesses 
because it is a consensual crime in the sense that all participants are usually willing 
parties who together have an interest in concealing it. 
 
It is important to note that one of the most serious development challenges facing 
South Africa is corruption. According to Partners in Transition (2002:1), corruption 
undermines democracy, reduces accountability and representation in policy-making, 
suspends the rule of law, and ultimately results in unequal service provision. In the 
Handbook on Fighting Corruption (1999:7), similar sentiments are shared as it is 
stated that corruption poses a serious development challenge. It is widely 
recognised that corruption impedes every development objective that a country 
seeks to promote. 
 
The Presidency (2005:1) stated that laws, policies and programmes have been put 
in place to extirpate corruption in South Africa. Social partnerships that include 
regional, continental and international partners have been established, yet more will 
have to be done to fight corruption. The Presidency (2005:1) further argued that a 
comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach is required to prevent and combat 
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corruption effectively. South Africa clearly has to continue to strengthen its capacity 
in its anti-corruption programmes and improve on the performance of the criminal 
justice system. It is evident that whereas certain of the efforts may have yielded 
results, others are lagging behind.     
 
The Public Service Commission (2002:8) has found that ―Provincial governments are 
in many ways more vulnerable than national departments and face special 
challenges. Management in provinces is generally less developed, and systems, 
procedures, controls and other elements of governance and integrity are also often 
weaker. Provincial administrations have experienced serious impediments in 
provinces that have had to integrate former homelands into their organisational set-
up.‖  
 
Van Vuuren (2005:92-93) states that provincial governments have, in certain 
instances, been affected by a lack of capacity to ‗deliver,‘ combined with poor 
accountability and oversight. This has affected their ability to spend their budget and, 
where they have done so, has made the disbursement of funds vulnerable to 
corruption by public officials and eager private sector representatives. One such 
example has been the Eastern Cape province where massive under-spending, 
mismanagement and probable corruption (both at a grand and petty level) led to 
central government intervention (Van Vuuren, 2005:92-93). 
 
The provincial governments should acknowledge their responsibility to keep the 
provinces honest and to be accountable to the citizens (Cwati, 2004:26). The 
Eastern Cape Province does not seem to be coping, whereas the Northern Cape 
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Province appears to be managing. The Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) (2003:120) revealed that when a further breakdown of 
corruption on the provincial level was done, it showed the Eastern Cape (with 25 
cases) as the province where the most corruption at the provincial level was 
exposed, followed by KwaZulu-Natal with 19 cases; whereas the Free State (three 
cases) and Northern Cape provinces (one case) proved to be the least corrupt 
provinces. Furthermore, Kwazulu-Natal and Eastern Cape provinces have been 
identified as provinces where crime syndicates have been involved with the 
assistance of government officials (Heath, 2001:4). 
  
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The study sought to provide answers to the following questions:  
 
I. What is the reason for significantly different levels of corruption between the 
Eastern Cape province and the Northern Cape province? 
II. What constitutes corruption at the provincial level?  
III. What is the impact of good governance on corruption? 
IV. How does corruption impact on service delivery? 
V. To what extent are the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces affected 
by corruption? 
VI. What initiatives have been taken by the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape 
provinces to fight corruption? 
VII. Which factors impact on the effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation and 
agencies? 
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VIII. How do the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces monitor and evaluate 
the effectiveness of the anti-corruption legislation and agencies? 
 
5. ASSUMPTIONS 
 
This study is based on the major assumption that the struggle against corruption is 
best approached by developing a system of laws, institutions and supporting 
practices which promote integrity and make corrupt conduct a high-risk activity. 
Corrupt practices and integrity weaknesses will emerge unless there is a minimum of 
systemically integrated and effective control mechanisms, management practices, 
transparency measures, ethics codes, laws and law enforcement, leadership and 
supervising institutions in place.  
 
In this study it is assumed that anti-corruption legislation is established to advance 
the investigation and prosecution of corruption-related crimes; the prevention of 
corrupt acts through such actions as the simplification of procedures and the policing 
of conflicts of interest; the education of the public, the media, and government 
officials on what constitutes corruption and why it must be combated, and the 
coordination of the activities of different government agencies responsible for  these 
actions. 
 
In South Africa, these anti-corruption measures are inadequate. Officials easily 
escape prosecution because the legislation on corruption is inadequate, ambiguous 
and ineffective.    
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It can be argued that the public is not well educated on the advantages of good 
governance and as a result citizens tend not to participate in promoting it. South 
African citizens do not appear to be aware of the fact that it is their responsibility to 
insist on honesty and integrity in government.  
 
6. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
 
The main aim of the study was to conduct a comparative analysis of anti-corruption 
legislation and anti-corruption agencies in dealing effectively with corruption in the 
Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces. Specifically the study sought to 
address the following:  
 
I. to examine the nature and extent of corruption in the Eastern Cape and 
Northern Cape Provincial Departments of Social Development; 
II. to identify factors affecting the effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation and 
agencies;  
III. to compare and analyse effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation and 
agencies in both the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces; 
IV. to identify and analyse factors associated with compliance or non-compliance 
with the anti-corruption in the Eastern Cape and Northern cape provinces; 
and 
V. to provide recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the anti-
corruption legislation and agencies in the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape 
provinces. 
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7. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
South Africa developed strategic and legislative anti-corruption frameworks in the 
form of acts and agencies. Legislation passed to support the government‘s fight 
against corruption includes the following:  
 
I. The  Prevention of Organised Crime Act ( No. 121 of 1998); 
II. The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication Related Information Act (No. 70 of 2002); 
III. The Witness Protection Act (No. 112 of 1998); 
IV. The Criminal Procedure Act (No. 51 of 1997); 
V. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (No. 12 of 2004), 
which provides the legal definition of corruption and creates a range of 
offences. It also allows for people found guilty of certain offences (such as 
those related to tenders) to be ‗blacklisted‘ and it requires senior officials to 
report corrupt activities;  
VI. The Promotion of Access to Information Act (No. 2 of 2000), which gives 
effect to Section 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(Access to Information) by setting out how one can obtain access to 
information held by the state. By so doing, it promotes transparency and 
prevents government from operating in secret;  
VII. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (No. 3 of 2000), which gives 
effect to Section 33 of the 1996 Constitution (Just Administrative Action). It 
ensures that decisions that affect the public are taken in a way that is 
procedurally fair and it gives people the right to request written reasons for 
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decisions they disagree with. In this way, it creates greater transparency - 
people may be less tempted to act corruptly if they know they will have to 
explain themselves to the public; 
VIII. The Protected Disclosures Act (PDA) (No. 26 of 2000), also called the 
‗Whistleblowers Act‘ was passed to encourage employees to disclose 
information about unlawful and irregular behaviour in the workplace. It offers 
protection from victimisation for ‗whistleblowers‘, as long as they meet the 
requirements and follow the procedures set out in the Act;  
IX. The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (No. 1 of 1999) and the 
Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (No. 56 of 2003). These Acts set 
out the requirements for dealing with public finances at the national, provincial 
and local government spheres of government; and  
X. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) (No. 38 of 2001), which creates 
the Financial Intelligence Centre and was designed to combat money 
laundering. 
 
The report which was prepared by the Public Service Commission on a review of 
South Africa‘s national anti-corruption agencies (2001:8) divides the anti-corruption 
agencies that had been established in South Africa into three groups. These are 
constitutional and oversight bodies; and the criminal justice agencies. The 
constitutional and oversight bodies are the following: 
 
I. The Office of the Auditor-General which has a constitutional mandate to audit 
and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial management 
of all public sector agencies;   
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II. The Office of the Public Protector, mandated to investigate and make 
recommendations to state departments on any conduct which may have 
resulted in prejudice to citizens, that is, acting as a buffer between the citizen 
and the state;   
III. The Public Service Commission as an oversight body responsible for 
monitoring and evaluation has been mandated to play an active role in 
evaluating the effectiveness of anticorruption agencies and to suggest 
improvements where necessary; and  
IV. The Independent Complaints Directorate which is responsible for 
investigating incidences of police misconduct.  
 
The Criminal Justice Agencies include the following: 
 
I. South African Police Service Commercial Crime Unit which investigates all 
cases of commercial crime; 
II.  South African Police Service Anti-Corruption Unit, responsible for 
investigation of allegations of corruption amongst South African Police 
Service members; 
III. The National Prosecuting Authority and its Directorate of Special Operations 
(the Scorpions); 
IV. The Special Investigating Unit and the Financial Intelligence Centre, created 
in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act to deal with such crimes as 
money-laundering; and 
V. The South African Revenue Service which, as a collector of tax, plays a vital 
role in supporting the democratic transition. 
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Other anti-corruption agencies referred to here are listed below: 
 
I. The Department of Public Service and Administration; 
II. The National Intelligence Agency:  
III. The South African Revenue Services; and 
IV. The National Anti-Corruption Forum. 
 
In addition, South Africa has also taken the following measures:  
 
I. Reformed management practices, including appointment and disciplinary 
procedures;  
II. Instituted financial disclosure requirements and performance systems for 
managers in the public service;  
III. Established a new, fair and transparent supply chain management system to 
prevent corruption in procurement;  
IV. Introduced a Public Service National Anti-Corruption Hotline System; and  
V. Instituted stringent financial management, risk management and fraud 
prevention requirements for public bodies. 
 
According to the DPSA (2003:4), a number of other anti-corruption initiatives were 
launched post-1994, culminating in the adoption of the Public Service Anti-
Corruption Strategy. The Batho Pele (People First) principles set out the required 
levels of professional ethics in the public service in terms of service delivery. In 1997 
the Code of Conduct for the Public Service which sets the standards of integrity for 
public servants was adopted. This was followed by the establishment of an Inter-
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Ministerial Committee on Corruption tasked with the development of a national anti-
corruption campaign.  
 
In 1998 a Moral Summit was held by religious and political leaders and a Code of 
Conduct for leadership was adopted. The Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference 
(1998) adopted the following key points to fight corruption in partnership: 
I. A definition of what South Africans understand by corruption was required;  
II. Renewed commitment of stakeholders to fighting corruption was necessary;  
III. A process to coordinate anti-corruption activities had to be implemented; and  
IV. Resolutions and recommendations for a national campaign against corruption 
were to be adopted (Transparency International South Africa [TISA], 2002:2). 
  
The National Anti-Corruption Summit which adopted parameters for the 
development of South Africa's National Anti-Corruption Programme was held in 
1999. The first meeting of the Cross-Sectoral Task Team on Corruption was held in 
this same year and the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference was also hosted 
in 1999. 
 
In 2000 the government and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Regional Office for Southern Africa (UNODC/ROSA) jointly held the International 
Anti-Corruption Expert Round Table. In 2001 the government and the 
UNODC/ROSA signed an agreement on the United Nations Support to the National 
Programme against Corruption. The Public Service Anti-Corruption Workshop was 
held. The tripartite (government, business and civil society) National Anti-Corruption 
Forum was launched. An anti-corruption partnership agreement was entered into 
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between the government and UNODC on 9 March 2001, and among various anti-
corruption activities, it also envisaged the preparation of a Country Corruption 
Assessment Report.  
 
A joint Country‘s Corruption Assessment Report by the United Nations and the 
Government of South Africa was presented to the country's parliament and public on 
2 April 2003. This report was prepared within the framework of the United Nations 
Global Programme against Corruption and the project of the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to support South Africa's Anti-Corruption Programme.  
 
According to the United Nations Information Services (2003:1), this report was the 
first comprehensive description and analysis of the corruption and anti-corruption 
scenario in South Africa. The report analysed the strengths and weaknesses of the 
legislative framework; institutional capacities for prevention, investigation and 
prosecution; management policy and practice; ethics and public education; and the 
role of civil society, mass media and political parties. It also examines the position of 
South Africa within the global and regional contexts. The main findings of the report 
are, inter alia, the following: 
I. South Africa contributes actively and substantially to international and 
regional anti-corruption efforts. Several pieces of legislation and enforcement 
structures are unique in the region and of the highest international standards.  
II. The country is making progress in terms of legislation, though it is still lacking 
a comprehensive, specific anti-corruption law. Such legislation is currently 
under consideration by parliament. There is no legislation regulating the 
private funding of political parties and campaigns.  
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III. South Africa has improved in terms of increased institutional capacity to 
investigate and prosecute corrupt practices. However, there is a need to 
enhance management capacities of individual government departments and 
to promote and strengthen coordination among anti-corruption entities (United 
Nations Information Services, 2003:2). 
 
The second National Anti-Corruption Summit took place in November 2004. The 
Summit aimed to strengthen inter-sectoral co-operation and assess its progress in 
terms of addressing corruption measured against global standards. In February 
2004, the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Bill was passed. The Bill, 
which replaced the Corruption Act of 1992 (Act 94 of 1992), is informed by the 
government's strategy to combat corruption at all levels of South African society. The 
Bill made provision for witness protection programmes and compelled people in 
positions of authority, particularly senior managers in government, parastatals and 
the private sector, to report corrupt activities. Failure to blow the whistle on 
corruption will carry a maximum penalty of ten years‘ imprisonment (South Africa 
Year Book, 2004/05:330). 
   
New laws, such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act (No. 2 of 2000) 
signed into law in February 2000, have since helped to increase transparency in 
government. The Public Finance Management Act (No. 1 of 1999), which became 
effective on April 1, 2000, helped to raise the level of oversight and control over 
public funds and improved the transparency of government spending, especially with 
regard to off-budget agencies and parastatals. Notwithstanding these efforts, 
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complaints still exist about the lack of certainty and consistency in interpreting and 
implementing the legislation (United States Trade Representative, 2004:435). 
 
8. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study focused on assessing the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies 
and legislation in relation to public sector corruption. In this study corruption was 
approached from a governance perspective. According to USAID Anti-corruption 
Strategy (2005:16), corruption can be understood as the abuse of public office, 
powers, or resources for private gain. Public sector corruption is a symptom of failed 
governance (Shah, 2006:2).  
 
A wide consensus has also recently emerged that corruption is a symptom of failed 
governance and hence curtailing corruption requires addressing the causes of miss-
governance (Huther & Shah, 2001:2). To be able to understand good governance, 
governance needs to be defined first. Governance describes the process of 
decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not 
implemented) (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific [UNESCAP], 2006:1).  
 
Good governance accomplishes this in a manner essentially free of abuse and 
corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law (wikipedia.org). Singh (2003:1) 
summarises this explanation by stating that good governance means effective, 
accountable and transparent governance. The effects of corruption seriously 
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constrain the development of the national economy and significantly inhibit good 
governance in the country (Pillay, 2004:586). 
 
The assessment was conducted in the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces. 
The assessment done based on three broad forms of corruption as it is not 
manifested in one single form. Broad forms of corruption as explained by Schacter 
and Shah (2004:17) are the following:  
 
I. Petty administrative or bureaucratic corruption are corrupt acts which are 
isolated transactions by individual public officials who abuse their office, for 
example, by demanding bribes and kickbacks, diverting public funds, or 
awarding favours in return for personal considerations. Such acts are often 
referred to as petty corruption even though, in the aggregate, a substantial 
amount of public resources may be involved.  
II. Grand corruption is the theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by 
state officials, usually members of, or associated with, the political or 
administrative elite.  
III. State capture or influence peddling is collusion by private actors with public 
officials or politicians for their mutual, private benefit. That is, the private 
sector ‗captures‘ the state legislative, executive, and judicial apparatus for its 
own purposes. State capture coexists with the conventional (and opposite) 
view of corruption, in which public officials extort or otherwise exploit the 
private sector for private ends.  
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9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
9.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 The study in question was conducted within both the quantitative and qualitative 
paradigms. This is what is referred to as methodological triangulation. Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000:391) describe methodological triangulation as using more than one 
research method within one study. In studies that address more encompassing 
domains of interest, triangulation contributes to the investigator's ability to achieve a 
complete understanding of that domain (Knafl & Breitmayer, 1989:237). 
Methodological triangulation provides richer data by the possibility of exposing 
information that may have remained undiscovered if one method had been used 
(Duffy, 1887:133). Methodological triangulation raises researchers above the 
personal biases that stem from single methodologies (Denzin, 1989:236). 
 
The qualitative research method is referred to as the interpretative ethnographic 
model of social science research because of its focus on understanding the people 
who derive meaning from their world (Dzvimbo, 1996:17). The qualitative design was 
considered suitable. Qualitative research emphasises the "thick description" of a 
smaller number of subjects within a specific setting (Rudestam & Newton, 1995:39). 
According to Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 24), qualitative research then is most 
appropriate for those projects where the goal is a deep narrative understanding. 
 
Quantitative research is the systematic scientific investigation of quantitative 
properties and phenomena and their relationships. Through quantitative research 
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the fundamental connection between empirical observation and mathematical 
expression of quantitative relationships will be provided. Although a distinction is 
commonly drawn between qualitative and quantitative aspects of scientific 
investigation, it has been argued that the two go hand-in-hand (Wikipedia, 2006: 
Online).  
 
9.2 PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants were drawn from the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape Provincial 
Departments‘ officials. The total sample size was 108.   
 
Departments that were identified for purposes of this study were the Departments of 
Social Development in the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces. The reasons 
for selecting these departments were because the following functions, which were 
also selected areas for the study, are administered and managed by these 
departments:  
 
I. Child Support Grant; 
II. Social relief of Distress; and 
III. Disability Grant and Old Age Grant. 
 
The National Minister of Social Development committed the National Department of 
Social Development to addressing the irregularities that exist in the social grants 
system, and to ensuring that social grants reach only the legitimate beneficiaries 
(Skweyiya, 2005: Online). This commitment initiated a national campaign by the 
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department to eradicate fraud and corruption. For this reason the Departments of 
Social Development in the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces were 
selected. 
 
The following statements clearly prove that there have been numerous cases of 
corruption that warrant investigation in the selected areas. Examples of corruption 
investigated by the Special Investigating Unit during its existence include the 
following: 
 
I. In the Eastern Cape it was found that syndicates were involved, with the 
assistance of government officials, in generating government cheques, 
cashing them and laundering the money (Heath, 2001:3). 
II. Some 160 people in the Eastern Cape have been convicted of social grant 
fraud (Cull, 2005:1).  
 
Punt (2006:176) supports views of the above authors and states that ―The public 
sector primarily holds monopolies on basic and essential services like welfare 
grants. Recipients of these services are thus highly vulnerable, often suffering from 
exploitation and human rights abuses‖.  
 
9.3 SAMPLING METHOD 
 
Because the study sought to use a representative sample, stratified random 
sampling was utilised. The population group was divided into strata. A sample was 
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selected so that certain characteristics are in the same proportion as they are to the 
population.  
 
When dealing with a sample frame that is not homogeneous and contains subgroups 
such as employees and clients, those subgroups need to be represented in the 
sample. In order to achieve this, random selection from each subgroup in the 
sampling frame was used to select a sufficient number of subjects from each 
stratum. Sufficient refers to a sample size large enough to be reasonably confident 
that the stratum represents the population (Wasserstein & Davis, 2001:24). 
 
Over-sampling was applied to cater for incidents where other employees and clients 
were no longer with the departments. The Personnel Salary (PERSAL) system in the 
departments is not accurate (Frazier, 1999:12). It takes time for people who, for 
example, are deceased, retired or have resigned, to be removed from the system. 
  
Departmental employees were selected from the PERSAL system. Employees to be 
served with questionnaires were randomly selected using a table of random 
numbers.  
 
Anti-corruption officials who are attached to the Premiers‘ offices of both the Eastern 
Cape and Northern Cape provinces as well as heads of Child Support Grant, Social 
Relief of Distress, Disability Grant and Old Age Grant units from the Eastern Cape 
and Northern Cape Provincial Governments were interviewed. The sample of the 
proposed study was composed of the following: 
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I. 50 officials drawn from each of the departments (100) forming Group A; 
II. Heads of Child Support Grant, Social Relief of Distress, Disability Grant and 
Old Age Grant units from the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape Provincial 
Governments (6) which formed Group B; and  
III. Senior managers of each department‘s Anti-Corruption units (2) forming 
Group C.  
 
9.4 DATA COLLECTION 
               
A survey was conducted to gather information in the form of written questionnaires 
and semi-structured one-on-one interviews. Reasons why questionnaires can form 
an important element of this study are that questionnaires are flexible, easy to apply 
and (usually) relatively inexpensive. Questionnaires also have advantages over 
some other types of surveys in that they do not require as much effort from the 
respondent as verbal or telephone surveys do, and often have standardised answers 
that make it simple to compile data (Wikipedia, 2006: Online). Questionnaires also 
have their limitations. These can be summarised as follows: Questions set could not 
be fully understood in the same manner; there is no opportunity to probe any further 
the answers supplied by respondents; and there is no control over who actually 
answers the questionnaire (Doublet, 2002:32). However, questionnaires offer an 
objective means of collecting information about people's knowledge, beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviour.  
 
The questionnaire was composed of three sections that were divided in the following 
manner: Section A required bibliographical information; Section B consisted of brief 
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statements using a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. Section B contained anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption 
agencies related statements. Section C allowed respondents to open up by 
responding to three open-ended questions.  
 
Semi-structured interviews are guided conversations where broad questions are 
asked which do not constrain the conversation, and new questions are allowed to 
arise as a result of the discussion. A semi-structured interview is therefore a 
relatively informal, relaxed discussion based around a predetermined topic. This 
technique allows each person involved in the interview to feel comfortable and also 
allows for two-way communication and openness (Ellison, 2006:2). Interviews were 
conducted in order to gain information on areas that had been catered for by the 
literature review.  
 
Document review was done through gathering data from pre-existing sources. These 
sources included reports of previous research or assessments by academics, 
interest groups, public officials; documents published by institutions and 
organisations such as the World Bank and Transparency International; government 
departments such as the Department of Public Service and Administration and 
Public Service Commission, as well as information from media reports. This review 
provided information on the functioning of the anti-corruption agencies and details on 
compliance with anti-corruption legislation.  
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9.5 PROCEDURE 
 
Questionnaires were sent via e-mail to Groups A with clear instructions on how to 
answer the questions. Groups B and C were interviewed face-to-face utilising semi-
structured interviews. Interviews were not audio-taped owing to the sensitivity of the 
subject. Extensive notes were therefore taken. Anonymity and confidentiality were 
taken into consideration as officials would not provide information if they feared 
disciplinary or criminal sanctions. Respondents may also have feared retaliation if 
they provided information. 
 
9.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
When analysing the data, data capturing was done manually by the researcher. 
Statistical procedures were utilised to interpret and analyse the quantitative data to 
determine the results. Quantitative data was analysed by using statistical methods 
which began with the collection of data based on a theory or hypothesis, followed by 
the application of descriptive statistical methods such as percentage and frequency 
of occurrence. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the basic features of the 
data in a study which provided summaries about the sample and the measures.  
 
Qualitative data was analysed by thematic content analysis. Codes were utilised in 
assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled 
during the study. The tape-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. The 
researcher listened to the transcripts to avoid omissions or distortions of meaning. 
These topics were subsequently assigned labels or codes where the labels used are 
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close to the terms they represented. The coding was then checked by the 
researcher to prevent unintentional omissions or incorrect recording of the data 
obtained from the participants. 
 
After data labelling, writing reflective comments, and revising or check coding the 
data was categorised. This is a process that is commonly known as pattern coding. 
Pattern coding is a way of grouping summaries into a smaller number of sets, 
themes, or constructs (Miles & Huberman, 1994:69). Memoing was then used as a 
tool to organise the themes and categories, and subsequently, integrating clusters 
into more general concepts. Memoing refers to the theorising write-up of ideas about 
codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding (Glaser, 1978: 
83). Memoing is one of the most useful and powerful sense-making tools at hand 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994:72). 
 
9.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Permission to conduct the study was obtained from the Heads of the Eastern Cape 
Department of Social Development and Northern Cape Department of Social 
Development. Ethical clearance was sought from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.  
 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Participants were assured of 
confidentiality, privacy and voluntary participation. They were made aware that they 
were free to withdraw from the study at any point if they wished to do so. In addition, 
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they were informed that they were not obliged to answer any question that they 
considered personal or were uncomfortable about answering.   
 
10. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
BLACKLIST   
 
To blacklist is to record a name in a blacklist as deserving of suspicion, censure, or 
punishment; especially to put in a list of persons stigmatised as insolvent or 
untrustworthy (Webster‘s Dictionary, 2006:Online). These persons are put on a 
blacklist so as to cause to be boycotted (Wordreference, 2006: Online). A blacklist is 
a list of persons or things considered undesirable or deserving punishment 
(Answers.com, 2006: Online). 
 
WHISTLEBLOWER  
 
A whistleblower is an employee, former employee, or member of an organisation 
who reports misconduct to people or entities that have the power to take corrective 
action. Generally, the misconduct is a violation of law, rule, regulation and/or a direct 
threat to public interest. Safety violations and corruption are examples (Wikipedia, 
2006: Online).  
 
 
 
 
30 
 
KICKBACKS   
 
A kickback is a payment made to a person in a position of trust to corrupt his 
judgment (Answers.com, 2006: Online). It is a bribe, usually from someone in the 
business/private sector to someone in government/politics, to either ‗look the other 
way‘ or to allow the business person to carry on with an unscrupulous venture 
(Urbandictionary, 2006: Online). 
 
11. STUDY OUTLINE 
 
This study was undertaken in six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction 
to the entire study. It includes the background, rationale for conducting the study, 
research questions, aims and objectives of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the definition and analysis of corruption. This chapter provides 
a comprehensive approach to understanding the nature of corruption. A survey of 
relevant literature on corruption is provided. This is done by discussing the extent, 
forms, causes and effects of corruption.  
 
Chapter 3 provides properties of effective anti-corruption legislation and anti-
corruption agencies. Attention is given to what anti-corruption legislation and anti-
corruption agencies ought to be rather than the somewhat abstract study of 
corruption itself.  
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Chapter 4 presents the methodology followed in the study. It describes the research 
design, participants, research instruments, methods of data collection and analysis 
as well as ethical considerations. 
 
Chapter 5   presents and discusses the findings obtained from the analysis of the 
qualitative and quantitative data.  
 
Finally, chapter 6   provides a summary of the findings, conclusions drawn from the 
findings and the limitations of the study. Recommendations for the improvement of 
anti-corruption legislation and agencies have been provided. Lessons learnt as well 
as examples of best practice have been highlighted. Areas for future research have 
been identified.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NATURE OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter will focus on the definition and analysis of corruption. It will also provide 
a comprehensive understanding of the nature of corruption. A survey of relevant 
literature on corruption will be provided. This will be undertaken by discussing the 
extent, forms, causes and effects of corruption. 
 
Corruption is a global problem and curbing it is a top priority in many countries. 
Prioritising the fight against corruption has led to the enactment of anti-corruption 
legislation and establishment of anti-corruption agencies in some countries. 
However, devising and implementing these remedies does not necessarily mean 
that corruption has been curbed. This is due to corruption being viewed as a 
complex phenomenon.  
 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDC, 2006: Online) aligns itself 
with this notion when it states that corruption is a complex phenomenon; that its 
character differs from country to country, depending on the prevailing social, 
economic and cultural conditions and, particularly, the legal context. Mollah and 
Uddin (2002:3) concur with this opinion when perceiving corruption as a complex 
process involving human behaviour and many other variables, some of which are 
difficult to recognise or measure.  
33 
 
Researchers have reached consensus that the degree of corruption is a function of 
multiple factors of a society (Hoon, 2003:1; Onyejekwe, 2004:6; Paul, 2000:14; 
Panday, 2005:4). The literature unanimously acknowledges that corruption is an 
ancient, wide and pervasive problem that continues to be a factor in everyday lives 
around the world in developed, developing and underdeveloped countries (Bardhan, 
1997:108; Sheifer & Vishny, 1993:1320; Paldam, 2002: 215).  
 
Corruption also has a long tradition as a field of academic inquiry (Rose-Ackerman, 
1997:51). Public administration, political science, sociology, criminal law and 
economics are among the disciplines that contribute to the knowledge of the subject 
(Jain, 2001:71). Certain fundamental aspects of the problem such as how corruption 
is generated or how it can be successfully fought are not fully understood and 
discrepancies remain (Clarke & Xu, 2004:2067). 
 
Research has mostly enhanced the knowledge about simple cause-effect 
relationships. However, researchers, governments and international institutions have 
realised that partial investigations do not provide a true comprehension of the 
phenomenon (Goudie & Stasavage, 1998:113) and a complete theoretical and 
empirical framework for corruption is still lacking (Ades & Di Tella, 1997:496). It has 
also been suggested that generously funded anti-corruption programmes have failed 
on a global scale precisely because partial analyses have encouraged a non-
integrated approach (Williams & Beare, 1999:115; Goudie & Stavage, 1998:113).  
 
According to Aidt (2003: 632) and Bac (1998:101), a number of researchers have 
reached a consensus that the non-existence of a complete and integrated 
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framework for corruption must be attributed to its extremely complex nature. 
Complexity has been advanced as an argument to explain the lack of a precise and 
comprehensive definition, which is far from being just a semantic issue since it 
determines what gets modelled and what is empirically tested (Aidt, 2003:633). 
Gaviria (2002:245) cites this intricate nature as resulting in differing performances 
among various countries in attempting to curb corruption.  
 
Although the complexity factor is often mentioned in the corruption literature, few 
studies analyse its nature in detail. Devising effective and practical anti-corruption 
initiatives is unlikely without understanding the complexity of corruption. This chapter 
aims at providing an exposé on the elements of this complexity.  
 
According to Doig and Riley (UNDP, 2006: Online), patterns of corruption vary from 
society to society and over time. To be able to understand the nature of corruption, 
perhaps the phenomenon itself needs to be defined and its extent, causes, forms 
and consequences need to be examined. Most observers note that corruption is a 
symptom of deeper problems of how a political leadership administers the key 
financial functions of a state (Heilbrunn, 2004: 5).  
 
In South Africa, legislation and agencies have been established for the purpose of 
combating corruption. However, corruption still seems to be concentrated among the 
wealthy individuals in our country. Acknowledging the necessity to understand the 
nature of corruption, Luo (2005: 122-124) summarises it as follows:  
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“Firstly, corruption is context-based. Depending on the individual, ideology, culture or 
other context, the term „corruption‟ can mean different things to different people. 
Secondly, corruption is norm-deviated. Although corrupt behaviour can arise in a 
number of different contexts, its essential aspect is an illegal or unauthorised 
transfer of money or an in-kind substitute. Thirdly, corruption is power-related. In 
order to be eligible as a corrupt transaction, a corruptor or bribee must necessarily 
be in a position of power, created either by market imperfections or an institutional 
position that grants him discretionary authority. Fourthly, corruption is virtually 
covert. Because of the nature of the operation, corruption is hidden in the 
underground informal arena. Fifthly, corruption is intentional. The motivation of 
personal gain conveys the very connotation of corruption. Sixthly, corruption is ex-
post opportunistic. Unlike normal transactions, corrupt practices are not codified in 
any explicit way, or written in any form of documentation. Lastly, corruption is 
perceptional. It relates to individual behaviour as perceived by the public as well as 
by political authorities”. 
 
Emphasising the importance of taking into consideration the impact that a changing 
political environment may have on corruption Luo (2002: 144) states that, politics do 
not only affect the understanding and explanation of corruption, but also produce 
and identify certain social behaviours as corrupt. According to Richter and Burke 
(2007:77), it is therefore necessary to examine not only corruption practices per se, 
but also the attitude and performance of the political system towards corruption. 
Richter and Burke (2007:77) also highlight aspects such as the exposure of 
corruption by the press, by the party in power and by different factions; and the 
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reaction of government to corruption, whether administratively or judicially, as 
detrimental to the fight against corruption.   
 
Although there may be a situation where certain behaviour is generally considered 
corrupt but no legal precedent has been established for it (in this case, the legalist 
definition lags behind the moralist definition), law-based norms are the most widely 
used (Luo, 2005: 122-124). This is because the legal definition of corruption is 
generally more operational, clear-cut, consistent and precise than the moral 
definition (Richter and Burke, 2007:77). Moreover, it usually does not take long for 
judiciary rules or institutional stipulations in a given political context to ―catch up‖ 
through the modification of the legal framework (Luo, 2005: 122).  
 
The person bribed must necessarily be acting as an agent for another individual or 
organisation, because the purpose of the bribe is to induce him or her to place his or 
her own interests ahead of the objectives of the organisation for which he or she 
works (Rose-Ackerman, 1975:157). In general, corruption leads the corruptor to 
secure private gains at significant public expense (Luo, 2005: 122-124). Although 
not all corruption is detrimental to social welfare, it violates legal codes or 
institutional rules stipulated in a given political context (Luo, 2002:115). Without this 
essence, corruption cannot be distinguished from gift-giving and interpersonal links 
(Luo, 2005: 122-124). 
 
Emphasising how corruption always depends on power; and how power does not 
necessarily emanate from the law, Richter and Burke (2007:77) state that people in 
public service gain power from the actual influence they exert on procedural costs 
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afforded by businesses. Richter and Burke (2007:77) add that nevertheless, 
bureaucratic corruption (involving governmental officials) constitutes the most 
corruptible and corrupted part in many societies. 
 
There are no formal written agreements signed when corruption happens.  Contact 
is made through oral communication so that it cannot be documented and used to 
prosecute a responsible entity (Richter and Burke, 2007:77). This is done so that 
those who are involved remain unidentified. Overall, corruption is an informal, veiled 
system transforming benefits derived from one‘s public roles and power to personal 
gain (Luo, 2002:115).  
 
Corruption fills the interstices of the formal system, causes its decomposition and 
provides new impetus for its re-composition (Luo, 2000: 199). Richter and Burke 
(2007:77) assert that Illegal misconduct may not necessarily be corruption if there is 
no personal gain. Echoing the above assertion, Luo (2005: 119) adds that: 
 
Addressing its sensitivity to the rationality underlying corruption enables 
differentiation of purposive dereliction of duty for personal gain from other careless 
mal-administrative behaviours. Parties in these practices are also not protected by 
any legal system. Corrupt transactions are, therefore, particularly endangered by ex-
post opportunism posed by the other party. Since corruption payments are a form of 
investment which have no value outside the transaction, the payer places him- or 
herself in the potential hold of the receiver, who can later demand additional 
payment or who may not (or insufficiently) perform the agreed service, without fears 
of countermeasures from the payer. As a result of this opportunism, ex-post 
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uncertainty associated with a corrupt transaction is formidable, especially for the 
bribing party.   
 
Since corruption is a perceptual term judged by others, the concept becomes 
dynamic, subject to change in social attitudes and political ideologies (Richter and 
Burke, 2007:77). As such, corruption can be further classified as ―white‖, ―black‖ or 
―grey‖ (Luo, 2000:196). Although according to Richter and Burke (2007:77) all these 
classifications violate legal codes or institutional rules, each of these has different 
moral implications. ―White‖ corruption (that is, some types of misconduct) can be 
tolerated by mass opinion; ―black‖ corruption is clearly condemned; and in between 
falls ―grey‖ corruption, which is often ambiguous (Luo, 2000:196). Accordingly, the 
legal definition of corruption remains important for ―black‖ and ―grey‖ corruption, but 
is not as important for ‗white‘ corruption (Richter and Burke, 2007:77). 
 
Under certain circumstances, the public may reasonably feel that an act legally 
defined as corruption is a necessary tool to survive (Luo, 2005:119). This explains in 
part why anti-corruption laws and rules in many transition economies have been 
changing so rapidly (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002:39). The nature of 
―perception‖ is even more prominent when one considers the dynamic nature of 
―norms‖, ―duties‖ and ―rules‖ (Luo, 2005:119). 
 
From the above, it is evident that corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon. This is 
possibly the reason why those who write about corruption first attempt to define it. 
Defining the concept is appropriate because it would not be easy to analyse, 
measure, assess or fight corruption without first determining its essential qualities.  
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Defining corruption provides a better understanding as to what is being assessed in 
terms of this research.  
 
2.2 CORRUPTION DEFINED  
 
Despite the assumption that most people know corruption when they see it, defining 
the concept does raise difficult theoretical and empirical questions (Johnston, 
1996:321). Authors have attempted to provide a definite, complete, analytic and 
formal description of corruption. However, these authors continue to disagree about 
the definition (Senturia, 1931: 448; Tanzi, 1998: 559). According to Jain (2001:71) 
and Klitgaard (1988:47), there has been consensus across disciplines that key 
features of corruption include the following:  
 
I. A discretional power over the allocation of resources;  
II. Higher rents associated with its misuse; and  
III. High probability of evading regulations/penalties associated with the 
wrongdoing. 
 
Agreeing on the involvement of the above-mentioned features has not made defining 
corruption any easier, as authors disagree on the meaning of the terms used. 
Authors confess that there are problems in the common use of those terms 
(Bardhan, 1997: 1320). Argandoña (2003:255) concludes that it is difficult to define 
corruption in terms that are clear and universally valid.  
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Certain authors define corruption as the abuse of entrusted authority for private gain 
which includes corruption in both the public and private sectors (USAID 
Anticorruption Strategy, 2005:16; Nye, 1967:27; Friedrich, 1966:70).  Such 
researchers provide a focused definition of corruption: ―the abuse of public office, 
powers, or resources for private gain‖ which is narrower and widely used.  This 
definition focuses on the activities of government officials and their interaction with 
the general public. According to Lanyi and Azfar (2005:5-6), this definition is also 
understood differently by the various scholars and practitioners in the field of 
governance: 
 
I. Abuse could be defined as including some or all of the following: a crime, an 
administrative violation, the infringement of a political standard, or an ethical 
lapse. 
II. Public power could be defined as the authority of any arm of the state, 
including executive bodies, the legislature, and the judiciary — and any agent 
of these branches. More expansively, one might include any organisation or 
activity that is funded or supervised by the state (for example, a public 
foundation or a bank), or perhaps any structure in which decision-making 
power over policies and resources is exercised by some representative, 
delegate, or fiduciary (for example, a corporation or labour union).   
III. Lastly, private gain simply refers to personal, kin, partisan, or other narrow 
interests that benefit the individual instead of the relevant public (or that 
benefit at the public‘s expense) (Lanyi & Azfar, 2005:5-6). 
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Rose-Ackerman (1978:216) and Klitgaard (1988:53) focus on the interactions among 
the parties involved, that is, an individual who is in charge of carrying out a public 
function, an individual who actually performs the operation of the agency, and a 
private individual with whom the agent interacts.  
 
Mollah and Uddin (2002:3) regard corruption not as a single, separate, independent 
entity which can be isolated and destroyed, but as a complex set of processes that 
involve human behaviour and many other variables, many of which are difficult to 
recognise and measure. Corruption is a social, legal, economic and political concept 
enmeshed in ambiguity and consequently it encourages controversy (Khan, 2004:3; 
Mollah & Uddin, 2002:3).  
 
The ambiguity and controversy might result from the fact that a number of competing 
approaches to understanding corruption are available. According to Khan (2004:2), 
authors place approaches to corruption into five groups, namely public-interest-
centred, market-centred, public-office-centred, public-opinion-centred and legalistic. 
 
Proponents of the public-interest-centred approach believe that corruption is in some 
way injurious to or destructive of public interest (Rogow & Laswell, 1970:54). Market-
centred enthusiasts suggest that norms governing public office have shifted from a 
mandatory pricing model to a free-market model, thereby considerably changing the 
nature of corruption (Tilman, 1970:62-64). Public-office-centred protagonists stress 
that misuse by incumbents of public office for private gain is corruption (Theobald, 
1990:2).  
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The public-opinion-centred authors emphasise the perspectives of public opinion 
about the conduct of politicians, government and probity of public servants (Leys, 
1970: 31-37). The legalistic approach suggests that corruption be viewed in terms of 
legal criteria in view of the problems inherent in determining rules and norms which 
govern public interest, behaviour and authority (Scott, 1972:5).  
 
The above-mentioned approaches have concentrated on the nature of corruption. 
However, they do not provide a clear meaning of corruption to any satisfaction. 
According to Khan (2004:3), there are four divergent views on the definition of 
corruption. The definitions contain moralists, functionalists, social censurists and 
social constructionist realists (Khan, 2004:3).  
 
The moralists view corruption as an immoral and unethical phenomenon that 
contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society, causing loss of 
respect for and confidence in duly constituted authority (Gould, 1991:468). One of 
the well-known proponents of this view, Nye (1979:419), portrays corruption as a 
behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status 
gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. 
 
However, defining corruption in this manner might result in a number of limitations. It 
individualises a societal phenomenon and attempts to dichotomise as to what is 
good and what is bad. In the process, societal contexts are ignored and the gap 
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between formal norms and the underlying practice-girded norms are not analysed 
(Caiden &  Caiden, 1977:301).  
 
The functionalists view corruption in terms of the actual function that it has (or 
performs) in socio-economic development. Claims are made by functionalists that 
corruption flourishes as a substitute for the market system, offers an acceptable 
alternative to violence and increases public participation in public policy (Leff, 
1979:25; Gould, 1980:49).  
 
Certain functionalists believe that political bureaucratic leaders may see a national 
interest in actively pursuing or tolerating a degree of administrative corruption 
(Klitgaard, 1988:53). The major criticisms against functionalists are that they ignore 
the political significance of deviance and lack any consideration of power, interest 
and social structure in their analyses.  At the same time the whole question of the 
origins of corruption is not considered (Lo, 1993:3).The social censure and social 
construction reality sees corruption in a different light as they view it from a broad 
societal perspective.  
 
The proponents of social censure believe that in understanding corruption one 
should take into consideration the capacity of the state to produce a particular form 
of social relations and shift the theoretical emphasis to the interplay of law, 
ideologies and political economy (Lo, 1993:5). On the other hand, social construction 
reality views corruption as problematic and the other actors involved can be studied 
by relating them to contextual information on their social positions, interests and 
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stakes in the system as well as on the political, economic and social conditions 
within which they function (Pavarala, 1996:25).  
 
The African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) Report 
(1991:2) provides a broader definition of corruption, referring to it as the use of one‘s 
official position for personal and group gain and that includes unethical actions like 
bribery, nepotism, patronage, conflict of interest, divided loyalty, influence peddling, 
moonlighting, misuse or stealing of government property, selling of favours, 
receiving kickbacks, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, under- or 
over-invoicing, court tempering, phoney travel and administrative documents and 
use of regulation as bureaucratic capital (AAPAM Report, 1991:2). The following 
definitions of political corruption and administrative corruption are adopted here as 
they conform to the above definitions of corruption: 
 
I. Political corruption is ―the behaviour of (elected) public officials which 
diverges from the formal components – the duties and powers, rights and 
obligations – of a public role to seek private gain‖.  
II. Administrative corruption is defined as ―the institutionalised personal abuse of 
public resources by civil servants‖ (Gould, 1991:468).  
 
Sheepchaiisara (1999:2) identifies two separate categories of administrative 
corruption: the first occurs where, for example, services or contracts are provided 
―according-to-rule‖ and the second, where transactions are ―against-the-rule.‖ In the 
first situation, an official receives private gain illegally for doing something which he 
or she is ordinarily required to do by law (Anti-corruption Gateway for Europe and 
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Eurasia, 2006: Online). In the second situation, the bribe is paid to obtain services 
which the official is prohibited from providing (Anti-corruption Gateway for Europe 
and Eurasia, 2006: Online).  
 
―According-to-rule‖ and ―against-the-rule‖ corruption can occur at all levels of the 
government hierarchy and range in scale and impact from ―grand corruption‖ to more 
ordinary, small scale varieties (Sheepchaiisara, 1999:2). Corruption involves 
behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil 
servants, by means of which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or 
those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them (Huberts, 
2001: 3). 
 
Corruption needs to be defined to enable one to expose complexities that are 
associated with the concept of corruption and the limitations of any singular 
definition. The above analysis has shown that a level of aptitude is required in how 
corruption is viewed. Taking these into account allows the realisation of what to 
focus on and needs to take into consideration not only conceptual difficulties, but 
also social and political processes which interpret and shape perceptions of 
corruption.  
 
The diagnosis of how widespread this behaviour is also needs to be done. The 
Handbook for Fighting Corruption (1999:15) states that it is advisable to examine the 
extent of corruption as it provides the first analytical cut of the assessment.  
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2.3 EXTENT OF CORRUPTION 
 
According to the Handbook for Fighting Corruption (1999:15), an evaluation of the 
extent to which corruption occurs provides the first analytical cut of the assessment. 
According to Lanyi and Azfar (2005:2), examining the extent of corruption is about 
determining to what extent corruption, if it exists, arises solely from incentives for 
individual government officials and private sector players; alternatively, to what 
extent corruption appears to be systemic.  
 
The Handbook for Fighting Corruption (1999:15) suggests that the extent of 
corruption can be sporadic or pervasive. Sporadic corruption occurs in isolated 
intervals with no apparent order, while pervasive corruption permeates most 
government institutions in a country, affecting activities within a specific institution 
(The Handbook for Fighting Corruption, 1999:15).  
  
The U4 Anti-Corruption Conceptual Glossary (2006: Online) refers to pervasive 
corruption as endemic or systemic. As opposed to exploiting occasional 
opportunities, endemic or systemic corruption occurs when corruption is an 
integrated and essential aspect of the economic, social and political system (U4 
Anti-Corruption Corruption Conceptual Glossary, 2006: Online).  
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Systemic corruption is not a special category of corrupt practice, but rather a 
situation in which the major institutions and processes of the state are routinely 
dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, and in which most people 
have no alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials (Johnston, 1997: 9). 
 
The Anti-Corruption Conceptual Glossary (2006: Online) states that sporadic 
corruption occurs irregularly and therefore does not threaten the mechanisms of 
control nor the economy as such. It is not crippling, but it can seriously undermine 
morale and sap the economy of resources (Anti-Corruption Conceptual Glossary, 
2006: Online). However, sporadic corruption can pose problems for development, 
although it does not have the same corrosive effect on political and economic 
systems as pervasive corruption (Handbook on Fighting Corruption, 1999: 23).  
 
While the harm caused by pervasive corruption makes it a key development issue, 
the comparatively lesser damage caused by sporadic corruption may not merit 
spending resources that could be invested in other development objectives 
(Handbook on Fighting Corruption, 1999: 23). Johnston (1997: 8) explains that in 
cases of systemic corruption, however, a lasting and pervasive pattern of abuses 
that few would hesitate to call corrupt is encountered.  
 
Systemic corruption within the public sector can be defined as the systematic use of 
public office for private benefit that results in a reduction in the quality or availability 
of public goods and services (Buscaglia, 1997:273). According to Meagher (2005:8), 
where systemic corruption is prevalent, networks and alliances exist that rely on 
exchanges to meet their objectives. Meagher (2005:8) further explains that these 
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networks use elements of the state and the political system to mediate their corrupt 
exchanges.  
  
Systemic corruption deals with the use of public office for private benefit that is 
entrenched in such a way that, without it, an organisation or institution cannot 
function as a supplier of goods or services (Buscaglia, 1999:8). The probability of 
detecting corruption decreases as corruption becomes more systemic (Hosen, 
2004:2). Therefore, as corruption becomes more systemic, enforcement measures 
of the traditional kind affecting the expected punishment of committing illicit acts 
become less effective and other preventive measures, such as organisational 
changes (for example, reducing procedural complexities in the provision of public 
services), salary increases, and other measures, become much more effective 
(Buscaglia, 2001: 6).  
 
Caiden (2003:6) regards the following as characteristics of systemic corruption:  
 
1. The organisation parades for external consumption a code of ethics that is 
contradicted by internal practices.   
2. Internal pressures, mostly informal so that there is no written record, 
encourage, abet and hide violations of the external code.  
3. Non-violators are excluded from the inner circle and any benefits 
emanating out of violations.   
4. Violators are protected and, when discovered, treated leniently whereas 
their accusers are victimised for revealing hypocrisy.   
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5.  Non-violators suffocate in the venal atmosphere and their conscience 
troubles them thereafter.  
6. Prospective whistle-blowers are terrorised and forever discredited; they 
need to be permanently protected from retaliation.  
7. Violators become so accustomed to their wrongdoing that they come to 
think themselves invincible; they feel when they have been exposed that 
they have been unfairly picked out.  
8. Collective guilt finds expression in rationalisations of the internal violations 
which no one intends to discontinue without strong external pressure.  
9. Internal investigators rarely act and find ready excuses to discontinue 
investigation.  
10.  Internal authorities maintain that any incidents are isolated, rare 
occurrences (Caiden, 2003:6).  
 
Certain authors further categorise varieties of corruption in terms of their nature and 
the manner in which these varieties happen. Corruption can be foreign-sponsored, 
institutionalised, and the outcome of political scandal and administrative 
malfeasance (Caiden, 1988:23). In foreign-sponsored corruption the main actors are 
public officials, politicians, and representatives of donor and recipient countries.    
 
Bureaucratic elites, politicians, businessmen and middlemen are responsible for 
political scandal (Kpundeh, 2006:7). Many observers see the supply side of 
corruption by international business in the form of foreign-sponsored bribery as the 
most significant contributing factor to corruption (Camerer, 2006: Online). In 
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administrative malfeasance petty officials and interested individuals play major roles 
(Khan, 2004:5). 
 
Corruption primarily takes place in three different ways: collusive, coercive and non-
conjunctive (Arora, 1993:1-19). In collusive corruption the corruptees themselves are 
willing and active participants in the process and use of corruption as an instrument 
for inducing wrong action or inaction on the part of authorities, deriving benefit 
greater than the costs of corruption on their part (Khan, 2004:5). Khan (2004:5) 
further explains that corruption is forced upon the corruptee by those in the position 
of power and authority in coercive corruption.  In non-conjunctive corruption benefits 
are obtained at someone else‘s cost and victims are unaware of their victimisation 
(Arora, 1993:1-19). 
 
Certain authors further identify strategies through which corruption is perpetrated. 
According to Arora (1993:1-19), major strategies such as mystification, distancing, 
folklore, colonisation and pacification have been used by beneficiaries to protect, 
promote and sustain corruption in diverse contexts. 
 
Summarising the findings on the effects of corruption, Elliott offers the following 
explanation:  
 
“When it is pervasive and uncontrolled, corruption thwarts economic development 
and undermines political legitimacy. Less pervasive variants result in wasted 
resources, increased inequity in resource distribution, less political competition and 
greater distrust of government. Creating and exploiting opportunities for bribery at 
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high levels of government also increases the cost of government, distorts the 
allocation of government spending, and may dangerously lower the quality of 
infrastructure. Even relative petty or routine corruption can rob government of 
revenues, distort economic decision making, and impose negative externalities on 
society, such as dirtier air and water or unsafe buildings” (Elliott, 1997:175-176). 
 
It is apparent that a simple perception of the level of corruption is, insufficient. A 
meaningful distinction as to how pervasive or sporadic corruption is will be provided. 
Sporadic corruption arises solely from incentives for individual government officials 
and private sector players when pervasive corruption is systematic. However, 
corruption is deadly, whether sporadic or pervasive. It is also clear that there are 
motivations that make people engage in corruption, hence an overview of the 
underlying causes of corruption will be provided below.     
 
2.4 CAUSES OF CORRUPTION 
 
A number of authors believe that the root causes of corruption are greed and 
dishonesty. Dishonesty breeds corruption (Farha, 2006:1). Greed and the desire to 
enjoy lifestyles beyond their reach make many government officials resort to bribes 
(Gururaj, 2006:2).  
 
Another factor that encourages corruption is the fact that corrupt officials go 
unpunished (Zuhua, 2006: Online). Apart from greed and dishonesty, additional 
causes of corruption are social, organisational and institutional (Stork, Hasheela & 
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Morrison, 2004:11). In the Report of the Nepru National Integrity Survey conducted 
in 2003, Stork, Hasheela and Morrison (2004:11- 13) tabulate these as follows:  
 
Corruption due to social causes will thrive where:  
 
I. Leaders in key positions are not capable of inspiring and influencing conduct 
of the highest moral standards;  
II. Religious and ethical teaching is weak;  
III. Punishment for offenders is lenient;  
IV. Large numbers of people have to compete for insufficient services such as 
schools or medical supplies in hospitals; and 
V. There is great inequality in the distribution of wealth and income.  
 
Additional organisational features may create an environment conducive to the 
following corrupt practices: 
  
I. Policies and procedures. Outdated and inadequate policies and procedures;  
II. Excessive discretion. Discretion is an important lubricant of productive 
management but too much of it can facilitate corruption;  
III. Insufficient supervision. If supervision is too inadequate to ensure that policies 
and procedures are being followed, even the best policies can be easily 
frustrated; 
IV. Insufficient publicity. Ignorance is a fertile ground for corruption and 
insufficient publicity of an institution‘s aims and procedures is a major cause 
of corruption; and  
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V. Insufficient deterrents (Stork, Hasheela & Morrison, 2004:11- 13).  
 
Institutional causes are at a national level, which are linked to governmental policies 
and procedures. These can be outlined as follows:  
 
I. Lack of government transparency and accountability. This allows for 
mismanagement and misuse of public funds where there are insufficient 
checks and balances in place to ensure accountability in the management of 
public funds; 
II. Lack of political will. Government in certain cases lacks the political will to 
deal firmly with the problem of corruption. Leaders engage in corruption as a 
means of sustaining themselves or protecting themselves as they may be 
engaged in corruption;  
III. Abuse of power. Excessive power vested in the executive wing of government 
is likely to be abused and will even hinder the effort of the government 
institutions established to fight corruption; 
IV. Inadequate legal and institutional framework. When the existing legal and 
institutional frameworks are faced with a number of inadequacies, such as 
insufficient power to enforce the laws, insufficient funding, insufficient 
manpower or a lack of autonomy, for example, they are not able to function 
effectively; 
V. Public reaction. This is a vital factor in the fight against corruption. The public 
perception of corruption plays a pivotal role in fighting corruption. When 
corruption becomes a means for survival owing to prevailing circumstances or 
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any other reason, it becomes an acceptable norm and the political will to fight 
or oppose corruption is absent. It becomes normal and a way of life; and 
VI. Lack of press freedom. When existing laws hamper or limit access to 
information, the fight against corruption is affected because information plays 
a vital role. As they play an important role in exposing cases of corruption, the 
media are especially affected in that they will not have the autonomy to 
function independently and will face restrictions in their reporting. Those in 
authority are also likely to use these laws to victimise the media (Stork, 
Hasheela & Morrision, 2004:11-13). 
 
In explaining causes of corruption, researchers further provide a list of potential 
causes, including the wealth of a country (Mauro, 1995:681), democracy (Sung, 
2004: 179), political institutions  (Gerring  & Thacker, 2004:295), ethno-linguistic 
diversity and political stability (Treisman, 2000: 399), trade openness (Wei, 2000), 
public sector recruitment and wages (Tanzi, 1998:559), and voting turnout (Adsera, 
Boix & Payne, 2003:445).  
 
The list does not end there. Certain authors mention factors such as population 
density, geography, mineral wealth, state formations, colonial legacies, social 
heterogeneity, clientelism and inequality, religion, media and political culture as 
additional causes of corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2004:295).  
  
Klitgaard (1988:75) identifies the political and bureaucratic monopolies and 
discretion, and the weak mechanisms of accountability as basic causes of 
corruption. Widespread corruption is an indication that the state is functioning poorly 
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(Rose-Ackerman, 1997:5). In fact, the entrenched characteristic of official corrupt 
practices is rooted in the abuse of market or organisational power by public sector 
officials (Buscaglia, 1997:277).  
 
Buscaglia (1997:277), further states that low compensation and weak monitoring 
systems are traditionally considered to be the main causes of corruption. Huntington 
(1968:15) argues that where economic opportunities are relatively plentiful and 
political opportunities scarce, people may try to buy their way into political power; 
and where political opportunities are plentiful and economic advantage more difficult, 
people are more likely to use political power to enrich themselves.  
 
Where civil society is weak, citizens and private interests are vulnerable to 
exploitation by political and/or bureaucratic monopolies and, because they lack the 
political means and organisational strength to insist on their formal rights, often 
respond to corruption in evasive or illicit ways (Alam, 1995:419), minimising its costs 
or fighting it with more corruption. Government salaries remain grossly insufficient, 
and, therefore officials devote much of their energy to finding illicit incomes rather 
than carrying out their nominal duties (Theobald, 1990:22-24).      
 
When diagnosing causes of corruption, Lanyi and Azfar (2005:12) differentiate 
between the causes of individualistic corruption and systematic corruption as 
follows: 
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Table 2.1: Diagnosis of Causes 
Location & Type of 
Corruption 
Individualist Systemic 
Diversion of state  
revenues to personal 
and campaign accounts 
 
 
Weak accounting and auditing 
systems; 
No controls on campaign 
finance or money laundering; 
Lack of transparency and 
criminal enforcement 
 
 
Network control of state, 
parties, and 
firms translate into state 
fiscal autonomy 
from political processes 
and the ability 
to self-enrich and 
perpetuate control 
 
Customs — Bribery, 
fraud, and collusion in 
customs administration 
 
 
Lack of transparency, 
monitoring, and 
audit control (for example, via 
computers) of 
valuations and levies; 
Low official pay and 
professionalism; 
Incentive effects of high duties 
 
Patronage system requires 
bureaucrats 
to buy positions and pass 
bribe shares upwards; 
 
Imbalances mean 
government is the main 
employer and can impose 
will on traders; 
 
Trade reform would 
threaten status quo 
sustained by elite 
collusion, lack of political 
competition, and reliance 
of campaign funds on 
corruption 
Procurement & 
Infrastructure — Bid-
rigging, kickbacks, over-
invoicing 
 
 
Vague design parameters and 
bid procedures; 
Weak inspection and audit; 
No competition; 
No established bid protest 
procedures 
 
Elite and mafia networks 
embedded in state and 
private sector 
institutions engage in 
collusion and self-
enrichment; 
Weak corporate 
governance and absent or 
inadequate official asset 
declarations; 
Campaign finance 
dependent on bribery 
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Judiciary & prosecutors  
 
Bribery, favouritism 
Low judicial status and pay; 
 
No checks and balances in 
appointments and tenure; 
Vague laws and procedures; 
 
 
Ineffective appeal system, 
oversight, and sanctions 
Lack of real political 
challenge and 
competition; 
 
Weak norms of legality and 
accountability; 
Carryover of ‗telephone 
justice‘ from 
Soviet era; 
 
Social imbalance and lack 
of economic 
restructuring mean no 
effective constituency 
for enforcement of 
contracts, 
property rights, and civil 
liberties 
 
Adapted from Lanyi and Azfar (2005:12) 
 
Bannon (1999:4) sees the causes of corruption as always contextual, rooted in a 
country‘s policies, bureaucratic traditions, political development, and social history. 
Still, corruption tends to flourish when standards are lax or poorly defined, regulatory 
institutions and enforcement practices weak, and government policies generate 
economic rents (Bottelier, 1998:4). Bottelier (1998:4) further explains that the 
opportunity for corruption is a function of the size of the rents under the control of a 
public official, the discretion that the official has in allocating those rents and the 
accountability that the official faces for his or her decisions.  
 
Klitgaard (1998:3-6) suggests that the dynamics of corruption in the public sector 
can be depicted in a simple model depicted below:  
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C = M + D –A 
Where: 
C (corruption) = M (monopoly) + D (discretion) – A (accountability) 
 
Interpreting this depiction, Bannon (1999:4) states that corruption will tend to emerge 
when an organisation or person has monopoly power over a good or service which 
generates rent, has the discretion to decide who will receive it (thus on how rents will 
be allocated), and is not accountable.  
 
Expatiating on the depiction, the World Bank (1999:4) provides the following 
explanation: 
 
“Monopoly rents can be large in highly regulated economies, and corruption itself 
often breeds demand for more regulation. The discretion of public officials may be 
large, exacerbated by badly defined, ever-changing and poorly disseminated rules 
and regulations. Accountability may be weak. The ethical values of a well-functioning 
bureaucracy may have eroded or never existed. Rules on conduct and conflicts of 
interest may be unenforced, financial management systems may have broken down, 
and there may be no mechanisms to hold public officials accountable. Watchdog 
institutions such as the ombudsperson, comptrollers, the media and special 
anticorruption bodies may be ineffectual or politicised. Combating corruption begins 
by designing better systems. Monopolies must be dismantled or carefully regulated. 
Official discretion must be clarified and circumscribed. Transparency must be 
enhanced. The probability of being caught as well as the penalties for corruption (for 
both givers and takers), must be increased and enforced” (World Bank, 1999:4).    
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According to Heymans and Lipietz (1999:9), the following conditions may influence 
the extent to which the execution of such discretion becomes vulnerable to corrupt 
practice:  
 
I. In the absence of clear rules and codes of ethics, discretionary power easily 
becomes abused.   
II. Low civil service salaries and poor working conditions, with few incentives 
and rewards for efficient and effective performance, are strong incentives for 
corruption.  
III. The less effective the government works in general, with slow budget 
procedures, lack of transparency, inadequate strategic vision and weak 
monitoring mechanisms, the more fertile the environment for corrupt practice.  
IV. The overall culture of governance also plays an important role. If political 
leaders and top bureaucrats set an example of self-enrichment or ambiguity 
over public ethics, lower level officials and members of the public might 
follow suit. If informal rules come to supercede formal ones, even the most 
stringent legal principles and procedures lose their authority. Hence, bribery 
and corruption may become the norm, even in the face of formal rules 
intended to support clean governance. Because of government‘s major role 
in most developing economies, opportunities for corruption are often more 
numerous. Furthermore, these countries have often inherited large colonial 
bureaucracies, where the new leadership has not had much opportunity to 
indigenise the machinery of government. The moral epicentre that may 
make for good governance has often been absent as a result. In such 
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environments, corruption has had fertile ground to take root (Heymans & 
Lipietz, 1999: 9).  
  
It can, therefore, be deduced that corruption occurs as a result of an incompetent 
manner in which the country is being governed. Corruption can also be associated 
with historical and cultural traditions, levels of economic development, political 
environment, and government policies. To be able to successfully conduct the 
assessment of anti-corruption strategies it might be important to be aware of 
possible forms of corruption that could occur. 
  
2.5 FORMS OF CORRUPTION    
 
Corruption is a broad concept that covers a wide range of practices and 
transactions. Jayawickrama (1998:2) and the UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (2004:10) 
place acts involving corruption into two broad categories, namely conventional 
bribery, or ‗petty corruption‘ and grand corruption. Petty corruption occurs when a 
public official demands, or expects, ‗speed money‘ or ‗grease payments‘ for doing an 
act which he or she is ordinarily required by law to do, or when a bribe is paid to 
obtain services which the official is prohibited from providing (Jayawickrama, 1998: 
2). Kovács  and  Tisné (2004:49) define petty corruption as the everyday corruption 
that takes place at the implementation end of politics, where the public officials meet 
the public. Petty corruption is bribery in connection with the implementation of 
existing laws, rules and regulations (U4 Anti-Corruption Glossary, 2006: Online).  
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Petty corruption refers to the modest sums of money usually involved, and has also 
been called ‗low‘ and ‗street‘ level to indicate the kind of corruption that people can 
experience in their frequent encounters with public administration and services like 
hospitals, schools, local licensing authorities, police, taxing authorities and so on 
(Amundsen, Sissener & Søreide,  2000:18). Petty corruption can involve the 
exchange of very small amounts of money, the granting of minor favours by those 
seeking preferential treatment or the employment of friends and relatives in minor 
positions (UN, 2004:10). Therefore, petty corruption is different from grand 
corruption which is sometimes referred to as political corruption (U4 Anti-Corruption 
Corruption Glossary, 2006: Online).  
 
Grand corruption means that important decisions are taken by high ranking officials 
responsible for public funds for personal motives, disregarding the consequences to 
the wider community (Wescott, 1997:3). According to Moody-Stuart (1997:42), grand 
corruption occurs when a person in a high position who formulates government 
policy or is able to influence government decision-making seeks, as a quid pro quo, 
payment, usually off-shore and in foreign currency, for exercising the extensive 
arbitrary powers vested in him or her. High level or ‗grand‘ corruption takes place at 
the policy formulation end of politics (U4 Anti-Corruption Corruption Glossary, 2006: 
Online).   
 
Grand corruption usually involves the giving of a benefit to a political leader or senior 
public official by a businessman in return for a decision in his favour (Wescott, 
1997:3). Grand corruption is corruption that pervades the highest levels of 
government (UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 2004:10). It refers not so much to the 
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amount of money involved as to the level in which it takes place; grand corruption is 
at the top levels of the public sphere, where policies and rules are formulated in the 
first place (U4 Anti-Corruption Corruption Glossary, 2006: Online). 
 
Petty corruption is, however, often overlooked as an area of concern in the public 
debate (Van Vuuren, 2004:11). In certain cases the term ‗petty corruption‘ is used in 
the context of relatively small bribes. However, even in this usage it has been rightly 
noted that pettiness of corruption refers only to the size of each transaction and not 
to its total impact on government income or policy (Scott, 1972:66).  
 
According to Wescott (1997:3), development programmes such as the UNDP do not 
condone petty corruption but they recognise that grand corruption is where the 
greatest damage is done. The most critical difference between grand corruption and 
petty corruption is that the former involves corruption of the central functions of 
government, while the latter develops and exists within the context of established 
governance and social frameworks (UN, 2004:10). 
 
Transactions that are considered corrupt in certain societies may be considered 
normal in others, depending on local traditions and values (Scott 1972:8). However, 
sources such as Lanyi and Azfar (2004:12), the UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (2005:6), 
Sajo (2002:1), Hoffmann (2001: 6) and Zeller (2006:12) agree that forms of 
corruption are bribery, extortion, misappropriation, self-dealing, and patronage. 
 
According to the UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (2004:12) and Lanyi and  Azfar (2005:6), 
there is another form of corruption called political corruption and campaign finance 
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improprieties. Lanyi  and  Azfar (2005:6) add an additional type, shirking as another 
form of corruption. However, bribery is the most naked form of abuse of office 
because economies where it occurs are at a rudimentary level (Zeller, 2006:12). 
 
2.5.1 Bribery  
 
Hoffmann (2001:6) states that bribery constitutes a form of corruption and can be 
executed towards public officers or decision-makers in the private sector. Lanyi  and  
Azfar (2005:14) define bribery as informal payments or gifts demanded by, or offered 
to, public officials. Lanyi  and  Azfar (2005:14) further explain that these payments 
could be demanded for services that public officials are expected to provide for 
licenses, or in exchange for choosing a contractor or arranging favourable 
privatisation deals.  
 
According to Thobabeen (1991:62), buying contracts can also be called kickbacks 
when government officials may use their bargaining power with contractors and their 
discretion in awarding contracts to obtain a fee. A percentage, usually 5 per cent, of 
the contracts is returned or kicked back to the public officials by the contractor 
(World Bank, 1997:20). 
 
Bribery is a crime implying a sum or gift given that alters the behaviour of the person 
in a manner not consistent with the duties of that person (Sall, 2006:2). It is the 
offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions as 
an official or other person in the discharge of a public or legal duty (Answers.com, 
2006: Online). It may be any money, goods, right in action, property, preferment, 
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privilege, emolument, object of value, advantage, or promise or undertaking to 
induce or influence the action, vote, or influence of a person in an official or public 
capacity (Alserhan, 2011:21). Hence, Voskanyan (2000:13) regards bribes as one of 
the main tools of corruption.  
 
Examples of permitted grease payments include discreet payments to obtain a 
business license in a foreign country, to secure a required visa, to receive police 
protection or to obtain a telephone service (McPhillips, 2006: Online). Nevertheless, 
most economists regard bribery as negative because it encourages rent-seeking 
behaviour; hence a state where bribery has become a way of life is a kleptocracy. 
Kleptocracy involves the systematic theft of public funds and property by public 
officials (Wedeman, 1997:459). 
 
The UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (2004:11) divides bribery into two categories, namely 
active and passive bribery. In criminal law terminology, the terms may be used to 
distinguish between a particular corrupt action and an attempted or incomplete 
offence (Saidi, 2004:8). Active bribery would include all cases where payment and/or 
acceptance of a bribe has taken place (UN, 2004:11). It would not include cases 
where a bribe was offered but not accepted, or solicited but not paid (Anti-Corruption 
Internet Database, 2006: Online).  
 
According to Stevens (2006: Online), active bribery, as termed in international 
treaties like the OECD Convention, occurs when a firm tries to bribe a public official 
to obtain a trading advantage. Active bribery occurs on the supply side as it is an 
offence committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe (U4 Anti-
65 
 
Corruption Corruption Glossary, 2006: Online). Active bribery is understood as the 
promise to give, or the giving of, any payment or any other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to someone holding a public office (public bribery) 
or to someone in business (private bribery) with the intention and expectation  of 
obtaining an unlawful benefit in return for the bribe (Hoffmann, 2001:6). 
 
Passive bribery refers to the receiving of the bribe (UN, 2004: 11). Passive bribery, 
which is the offence committed by an official who receives the bribe occurs on the 
demand side (U4 Anti-Corruption Corruption Glossary, 2006: Online). Passive 
bribery is understood as acceptance of a payment or any other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, from someone in return for which the person who 
has accepted the bribe favours the giver in an unlawful way (Hoffmann, 2001:6). 
 
In this sense, therefore, offering a bribe is called active bribery; receiving or 
accepting it is called passive bribery. However, certain authors view this distinction 
as insufficient.  In a number of situations the recipient could have induced or 
pressured the briber and would have been, in that sense, the more active (US 
Working Group on Bribery, 2004:56). Stevens (2006: Online) supports this view by 
stating that it is passive bribery when a firm complies with a demand for a bribe.  
 
The UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (2004:12) identifies specific types of bribery which 
include the following:  
 
I. Influence-peddling in which public officials or political or government insiders 
peddle privileges acquired exclusively through their public status that are 
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usually unavailable to outsiders; for example access to or influence on 
government decision-making. Influence-peddling is distinct from legitimate 
political advocacy or lobbying. 
II. Offering or receiving improper gifts, gratuities, favours or commissions. In 
certain countries, public officials commonly accept tips or gratuities in 
exchange for their services. As links always develop between payments and 
results, such payments become difficult to distinguish from bribery or 
extortion. 
III. Bribery to avoid liability for taxes or other costs. Officials of revenue collecting 
agencies, such as tax authorities or customs, are susceptible to bribery. 
IV. Bribery in support of fraud. For example, payroll officials may be bribed to 
participate in abuses such as listing and paying non-existent employees 
(―ghost workers‖). 
V. Bribery to avoid criminal liability. Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, 
judges or other officials may be bribed to ensure that criminal activities are 
not investigated or prosecuted or, if they are prosecuted, to ensure a 
favourable outcome.  
VI. Bribery in support of unfair competition for benefits or resources. Officials 
responsible for making contracts for goods or services may be bribed to 
ensure that contracts are made with the party that is paying the bribe and on 
favourable terms. In certain cases where the bribe is paid out of the contract 
proceeds themselves, this may also be described as a ―kickback‖ or secret 
commission. 
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VII. Bribery to obtain confidential or ―inside‖ information. Employees are often 
bribed to disclose valuable confidential information, undermining national 
security and disclosing industrial secrets.  
 
Subramuniyaswami (2006:381) identifies three kinds of bribery, as listed below:  
 
I. The first is the most common - withholding services one has been paid to 
perform until that additional, secret compensation is paid. 
II. The second kind is a little more subtle. It involves favours-contracts, 
concessions and legal immunity which are given to those who pay a bribe in 
cash or kind. The briber offers money to purchase a secret, unauthorised use 
of influence, position or authority.  
III. The third form of bribery which is even more subtle is to provide a service and 
then extract a reward. This is, however, the most easily detected of all, 
because when asked for another service, it is denied, that is if the gift, after 
the first service was performed, was not given or was not large enough. 
 
It is, therefore, evident that a bribe is the gift bestowed to influence the receiver‘s 
conduct. Because threats can be implicit, the distinction between extortion and 
bribes is not always clear (Lanyi & Azfar, 2005:14). However, according to 
Voskanyan (2000:14), the converse of bribery is extortion - the abuse of power in 
such a way to secure a response in payment of money or other valuables. 
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2.5.2 Extortion 
 
Voskanyan (2000:14) describes extortion as either wresting or wringing from a 
person, extracting by torture or obtaining from a reluctant person by violence, 
torture, intimidation, or abuse of legal or official authority, or in a weaker sense by 
importing, overwhelming arguments or any powerful influence, money from a person 
by force or by undue exercise of authority or power. Whereas bribery involves the 
use of payments or other positive incentives, extortion relies on coercion, such as 
the use or threat of violence or the exposure of damaging information, to induce 
cooperation (UN, 2004:15).  
 
Lanyi and Azfar (2005:14) describe extortion as the threat of the use of force or 
other forms of intimidation to extract payments, for example, a regulator who 
threatens to shut a factory down based on the violation of some standard if a 
payment is not made. In certain cases, extortion may differ from bribery only in the 
degree of coercion involved (UN, 2004:15).  
 
Extortion is also often used loosely to refer to everyday situations where one person 
feels indebted against their will to another in order to receive an essential service or 
avoid legal consequences (Goel, 2009:47). According to the UN Anti-Corruption 
Toolkit (2004:15), with other forms of corruption, the ―victim‖ can be the public 
interest or individuals adversely affected by a corrupt act or decision, whereas in 
extortion cases a further ―victim" is created, namely the person who is coerced into 
cooperation. Extortion is a criminal offence whereby an individual obtains money, 
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goods and services or desired behaviour from another by wrongfully threatening or 
inflicting harm to his or her person (Criminal Law lawyer Source, 2006: Online). 
 
While extortion can be committed by government officials, such officials can also be 
victims of it (UN, 2004:15). For instance, according to the World Book (1985:355), 
extortion originally meant the crime of obtaining payment by threatening to disclose 
misuse of official power by government officials.  An official can extort corrupt 
payments in exchange for a favour or a person seeking a favour can extort it from 
the official by making threats (UN, 2004:15). 
 
Goel (2009:46) writes that extortion is commonly practised by organised crime 
groups. Extortion can be an asset in a clientelistic system for patrons who can 
distribute opportunities to extort (Sajo, 2002:1). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:15) 
support this statement by adding that clientelism is associated with corruption.  
 
2.5.3. Misappropriation 
 
Misappropriation is the intentional, illegal use of the property or funds of another 
person for one‘s own use or other unauthorised purpose, particularly by a public 
official, a trustee of a trust, an executor or administrator of a dead person‘s estate or 
by any person with a responsibility to care for and protect another‘s assets (Clarke, 
Xu &  Xijun, 2010:6). Lanyi  and  Azfar (2005:14) shorten this statement as the theft 
or private use of public funds or equipment which can vary from relatively innocuous 
practices like asking your official driver to pick up your children from school, to 
sinister ones like the theft and dilution of vaccines that lead to the proliferation of 
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resistant strains of diseases. This can include, at high levels of government, theft 
that takes place directly from the treasury and involves large amounts of money 
(Lanyi & Azfar, 2005:14). 
 
2.5.4. Self-dealing  
 
Self-dealing is the conduct of a trustee, an attorney, a corporate officer, or other 
fiduciary that consists of taking advantage of his or her position in a transaction and 
acting for his or her own interests rather than for the interests of the beneficiaries of 
the trust, corporate shareholders, or his or her clients (Thefreedictionary.com, 2006: 
Online). Self-dealing is a situation where one takes an action in an official capacity 
which involves dealing with oneself in a private capacity and which confers a benefit 
on oneself (Kernaghan & Langford, 1990:152). According to Lanyi  and  Azfar 
(2005:15), self-dealing is the practice of hiring one‘s own firm or a firm belonging to 
close relatives or friends to provide public services. The definition can be extended 
to selecting such a firm as the purchaser of a privatised company (Lanyi & Azfar, 
2005:15). 
 
2.5.5 Patronage 
 
Patronage is the act of a so-called patron who supports or favours some individual, 
family, group or institution (Encyclopedia, 2006: Online). Nelson (1996:45) defines 
patronage as an act and substance of giving: 
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I. The giver: a) the support of a patron, usually given with the air of superiority, b) 
the power to give resources, opportunities and jobs to individuals without 
regard to merit.  
II. The receiver: the resources, opportunities and jobs given by a superior on any 
basis other than merit. Patronage happens when leaders of a political party that 
comes to power place many of their faithful followers into important public 
offices (U-S-history.com, 2006: Online).  
 
Originally the term ―patronage‖ was coined in Latin (patronatus) for the formal 
relationship between a patronus and his clientes (http://experts.about.com). Political 
patronage is defined as the dispensation of favours or rewards such as public office, 
jobs, contracts, subsidies, prestige or other valued benefits by a patron (a person 
who is responsible for controlling their dispensation) to a client (The Canadian 
Encyclopedia, 2006: Online). Generally, it can be described as a system where an 
individual(s) in a powerful position (the patron) offers hand-outs in return for support 
(Noël, 2006:2). 
 
Orac and Rinne (2000:1) state that patronage suggests the transgression of real or 
perceived boundaries of legitimate political influence, and the violation of principles 
of merit and competition in civil service recruitment and promotion. The merit system 
evolved in America in response to the troubles created by political patronage under 
the ―spoils system‖ where its roots extend back to ancient China where the first merit 
system was developed (United States Office of Personnel Management, 1999:5). 
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Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that governments the world over accept 
that certain political appointments are fully legitimate (Orac & Rinne, 2000:1). 
However, Magilavy (2001: 2) is opposed to the appointment of public officials to the 
public service made as a reward for political activity. A small number of these 
appointments are justified as a means for political leaders to fashion a circle of 
government policymakers and managers who share a common agenda (Orac & 
Rinne, 2000:1).  
 
Competency is essential to ensure that the goals of the public service are achieved 
(Canada, 2001:1). Patronage is clearly a problem when these appointments pervade 
public administration, resulting in severely undermining merit principles (Orac & 
Rinne, 2000:1). Orac & Rinne (2000:1) further state that somewhere between these 
two extremes the line between appropriate and inappropriate uses of patronage is 
crossed.  
 
This use of public offices as rewards for political party work is known as the spoils 
system which is popular in numerous countries (U-S-history.com, 2006: Online). 
There were justifications for the spoils system, but the true motivation is to secure 
jobs for party activists and to enable the functioning of large political parties without 
the need for external funding (Meir, 2005:2). The spoils system is opposed to a 
system of awarding officers on the basis of some measure of merit independent of 
political activity (Liff, 2010:4).   
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According to Orac and Rinne (2000:1), a straightforward definition of patronage, ―the 
power of appointing people to governmental or political positions‖ and ―the positions 
so distributed‖, fails to convey the negative connotation that patronage has. 
 
Patronage is at times defended as a process that makes job, contract and subsidy 
allocation less expensive and an antidote to the excessive bureaucratisation of 
government (Noël, 2006:2).  Certain authors claim that patronage appointments help 
build a stable political environment. Patronage is, therefore a recognised and 
legitimate power of the executive branch (Answers.com, 2006: Online). Such overt 
political patronage is seen as a tool for rewarding and enforcing loyalty; loyalty is the 
criterion for selecting a person rather than more meritocratic considerations (Lokanc, 
2007:36-37).  
 
The arguments in favour of patronage have a certain degree of merit, but none are 
really convincing as having loyal workers is a necessity at the highest levels of policy 
making; but the law recognises this and allows the highest-level political 
appointments, the ―confidential‖ employees, to be appointed based on political 
affiliation (Meir, 2005:2). Political appointments are allowed where elected officials 
may hand-pick political advisers (McCourt, 2000:5). However, the vast majority of 
bureaucrats need to be professionals for whom capability is more important than 
loyalty (Meir, 2005:2). Hence, where civil servants are unionised, resistance to 
bureaucratic patronage is even greater (Noël, 2006:2).   
 
Lanyi and  Azfar (2005:15) define patronage as the hiring of one‘s own friends and 
relatives, even when they are not the best qualified, or accepting bribes in exchange 
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for government jobs. Nepotism and cronyism are identified as more specific forms of 
patronage. Offering government jobs in exchange for political support is a 
questionable practice, but there is debate about whether it is a form of corruption 
(Lanyi & Azfar, 2005:15). However, patronage can consequently be seen as one of 
the possible major deficiencies of a system of excess bureaucracy, defined as a 
system with a weak bureaucratic structure, the availability of large public resources 
to the patron, and that these public resources be easily divisible in order to target 
specific groups and individuals (Lokanc, 2007:36-37). 
 
According to Golden (2000:12), civil service regulations guide the appointment 
process for positions in the public administration. Despite these regulations, 
countries continue offering government jobs in exchange for political support. There 
may be relatively many of these in certain countries or relatively few in others, but in 
most cases they should be narrowly confined to senior staff members who ere 
working directly with politicians (McCourt, 2000:5). 
 
In his study of patronage appointments in United States cities early in the twentieth 
century, Key (1935:15) enumerated the following five methods of evasion of civil 
service laws that are used to classify the manner in which civil service regulations 
are violated. These are as follows: 
 
I. limiting the scope of merit laws;  
II. appointing the ―right guys‖ to civil service commissions;  
III. budgetary sabotage;  
IV. manipulating the selection process; including fixing assessment results; and 
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V. manipulating the movement and promotion of personnel. 
 
Voskanyan (2000:15) describes the assignment of government positions to political 
supporters as a form of corruption which has long been a practice in politics. While 
civil service regulations may effectively curtail the number of patronage jobs, political 
appointments remain at the top levels of government and provide a legitimate way 
for elected politicians to influence bureaucracy through the appointment of legal 
executive officials (Voskanyan, 2000:15).  
 
Holmes (1993:205) identifies three major forms of patronage, which are as follows: 
 
I. Nepotism. In this context it is the granting of public office on the bases of 
family ties; 
II. Shared experience. Here the patron and client have usually worked together 
in the past and are on good terms and the patron promotes or has promoted 
the client on the basis of these past experiences and warm relationship; and 
III. Shared interest. In this case, the patron does not have common experience 
with someone he or she wishes to promote, but rather a common interest.  
 
Nelson (1996:45) classifies patronage as voluntary and inclusive patronage 
(voluntary) versus coercive and exclusive patronage (violent dictatorships). 
Exclusive systems serve patronage for a small proportion of the population while 
inclusive systems redistribute a modest proportion of the patronage to a larger 
proportion of the population (Nelson, 1996:45). 
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2.5.6 Shirking 
 
Lanyi and Azfar (2005:15) define shirking as avoiding or neglecting a duty or 
responsibility. Shirking is a widespread practice in the public sectors of many 
developing and transitional countries, where public officials routinely come late to 
work, leave early, are regularly absent from work, or perhaps never come to work at 
all. This definition is wide and is intended to capture intentional neglect of duty as 
well as overt acts of corruption (ACPO, 2003:2). In this regard these workers 
purchased their jobs and never actually intended to y work and those who hired 
them were aware of this (Lanyi & Azfar, 2005:15).  
 
The sale of jobs, which is related to shirking, appears to be a widespread practice in 
certain transitional countries (Anderson, Azfar, Kaufmann, Lee, Mukherjee & 
Ryterman, 1999:20). In certain cases, they may have other jobs, so that the 
government ―job‖ is simply an income supplement financed by the taxpayer (Lanyi & 
Azfar, 2005:15). Shirking belongs in a class of opportunistic behaviour which 
includes shirking, adverse selection, moral hazard, and free riding (Ostrom, 
Schroeder & Wynne, 1993: 43). 
 
2.5.7 Political corruption and campaign finance improprieties 
 
Political corruption  and  campaign finance improprieties are certain interactions 
between the elite and politicians, particularly those that lead to the former being 
favoured in terms of policy (Lanyi & Azfar, 2005:15). These might include exchanges 
of campaign financing for political favours like procurement or privatisation deals. 
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However, other commentators insist that these types of interactions are, for the most 
part, legitimate forms of political exchange (Huntington, 1968:8). 
 
The party funding challenge is prevalent throughout the world, even in the 
comparatively older, more established democracies (Sokomani, 2005:1). Owing to 
the acuteness of this problem, certain authors (Drew, 1999:1; Etizoni, 1984:10) call it 
the 800 pound gorilla. Drew (1999:1) views the conditions surrounding campaign 
financing as one of the most poisonous elements in contemporary society. 
Corruption in political financing manifests itself in many ways, often illegally, but in 
many cases more or less within the law, if not the ethics of the situation (Bailey, 
2004:12). 
 
Lanyi and  Azfar (2005:8) further classify corruption by providing the following sector 
specifics: 
 
I. Government budgetary funds are misused and embezzled;  
II. Government procurement is subject to bid-rigging, kickbacks, and official 
collusion in over-invoicing; and  
III. Officials responsible for delivering public services, such as education, health, 
or public utilities are involved in theft, self-dealing, and bribery.  
 
From the above it is evident that corruption demonstrates itself in different forms. 
Some are more evident than others. Some are regarded as less harmful and 
widespread. However, there is not a single kind of corruption that can be regarded 
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as legal and they all lead to shadow economies. This is an undeniable fact which 
clearly shows that corruption has negative effects.  
 
2.6 EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION  
 
The purpose of this section is to review the impact that corruption has, considering 
the experiences of various countries as proven by studies that have been 
conducted. There have been claims that not everything is bad about corruption. Its 
effects can be positive too (Mollah & Uddin, 2002:11). Although the term ‗corruption‘ 
generally has a negative connotation, it can in certain circumstances be a distinctly 
beneficial phenomenon (Voskanyan, 2000:27). 
 
Corruption, among other things, assists in capital formation, fosters entrepreneurial 
abilities, allows business interests to penetrate the bureaucracy, and permits the 
logic of market to insinuate itself into transactions from which public controls exclude 
it (Theobald, 1990:2). Certain researchers argue that corruption in the form of bribing 
can be an important arm in the hands of entrepreneurs seeking to do business with 
a hostile or indifferent government and may stimulate the development process 
(Goudie & Stasavage, 1997:30; Voskanyan, 2000:28).    
 
Leff (1964:8) argues that in many developing countries excessive bureaucratic 
control and regulations create uncertainty for entrepreneurs, so bribery can assist 
bureaucrats to negotiate excessive regulations and minimise uncertainty over 
enforcement. In addition, according to one school of corruption apologists, bribery 
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could enhance efficiency by cutting the considerable time needed to process permits 
and paperwork (Voskanyan, 2000:28).  
 
However, evidence has proven that corruption has adverse effects. According to 
Kaufmann (1997:2), on closer examination the argument that all corruption is not 
bad is debatable for the following reasons: 
 
I. First, it ignores the degree of discretion that politicians and bureaucrats can 
have, particularly in corrupt societies. They have discretion over the creation, 
proliferation, and interpretation of counterproductive regulations. Thus instead 
of corruption being the grease for the squeaky wheels of a rigid 
administration, it becomes the fuel for excessive and discretionary 
regulations. This is one mechanism whereby corruption feeds on itself. 
II. Secondly, available empirical evidence refutes the ―speed money‖ argument 
by showing a positive relationship between the extent of bribery and the 
amount of time that enterprise managers spend with public officials. 
 
Corruption has a negative, deleterious and devastating influence on investment and 
economic growth, administrative performance and efficiency and political 
development (Mollah & Uddin, 2000:11). Certain investigations revealed that the 
excessive tolerance of corruption can have serious negative effects on economic 
and political development (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998:7).   
 
Corruption tends to shift government spending away from the social areas towards 
the construction of unneeded projects or lower quality investments in infrastructure 
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whereby corrupt politicians choose investment projects, not on the bases of their 
intrinsic economic worth, but on the opportunity for bribes and kickbacks these 
projects present. Political corruption has particularly damaging effects on the 
allocation of resources because it tends to divert resources away from the function 
to which they would have been allocated in the absence of corruption (Voskanyan, 
2000:29).  
 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997:10) state that corruption tends to be associated with higher 
public investment and high corruption tends to reduce government revenue, which in 
its place reduces the resources available to finance spending, including public 
investment. High corruption also tends to be associated with poor quality of 
infrastructure, which reduces its contribution to output. Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997:139) further argue that large-scale corruption has powerful effects on both the 
quality and the quantity of public investment.  
 
When corrupt politicians influence the approval of an investment project the rate of 
return as calculated by cost-benefit analysis ceases to be the criterion for project 
selection (Abbey, 2005:7). ―White elephants‖ and ―cathedrals in the desert‖ end up 
being produced (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998:9). When corruption plays a large role in the 
selection of projects, certain projects are completed but never used while others are 
so poorly built that they will need continuous repair and their output capacity will 
disappoint (Voskanyan, 2000:31). In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
capital spending often fails to generate the economic growth (Tanzi & Davoodi, 
1998:10).  
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According to Tanzi and Davoodi (1998:9), widespread corruption in the investment 
budget will not only reduce the rate of return of new investments in a country, but will 
also affect the rate of return the country gets from its existing infrastructure. This 
implies that the existing infrastructure may also be contaminated because past 
investments were administered or distorted by corruption (Voskanyan, 2000:31). 
Higher spending on capital projects might reduce the resources available for other 
spending.  
 
Pollock (1937:29) writes that vast amounts of finances have been and continue to be 
wasted under the patronage system. Calculating the cost of patronage has only 
begun. Pollock (1937:29) further explains that despite the fact that these patronage 
costs are almost beyond calculation, and even though one cannot formulate a 
perfectly correct balance sheet, it is possible to indicate the items of loss which are 
directly attributed to the spoil system. 
 
According to Stuart (1997:42), development based on corrupt practices has driving 
forces with particular characteristics such as: 
 
I. a focus towards large scale capital-intensive investment and away from those 
which maximise use of local labour and resources;  
II. inadequate attention to long-term affordability and maintenance;   
III. inadequate care for protecting the environment; and  
IV. decisions taken secretly, outside normal government procedures and with 
little or no consultation. 
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The damage corruption causes is not only economic. It also undermines social 
values and can imperil democracy itself (Stuart, 1997:42). Corruption tends to 
concentrate wealth, not only increasing the gap between rich and poor but providing 
the wealthy with illicit means to protect their positions and interests, which, in turn, 
can contribute to social conditions that foster other forms of crime, social and 
political instability and even terrorism (UN, 2004:17). 
 
Continuance of corruption in a country leads to economic malaise and the 
squandering of public resources, lowers governmental performance, adversely 
affects general morale in the public service, jeopardises administrative reform efforts 
and accountability measures and perpetuates social and economic inequalities (UN, 
1990:Online). Patronage costs may be listed under three headings: losses of a 
general, moral character; losses to political parties; and losses in public 
administration (Pollock, 1937:29). Patronage poses a challenge to administrations 
where there are many political cadre posts (McCourt, 2000:5). 
 
Corruption reinforces political instability and underdevelopment (Ouma, 1991:473). 
In short, corruption impedes economic growth, stifles entrepreneurialism, misuses 
national resources, weakens administrative capacity, contributes to serious political 
decay and undermines stability, democracy and national integration (Khan, 2004:6).  
According to Mauro (1995:681) and Schleifer and Vishny (1993:599), corruption 
retards economic growth, lowers investment, decreases private savings, and 
hampers political stability. Foreign direct investment reacts negatively to the 
presence of corruption within the public sector in developing countries (Leiken, 
1996:55). The existence of official corruption distorts market systems by introducing 
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uncertainty in social and economic interactions (Andvig, 1991:51). Official corruption 
is an essential input for the growth of organised criminal groups with the capacity to 
pose a significant international security threat (Leiken, 1996:56). 
 
Scholars have contributed to the economic analysis of corruption. When analysing 
the effects of corruption, Mauro (1998:683) reports regression analysis which shows 
that a country that improves its standing on the corruption index from 6 to 8 (0 being 
the most corrupt, 10 the least) will experience a 4 percentage point increase in its 
investment rate and a 0.5 percentage point increase in its annual per capita GDP 
growth rate. This analysis is supported by Tanzi (1998:565) who provides a 
summary of these effects as they have been quantified in recent studies, and which 
include:  
 
I. Reducing investment and hence growth by increasing costs and uncertainty;  
II. Reducing spending on health and education because these expenditures do 
not lend themselves easily to corrupt practices on the part of those who 
control the budget strings;  
III. Reducing spending on operations and maintenance for reasons similar to the 
point above;  
IV. Increasing public investment because public projects are easier to manipulate 
by public officials and private bidders;  
V. Reducing the productivity of public investment and infrastructure;  
VI. Reducing tax revenues due to corrupt tax and customs administration; and  
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VII. Reducing direct foreign investment because corruption acts as a tax: the less 
predictable the level of corruption (the higher its variance), the greater its 
impact on foreign investment.  
A higher variance makes corruption act like an unpredictable and random tax (Tanzi, 
1998:565).  
 
A number of studies have provided evidence that corruption has serious financial 
implications for both the economy in terms of slow growth (Ades & DiTella, 1996:6; 
Mauro, 1995:681), as well as its effects on democracy in terms of decreasing 
government effectiveness, stability (Adsera, Boix & Payne, 2003:445, Mauro, 
1995:681); and political legitimacy (Doig &  Theobald, 2000:75).  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned negative impact of corruption, there is also an 
element of disproportionality and inequality (U4, 2006: Online). Schaeffer (2002:20) 
supports this view by stating that corruption also has a direct and adverse effect on 
the general welfare of the citizens, especially the poor, as corruption affects the poor 
disproportionately. Corruption has distributional consequences which affect income 
inequality and poverty by reducing economic growth, the progressivity of the tax 
system, the level and effectiveness of social programmes, and by perpetuating an 
unequal distribution of asset ownership and unequal access to education (Gupta, 
Davoodi & Alonso-Terme, 1998:29).    
 
The poor are more vulnerable to extortion and intimidation for basic services, as well 
as to the harsh consequences of corruption on their country‘s overall development 
(Transparency International, 2006: Online). Surapaneni (2006:19) is of the same 
opinion and states that while corruption impacts negatively on most of the segments 
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of the society, the poor are more vulnerable, both in terms of being easy targets for 
being subjected to extortion, bribery, double-standards and intimidation as well as in 
terms of being hit by the negative and harsh consequences of corruption on a 
country‘s overall development processes. 
 
Corruption has a direct and indirect impact on the poor (Jones, Dietsche & Weinzier, 
2006:30). It impacts directly through increasing the cost of public services, lowering 
their quality and often altogether restricting poor people‘s access to such essential 
services as water, health and education; and impacts indirectly through diverting 
public resources away from social sectors and the poor, and through limiting 
development, growth and poverty reduction (Surapaneni, 2006:19).  
 
The UNODC (2002:10) summarises known negative impacts of corruption as 
follows: 
 
I. It undermines economic growth by diverting resources to inefficient or 
unproductive sectors or actors; by reducing income tax and other revenue 
sources; by increasing the cost of doing business; by reducing the quality of 
contracted works; and ultimately undermines investor confidence and 
contributes to capital flight; 
II. It undermines poverty reduction efforts, as  fewer resources will be available 
for social programmes; through poor targeting of beneficiaries, both in terms 
of the overall effectiveness of services, and making services accessible to 
more citizens on an equitable basis; 
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III. It undermines the safety, environmental health and the sustainability of cities, 
in that health and zoning regulations are ignored; and by weak enforcement 
of environmental protection policies and regulations, may even compromise 
the needs of future generations; and 
IV. It threatens political stability, particularly in the case of systemic corruption. 
The loss of public confidence in the rule of law, justice and governance 
institutions can lead to political instability and even civil strife (UNODC, 
2002:10).  
 
Certain researchers have succeeded in differentiating between the effects of grand 
corruption and the effects of petty corruption. According to Westcott (1997:1), grand 
corruption leads to increased transaction costs and reduces predictability, and it 
impedes sustainable development because it distorts the decision-making process 
and leads to the wrong people being awarded the wrong projects at the wrong 
prices.  
 
Grand corruption is considered to be particularly bad for the legitimacy of the 
government, affecting countries‘ policy and law-making processes; weakening public 
institutions and altering  countries‘ public spending priorities (for example, by 
allocating more public spending to lucrative sectors to ensure pay-offs and kickbacks 
from large public and infrastructure works);  exhausting the countries‘ natural 
resources and public wealth; and hindering business and investment (Transparency 
International Press Release, 2004: 86). Grand corruption leads to a broad erosion of 
confidence in good governance, the rule of law and economic stability (UN, 
2004:10). 
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Unlike grand corruption, which impacts negatively on a country by taking large sums 
of money away from the public purse, the impact of petty corruption is described in 
the following manner: 
 
I. Petty corruption directly impacts on individuals, particularly the poor and 
vulnerable.  
II. It is often just as damaging to the poor, and is more immediate and tangible 
than the larger corruption cases which make breaking news and scandals. 
III. Bribes are often simply demanded and the non-payment thereof can result in 
devastating consequences, ranging from the denial of access to essential 
public services to unjust sentencing and imprisonment. 
IV.  Petty corruption is not only detrimental to development processes but is also 
a threat to basic human rights (both civil rights such as guarantees of fair trial 
and justice, as well as socio-economic rights such as access to health, 
education, and others).  
V. As is often the case with petty corruption, it is not only those who can afford it 
who are asked to pay, but those who are thought to have no other options. 
VI. It is estimated that lower income households spend a larger proportion of their 
income on bribes and find these to be a heavy financial burden.  
VII. Petty corruption can go as far as threatening national security as it affects 
millions of people around the world as they go about their daily lives (U4 
Helpdesk Query, 2006: Online). 
 
Petty corruption has negative consequences (as listed above), ranging from 
affecting the livelihoods and the human rights of individuals, particularly the poor and 
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the vulnerable, to facilitating varied forms of criminal activity (U4 Helpdesk Query, 
2006: Online). The TI Global Corruption Barometer (2004:5) concludes that while the 
two may affect particular target groups and aspects of a country‘s governance and 
development processes to a different degree, the overall damaging impact of grand 
or petty corruption is equally serious.  Corruption in its all forms and manifestations 
has negative ramifications as both grand and petty corruption are judged as 
significant obstacles (U4 Helpdesk Query, 2006: Online).   
 
From the above it can be deduced that corruption has negative consequences on 
economic growth, investment, and social welfare. In countries infested with 
corruption, contracts are not necessarily awarded to the most competitive 
businesses but to those that are willing to pay the highest bribe. In these countries 
projects are not chosen based on the benefit they will provide to the citizens, but on 
enriching corrupt politicians. Studies have proved that in such countries, 
procurement and recruitment processes are riddled with nepotism and depraved 
client-patron connections.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter recapitulated the nature of corruption from the literature to provide a 
framework for the subsequent attempt to examine the effectiveness of anti-
corruption agencies and legislation. The manner in which selected authors define 
corruption highlights key concepts in the definition and identifies areas where the 
controversy lies. The ack of an authoritative consensus on how corruption should be 
defined has been highlighted. It has been revealed that a definition of corruption 
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should not be restricted to a particular sector or transaction as it may omit critical 
parts of the problem.  However, narrow definitions are proven to be suitable when 
the problem of corruption is limited.  
 
Different causes of public corruption were elaborated on, such as the nature of the 
regulatory environment, lack of transparency in government, the influence of 
powerful business interest groups, low salaries of public servants, weakness in the 
legal framework, and the self-sustaining cycle of corruption. It can also not be denied 
that greed and selfishness stimulate corruption, encouraging those who are corrupt 
to ignore the suffering that is inflicted by their actions on fellow humans.     
 
It is clear that a combination of factors including, inter alia, political, economic, 
social, cultural and behavioural contribute to corrupt practices and ethical 
bankruptcy. Studies reveal that a lack of accountability and transparency is possibly 
the single most important factor contributing to widespread corruption. Among other 
factors that perpetuate corruption is low ethics and mortality in the public service. It 
has also been stated that public officials can be persuaded by both domestic and 
international private sectors to engage in corruption. 
 
The inability of governments to monitor the integrity of public officials also owes 
much to a low level of public awareness of the nature and real costs of corruption, 
and to a high level of tolerance of corruption.  The nature of public sector corruption 
appears to vary among countries. However, corruption encountered in the 
developing and transitional world is either grand or petty, with the latter regarded as 
causing little public outcry. In this type of corruption, public officials charge extras for 
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services, seek small favours, or use public facilities and equipment for their own 
marginal personal gain. Such actions are regarded as warning signs that 
governments should not provide unacceptably low salaries.     
 
Grand corruption is not readily identifiable and is managed by powerful people in a 
country. Such corruption retards the economy significantly and benefits the minority 
at the expense of the many. It occurs in infrastructure projects and deals where 
special market advantages are sought or access to powerful positions is secured. 
Corruption analyses also attribute its existence to monopoly power, unrestricted 
discretion, and lack of accountability and transparency.  
 
Corruption is known for being a damaging factor in the economic malaise, 
government performance, public resources and general morale in the public service 
in certain countries. It is also viewed as having a negative effect on administrative 
efficiency. 
 
This chapter also reviewed the role of corruption in economic development by taking 
into account its different types and levels and their elements that are most critical for 
economic activities. When the environment of the country is corrupted, the 
confidence of the public in government tends to be undermined; wrong economic 
choices are engendered; the government‘s ability to implement policies are 
constrained, the poor are made to pay the price;  and the government‘s strategy of 
private sector oriented growth is threatened. Countries with such environments lose 
much needed revenue and human talent for development, priorities for public policy 
are distorted, and scarce resources are shifted away from the public interest. 
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Authors view corruption as preventing the poor from participating in decision-making 
and development. Corruption also has a tendency of exacerbating inequality and 
poverty in a country by reducing the country‘s growth. Amongst the problems 
pointed out by the above review are biased tax systems favouring the rich and 
influential; lower social spending; unequal access to education; low investments in 
social programmes; interest-group lobbying; and increased investment risks for the 
poor. 
 
 
People who observe that politicians and public officials are not prosecuted, and 
judges either ignore or get involved in corruption themselves, merely follow the 
example.  When corruption grows rapidly, people finally accept it as a way of life.  In 
the chapter that follows, characteristics of effective anti-corruption legislation and 
anti-corruption agencies will be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES AND ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide characteristics of effective anti-corruption 
legislation and anti-corruption agencies. Greater attention will be given to what anti-
corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies ought to be rather than the 
somewhat abstract study of corruption itself. It is structured in two main sections. 
The first section analyses a range of legislative avenues that can be followed in 
curbing corruption. The second section assesses the main features of effective anti-
corruption agencies.  
 
Since fighting corruption has become a key priority for a number of countries, 
initiatives have been taken towards achieving this goal. Such initiatives have 
multiplied through the inauguration of specific anti-corruption institutions or through 
watchdog organisations and anti-corruption legislation. These agencies and laws are 
meant to keep an ―eye‖ on public ethics and to achieve levels of transparency, 
especially with regard to public sector decision-making.  
 
The European Commission (2006:2) describes what is the overall objective of these 
efforts, namely to contribute to the prevention and control of corruption so that 
corruption no longer undermines the confidence of the public in the political and 
judicial system, democracy, the rule of law, and economic and social development. 
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Both comprehensive anti-corruption legislation and implementing this legislation are 
necessary to advance the rule of law and prevent corruption (American Bar 
Association: 2006: Online). Anti-corruption agencies are regarded as part of a 
number of strategies that can reduce corruption in a government (Heilbrunn, 
2004:18). 
 
It is, therefore, evident that countries worldwide have embarked on various anti-
corruption initiatives. It is clear that anti-corruption agencies have been an integral 
part of these initiatives. 
 
3.2 ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES 
 
Del Mar Landette (2002:3) writes that strategies to combat corruption are often led 
by independent anti-corruption agencies created specifically to spearhead the fight. 
Specialised and independent anti-corruption agencies present the advantage of 
being exclusively devoted to fighting corruption (Transparency International, 
2000:41). 
 
Heilbrunn (2004); Stapenhurst and  Langseth (1997); Pope and Vogl (2000); Del 
Mar Landette (2002); Man-wai (2006); Jennett  and Hodess (2007); Neumann 
(2005); Lincoln (2000); Camerer (1999) and Boone (2002) provide a compendium of 
features of effective anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). In addition, Stapenhurst and 
Langseth (1997) and Heilbrunn (2004) provide reasons why ACAs fail which also 
point in the same direction as to what an anti-corruption agency ought to be.  
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3.2.1 Features of Effective Anti-Corruption Agencies  
 
Among characteristics that are identified by writers are political backing, adequately 
resourced, independent, educational and integrity. Other than sufficient monetary 
resources, a number of important requirements that can be identified for an anti-
corruption agency to function effectively include sufficient staff and resources with 
specific knowledge and skills, special legislative powers, high level information 
sharing and co-ordination, and operational independence (Camerer, 1999:2). 
 
According to Heilbrunn (2004:18), crucial elements of effective anti-corruption 
agencies include the independence of a commission, a clear reporting hierarchy, 
and commitment by the government to enact reforms that may be politically difficult. 
Stapenhurst and Langseth (1997:324-325) argue that to operate successfully, an 
anti-corruption agency should possess the following: 
 
I. Committed political backing at the highest levels of government;  
II. Political and operational independence to investigate even the highest levels 
of government;  
III. Adequate powers of access to documentation and to question witnesses; 
and  
IV. Leadership which is publicly perceived as being of the highest integrity. 
 
As corrupt practices become even more sophisticated, conventional law 
enforcement agencies are less well placed to detect and prosecute corruption cases 
(TI, 2000:41-42). It is suggested that specialised and independent anti-corruption 
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agencies should have preventive and educational components, as well as the ability 
to gather intelligence, process complaints, and advise government and private 
agencies (TI, 2000:41-42). In addition to those highlighted by Stapenhurst and 
Langseths (1997:324-325), the TI Sourcebook (2000:96) also identifies the following 
two elements that an anti-corruption agency must possess to operate successfully:   
 
I. Adequate resources to undertake its mission; and  
II. User-friendly laws (including the criminalisation of ‗illicit enrichment‘). 
 
According to Heilbrunn (2004:14-15), strategies such as the independence of 
commissions need a clear reporting hierarchy that comprises executive officials, 
parliamentary authorities, and oversight committees; and governments must have a 
commitment to enact reforms that may be politically difficult. Given that prevention is 
always better than prosecution, a small investigative and monitoring unit with 
appropriate authority and political independence may be much better placed than 
other government agencies to ensure that effective preventive steps are identified 
and taken (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997:324). Heilbrunn (2004:14-15) further 
suggests that how a government is able to enact these strategies requires 
negotiations among key actors in the government, civil society and the media. The 
TI Sourcebook (2000:104) provides the following indicators for assessing anti-
corruption agencies as integrity pillars: 
 
I. Are the appointing procedures for the head of the agency such as to ensure 
that he or she is competent, independent of the party in power, and likely to 
discharge the agency‘s duties without fear or favour?  
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II. Once appointed, is the head of the agency independent from political control 
in the day- to-day conduct of the agency‘s affairs?  
III. Is the agency adequately resourced?  
IV. Do other staff enjoy independence from political interference in the discharge 
of their duties?  
V. Are there ―no go‖ areas for investigators? 
VI. Are staff adequately trained?  
VII. Are staff adequately remunerated?  
VIII. Is the Office of the President or Prime Minister within the agency‘s 
jurisdiction? (If so, are the staff confident enough to exercise that jurisdiction 
should occasion arise?)  
IX. Are staff in sensitive areas subjected to random ―integrity tests‖? 
X. Are there arrangements to ensure that the agency itself cannot become a 
source of corruption?  
XI. Can the services of staff whose integrity has become doubtful be quickly 
dispensed with?  
XII. Is the agency accountable to the executive, the legislature, the courts and the 
public? 
 
A prime challenge in many countries is to mobilise the necessary political will to 
establish such agencies (Pope & Vogl, 2000:6). In support of this statement, the 
Anti-Corruption Handbook (2005) states that while the approach taken in designing a 
successful national strategy will vary depending on a country's prevalent patterns 
and levels of corruption, as well as the political and economic systems currently in 
place, it is possible to say that anti-corruption strategies should be driven by political 
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will (Anti-Corruption Handbook, 2005:1). Participatory approaches to fighting 
corruption, and especially the importance of active involvement by civil society and 
the media, are now generally accepted as fundamental to any successful anti-
corruption reform programme. However, political will is frequently the missing 
ingredient (Lincoln, 2000:41). 
 
Del Mar Landette (2002:56) provides the following good practice guidelines: 
 
I. Clear, strong and enforceable legal framework. The basis for an effective anti-
corruption agency is the support of a legal framework that clearly sets the 
scope of action of the agency; provides it with all the tools necessary to 
perform its functions effectively; and that can be enforced by the agency 
through the justice system.  
II. Independence and freedom of action. ACAs‘ independence of resources, 
structure and power should guarantee their freedom of action. In the case of 
Ecuador‘s Commission for the Civic Control of Corruption (CCCC), although it 
is free from political and bureaucratic interference and has the ability to hire 
and dismiss its staff, its independence is curtailed by the lack of power and 
limited resources. The power and independence of the agency could be 
expanded by allowing it to supplement its formal budget with proceeds from 
the sale of assets and properties of those found guilty of corrupt and illegal 
acts. This additional income could help to finance the recruitment and training 
of specialised prosecutors and to improve salaries and working conditions of 
the staff, and deter officers from becoming corrupt. 
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III. ―Four-Point‖ System for fighting corruption. A model similar to Hong Kong‘s 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) three-pronged approach 
should be followed by the commission, adding a fourth dimension, 
prosecution, making it a ‗four-point system‘ where the concepts of education 
and prevention complement investigation and prosecution, making these four 
areas interdependent and supportive of each other.  
IV. Cooperation, community involvement and accountability. The CCCC must 
recognise that in the fight against corruption it cannot act alone, nor can it 
single-handedly eliminate corrupt behaviour. It must be the leader and key 
instrument of a national anti-corruption system, made up of all the 
government agencies that have the mandate to regulate public and private 
sector activities, together with private sector and civil society allies. 
Cooperation among these organisations is crucial for the success of the 
national anti-corruption strategy. In terms of community involvement and 
accountability, the CCCC‘s model of having seven Commissioners 
responsible and accountable to each of the constituencies that elected them 
provides an innovative mechanism to involve civil society and to ensure public 
support for the anti-corruption agency‘s work, as well as offering a strong 
accountability mechanism. 
 
Analysts such as Pope and Vogl (2000); Stapenhurst and  Langseth (1997); and 
Jennett and  Hodess (2007:2) emphasise the importance of the procedures in which 
the ACA‘s employees are dismissed and fired, and their integrity. From the outset, 
the shape and independence of a commission may well be determined by how the 
office holder is appointed or removed (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997:324). National 
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anti-corruption agencies should not be run by hand-picked supporters of politicians 
in power as such leaders could be deployed to intimidate political opponents (Pope 
& Vogl, 2000:8).  
 
The challenge of making executive appointments to anti-corruption agencies is to 
ensure that persons of integrity are selected, that they enjoy independence from 
political (and private sector) interference, and that they are held to account for their 
actions (Jennett & Hodess, 2007:2).  
 
If the appointing mechanism ensures consensus support for an appointee through 
parliament, rather than government, and an accountability mechanism exists outside 
government (for example, a parliamentary select committee on which all major 
parties are represented), the space for abuse for non-partisan activities can be 
minimised (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997:324). Furthermore, credibility and 
effectiveness depend on the exemplary behaviour of the anticorruption agency itself. 
It must act, and be seen to act, in conformity with international human rights norms. 
It must operate within the law and be accountable to the courts (Pope & Vogl, 
2000:8). 
 
Jennett and Hodess (2007:2) further provide a criterion for selecting appointees, that 
is, executive, non-executive and seconded personnel for anti-corruption agencies. 
Pope and Vogl (2000:8) add that appointment procedures need to address the issue 
of whether the proposed mechanism sufficiently insulates the process to ensure that 
persons of integrity are given the leadership and that they are protected from 
political pressures while they are in office. Comparative analysis of ACAs suggests 
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that more important than the status of an ACA's personnel in determining the 
probabilities of success or failure, are the following aspects: 
 
I. Integrity. Integrity of staff is crucial to the credibility and effectiveness of an 
ACA. Staff members at all levels should, therefore, undergo some form of 
integrity checks to minimise the risk of staff undermining the agency's role in 
curbing corruption. Some agencies have their own internal oversight body to 
investigate breaches of its code of conduct, or a body that monitors and 
reviews all complaints held against the ACA.  
II. Regulation of appointments and dismissals. The regulation of appointments 
and dismissals by the ACA of its non-executive staff without the interference 
of third parties is an important asset which helps determine the quality of 
personnel - since managers will be able to dismiss staff if they fail to live up to 
professional and/or moral expectations - and work in favour of the agency's 
independence, since it acts as a safeguard against undue influence over 
appointments by the political elite, as well as a protection of officers from 
political, economic or personal interference and pressures. 
III. Expertise and continuous training are essential if the highest professional 
standard of an ACA is to be maintained.  
IV. Adequate salary levels are necessary to maintain staff morale and to act as a 
disincentive to engagement in corrupt activities (Jennett & Hodess, 2007:2).  
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3.2.2 Reasons for Failure of Anti-Corruption Agencies 
 
As stated earlier, some authors identify variables that determine the failure of ACAs. 
According to Pope and Vogl (2000:6), although anti-corruption agencies can be 
critical in preventing corruption before it becomes rampant, not only are they difficult 
to set up but they often fail to achieve their goals once they have been established.  
ACAs are expected to: 
 
I. combat corruption in an independent, knowledge-based manner by 
developing a specialised repressive, preventive and educational/research 
capacity; 
II. overcome inadequacy of traditional law enforcement structures and 
processes and assume a leading role in implementing national anti-corruption 
strategies; and 
III. re-assure public opinion of the government‘s commitment to fight corruption. 
(De Sousa, 2010:16). 
 
Although according to Lo (2006:2), it is often said that the organisational uniqueness 
of the ICAC symbolises a success model for anti-corruption, De Sousa (2010:12) 
argues that there is no standardised model of what an ACA should look like. 
However, De Sousa (2010:12) acknowledges that relevant literature identifies the 
following series of requisites that need to be in place for a particular agency to be 
classified as an ACA: 
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I. Distinctiveness from other enforcement agencies with competences in this 
domain. In relation to other law enforcers, ACAs are primarily or exclusively 
mandated to combat corruption; 
II. The development of preventive and/or repressive dimensions of control; 
III. Durability: it cannot have an occasional or perennial existence; 
IV. Powers to centralise information (collection, storage, processing, and 
diffusion; information hub); 
V. Articulation of initiatives undertaken by other control actors (interface); 
VI. Knowledge production and transfer (role of research, membership of and 
participation in international forums and networks); 
VII. Rule of law (checks-and-balances and accountability to sovereign authority); 
and  
VIII. Existence, known by and accessible to the public at large. 
 
When the above-mentioned authors identify requisites, some highlight variables that 
lead to the failure of ACAs. Pope and Vogl (2000:6), Heilbrunn (2004:14) and the TI 
Sourcebook (2000:95) underscore a number of these factors. According to the TI 
Sourcebook (2000:95), anti-corruption agencies fail owing to the following reasons: 
 
I. Weak political will – vested interests and other pressing concerns overwhelm 
the leadership;  
II. Lack of resources – there is a lack of appreciation for the cost-benefits of a 
―clean‖ administration and the fact that an effective agency needs proper 
funding; 
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III. Political interference – the agency is not allowed to do its job independently, 
least of all to investigate officials at the higher and highest levels of 
government;  
IV. Fear of the consequences – a lack of commitment and a readiness to 
accommodate the status quo lead to agencies losing independence, 
resources, or both; 
V. Unrealistic expectations – fighting systemic corruption is a long-term exercise; 
VI. Excessive reliance on enforcement – the effective preventive capacities of the 
agencies are not fostered;  
VII. Overlooking the elimination of opportunities – relying on enforcement after the 
event, corruption levels continue unabated;  
VIII. Inadequate laws – without enforceable and effective laws, an agency is 
hamstrung; 
IX. Being overwhelmed by the past – a new agency, usually small and needing to 
settle in, can be overwhelmed by inheriting the total backlog of unfinished 
business from other enforcement agencies, crippling it from day one;  
X. Failure to win the involvement of the community, for example, a lack of public 
awareness campaigns;  
XI. Insufficient accountability – if the agency is not itself accountable in 
appropriate ways, it can become an agency for persecuting government 
critics;  
XII. Loss of morale – as people lose confidence in the agency, its staff lose 
morale; and 
XIII. The agency itself becomes corrupt. 
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Anti-corruption agencies may be so beholden to their political masters that they dare 
not investigate even the most corrupt government officials; they may lack the power 
to prosecute; and they may be poorly staffed (Pope & Vogl, 2000:6). Heilbrunn 
(2004:14) summarises key variables that might explain a failure to reduce corruption 
through the establishment of an anti-corruption agency as the absence of laws 
necessary for its success; a lack of independence from interference by the political 
leadership; an unclear reporting hierarchy; the absence of oversight committees, 
and the size of a country, either geographically or in terms of its population. 
 
Heilbrunn (2004:15) explains variables that lead to the failure of anti-corruption 
agencies to reduce corruption as follows: 
 
I. The failure by many governments either to enforce existing laws or the 
commissions having no mandate to enforce laws; 
II. Interference by the political leadership;  
III. Monopolisation of information by the executive branch therefore eliminating 
any accountability from independent agencies; and 
IV. Non-existence of oversight committees that provide control over the ACA and 
protect it from any persecution of political opponents.  
 
 
Anti-corruption agencies have proven to be successful in Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Botswana (Del Mar Landette, 2002:3). However, according to Man-wai (2006:198), 
the Hong Kong model in fighting corruption has been the most successful. 
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3.2.3 Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption  
 
Heilbrunn (2004:3) differentiates among four types of anti-corruption commissions: 
first, the universal model with its investigative, preventative, and communicative 
functions.  
 
―The universal model is typified by Hong Kong‟s Independent Commission against 
Corruption (ICAC). Second, the investigative model is characterised by a small and 
centralised investigative commission as operates in Singapore‟s Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau (CPIB). Both the universal and investigative models are 
organisationally accountable to the executive. Third, the parliamentary model 
includes commissions that report to parliamentary committees and are independent 
from the executive and judicial branches of state. The parliamentary model is 
epitomised by the New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption 
that takes a preventative approach to fighting corruption. Finally, the multi-agency 
model includes a number of offices that are individually distinct, but together weave 
a web of agencies to fight corruption” (Heilbrunn, 2004:3). 
 
 
Hong Kong‘s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), Singapore‘s 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and Botswana‘s Directorate of 
Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) possess common elements that 
contribute to their success, such as the following: 
 
I. A strong, enforceable legal framework;  
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II. Independence of action, resources and staff, and the power to investigate and 
pursue corruption at the highest levels of government; 
III. Political and bureaucratic support, and the capacity to access information, 
witnesses and documentation; and  
IV. Community involvement and support, and adequate accountability 
mechanisms that involve civil society (Del Mar Landette, 2002:4).  
 
The well-known successful anti-corruption agency, the Hong Kong ICAC, is said to 
consist of eleven components, that is, a three-pronged strategy; enforcement led; 
professional staff; an effective deterrence strategy; an effective prevention strategy; 
an effective education strategy; adequate law; a review mechanism; equal emphasis 
on public and private sector corruption; a partnership approach; a top political will; 
independence, and adequate resources. The table below illustrates and describes 
these components: 
 
Table 3.1: Hong Kong Model   
COMPONENT  DESCRIPTION 
1. Three-pronged 
Strategy 
The three-pronged approach adopted by the Hong Kong 
ICAC consists of deterrence, prevention and education.  
As a result, the Commission consists of three separate 
departments: the Operations Department to investigate 
corruption: the Corruption Prevention Department to 
examine the systems and procedures in the public 
sector, to identify corruption opportunities and to make 
recommendations to plug the loopholes; and the 
Community Relations department to educate the public 
against the evil of corruption and to enlist their support 
and partnership in fighting corruption. 
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2. Enforcement 
led 
The ICAC devotes over 70 per cent of its resources to 
the Operations Department, the reason being that any 
successful fight against corruption must start with 
effective enforcement on major targets, so as to 
demonstrate to the public the government‘s 
determination to fight corruption at all costs, as well as to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
agencies. 
3. Professional 
staff 
Fighting corruption is a very difficult task, because one 
confronts people who are probably very intelligent, 
knowledgeable and powerful. Thus the corruption 
fighters must be very professional in their approach. The 
ICAC ensures that their staff members are professionals 
in their diverse responsibilities.  
4. Effective 
deterrence 
strategy 
The ICAC‘s strategy to ensure effective enforcement 
consists of the following components: i. An effective 
public complaint system to encourage reporting of 
corruption by members of the public and referrals from 
other institutions. ii. A quick response system to deal with 
complaints that require prompt action. iii. A zero 
tolerance policy. So long as there is reasonable 
suspicion, all reports of corruption, irrespective of 
whether they are serious or relatively minor in nature, will 
be properly investigated. iv. A review system to ensure 
all investigations are professionally and promptly 
investigated. v. Publication of any successful 
enforcement in the media to demonstrate effectiveness 
and to deter the corrupt. 
5. Effective 
prevention 
strategy 
The corruption prevention strategy reduces the 
corruption opportunities in government departments and 
public institutions, through an enhanced system control; 
enhanced staff integrity; streamlined procedures; proper 
supervisory checks and control; efficiency, transparency 
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and accountability; and promoting a staff code of ethics. 
6. Effective 
education 
strategy  
The ICAC has a wide range of education strategies in 
order to enlist the support of the entire community in a 
partnership to fight corruption. It includes: i. Media 
publicity to ensure effective enforcement cases are well 
publicised, through press releases, media conferences 
and interviews, as well as the making of a television 
drama series based on successful cases. ii. Media 
education – the use of mass media commercials to 
encourage the public to report corruption; to promote 
public awareness of the evils of corruption and the need 
for a fair and just society, and as a deterrence to the 
corrupt. iii. School ethics education programme, starting 
in kindergarten up to university level. iv. Establishing an 
ICAC Club to accept members who wish to perform 
voluntary work for the ICAC in community education. v. 
Corruption prevention talks and ethics development 
seminars for public servants and business sectors. vi. 
Issuing corruption prevention best practices and 
guidelines. vii. In partnership with the business sector, 
setting up an Ethics Development Centre as a resource 
centre for the promotion of a staff code of ethics. viii. 
Organising exhibitions, fairs, television variety shows to 
spread the message of a clean society. ix.  Wide use of 
websites for publicity and reference, youth education and 
ethics development 
7. Adequate law  Hong Kong has comprehensive legislation to deal with 
corruption. In terms of offences, apart from the normal 
bribery offences, it created two unique offences: 1. 
Offence for any civil servant to accept gifts, loans, 
discounts and passage, even if there are no related 
corrupt dealings, unless specific permission is given. 2. 
Offence for any civil servant to be in possession of 
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assets disproportionate to his or her official income; or 
living above his or her means. On investigative power, 
apart from the normal police power of search, arrest and 
detention, the ICAC has the power to check bank 
accounts, require witnesses to answer questions on 
oath, restrain properties suspected to be derived from 
corruption, and hold the suspects‘ travel documents to 
prevent them from fleeing the jurisdiction. Not only are 
they empowered to investigate corruption offences, both 
in the government and private sectors, they can 
investigate all crimes which are connected with 
corruption. 
8. Review 
mechanism  
With the provision of wide investigative power, there is 
an elaborate checks and balance system to prevent 
abuse of such wide power. One unique feature is the 
Operations Review Committee. It is a high-powered 
committee, with the majority of its members from the 
private sector, appointed by the Chief Executive. The 
Committee reviews each report of corruption and 
investigation to ensure all complaints are properly dealt 
with and there is no ‗whitewashing‘. It publishes an 
annual report to be tabled before the legislature for 
debate, thus ensuring public transparency and 
accountability. In addition, there is an independent 
Complaint Committee where members of the public can 
lodge any complaint against the ICAC and/or its officers 
and there will be an independent investigation. It also 
publishes an annual report to be tabled before the 
legislature. 
9. Equal 
emphasis on 
public &private 
sector 
Hong Kong is one of the earliest jurisdictions to 
criminalise private sector corruption. The ICAC places 
equal emphasis on public and private sector corruption. 
The rationale is that there should be no double standards 
110 
 
corruption  in society. Private sector corruption can cause as much 
damage to society, if not more, than public sector 
corruption. Serious corruption in financial institutions can 
cause market instability. Effective enforcement against 
private sector corruption can be seen as a safeguard for 
foreign investment and ensures that Hong Kong 
maintains a high level of integrity in its business 
environment. 
10. Partnership 
approach  
One cannot rely on a single agency to fight corruption. 
Each member of the community and each institution has 
a role to play. The ICAC adopts a partnership approach 
to mobilise all sectors to fight corruption together. The 
key strategic partners of ICAC include: 1. Civil Service 
Commission 2. All government departments 3. Business 
community 4. Professional bodies 5. Civic societies and 
community organisations 6. Educational institutions 7. 
Mass media 8. International networking 
11. Top political 
will, 
independence 
and adequate 
resources 
In Hong Kong there is clearly a top political will to 
eradicate corruption which enables the ICAC to be a truly 
independent agency. The ICAC is directly responsible to 
the very top, who is the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. 
This ensures that the ICAC is free from any interference 
in conducting their investigations. The strong political 
support was translated into financial support. The ICAC 
is probably one of the most expensive anti-corruption 
agencies in the world! In 2002, its annual budget 
amounted to US$90M, about US$15 per capita. One 
may wish to multiply this figure with one‘s own country‘s 
population and calculate the anti-corruption budget that 
needs to be given to the equivalent of Hong Kong‘s! 
However, looking at the ICAC budget from another angle 
– it represents only 0.3 per cent of the entire government 
budget or 0.05 per cent of Hong Kong Gross Domestic 
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Product (GDP). One may infer that such a small 
‗premium‘ is a worthwhile investment for a clean society 
(Man-wai, 2006:196-201). 
Source: (Man-wai, 2006:196-201)  
 
Hong Kong‘s experience proved that given a top political will, a dedicated anti-
corruption agency and a correct strategy, even the most corrupt country like Hong 
Kong can be transformed into a clean society (Man-wai, 2006: 201).  
 
3.2.4 State of Anti-Corruption Agencies in South Africa  
 
South Africa has adapted the Multi-Agency Model as used by the United States of 
America and most of Western Europe, which involves putting measures in place to 
address gaps, weaknesses, and new opportunities for corruption (Meagher & 
Voland, 2006:20). According to Boone (2002:43), the presence in South Africa of no 
fewer than 12 agencies which have anti-corruption as part of their mandate is proof, 
if it were needed, that there is strong political will to tackle corruption and that 
resources are being made available. One would infer that it is unnecessary to have a 
number of agencies working towards the same goal. In a developing country such as 
South Africa available resources would better be utilised optimally by one agency 
towards strengthening its functionality in promoting anti-corruption strategies. 
 
The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (2002:14) states that of the 12 
agencies, only the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) has an exclusive (albeit narrow) 
anti-corruption mandate and none of the existing mandates promote a holistic 
approach to fighting corruption. The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 
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(2002:14) further argues that this situation of fragmentation, insufficient coordination, 
poor delineation of responsibility and assimilation of corruption work into a broader 
mandate directly affects the resourcing and optimal functioning of these agencies. 
To address this situation the following actions are recommended: 
 
I. A clear definition of the roles, powers and responsibilities of the twelve  
agencies in order to increase their efficiency, including the allocation of new 
roles to negate deficiencies in areas of focus and to promote a holistic and 
integrated approach; 
II. Establishment of formal coordinating and integrating mechanisms within the 
national executive and between departments and agencies involved in anti-
corruption work. Coordination at the level of departments and agencies must 
be regulated by a protocol and this mechanism must be accountable to the 
national executive through the governance and administration structures; 
III. Well defined accountability arrangements for all the institutions (departments 
and agencies); and 
IV. Increased institutional capacity of institutions (departments and agencies), in 
particular the competencies of employees, and a focus on prevention 
(Department of Public Service and Administration, 2002:14). 
 
Echoing the same sentiments of the Department of Public Service and 
Administration above, Boone (2002:43) writes that as a number of representatives 
involved in the South African campaign have noted, the sheer number of agencies 
makes an integrated national approach to the problem difficult. Writers such as 
Heilbrunn (2004:3), Del Mar Landette (2002:4) and Man-wai (2006:196-201), as 
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shown above in section 3.2.3, are in favour of the Hong Kong ICAC model, which is 
a typical example of a single anti-corruption agency. 
 
3.2.5 Single Anti-Corruption Agency Approach 
 
Hong Kong, through the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), has 
provided the standard for powerful, centralised anti-corruption agencies (Meagher & 
Voland, 2006:10). The  issue of having one anti-corruption agency in South Africa 
has been debated by a number of researchers, including Meagher and Voland 
(2006), Camerer (1999), and the Public Service Commission (2001). There have 
been conflicting opinions. For some, the question is whether South Africa can afford 
a single agency approach to fighting corruption while others recommend that the 
country should establish such an agency. 
 
While some support the idea of establishing a single anti-corruption agency in South 
Africa, real concerns exist about its location, funding and mandate (Public Service 
Commission, 2001:5). The Public Service Commission (2001:5) argues that  a single 
agency should not be encouraged because the current mechanisms are not 
functioning optimally; it is important to establish whether existing agencies can be 
restructured and transformed before planning the establishment of a new body; and 
risks involved in establishing a new single agency include the addition of another 
layer of bureaucracy to the law enforcement sector and the diversion of already 
scarce resources from existing agencies and other government priorities. However, 
according to Camerer (1999:11), in the light of the criteria which underlie effective 
anti-corruption agencies, a number of conclusions can be drawn in relation to the 
relative success of both the Hong Kong and South African case studies in fighting 
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corruption (Camerer, 1999:11). Camerer (1999:11) indicates that criminal 
investigations are central to the ICAC‘s mandate; activities are supported by a well-
resourced police force and criminal justice system and that it acts within a 
‗supportive‘ political environment, while in South Africa tension exists when it comes 
to institutional capacity to deal with corruption; and owing to a lack of support  by a 
sympathetic context to corruption reform or an effectively functioning criminal justice 
system, the weaknesses in the system become apparent. The first key variable that 
might explain a failure to reduce corruption through the establishment of an anti-
corruption agency is the absence of legislation necessary for its success (Heilbrunn, 
2004:15). 
 
It can be deduced that anti-corruption agencies are meant to spearhead the fight 
against corruption. However, there is evidence that for ACAs to be able to serve this 
purpose there are characteristics they cannot do without. A number of such features 
have been presented by a preponderance of literature.  
 
The literature provides reasons why such agencies fail. Various types of anti-
corruption agencies are identified as well as identifying which operate better than 
others and writers agree that as an anti-corruption agency the Hong Kong ICAC is 
the best in the world. It has been established that the success of anti-corruption 
agencies also hinges on effective anti-corruption legislation. 
 
The situation regarding anti-corruption agencies in the country has proved not to be 
based on the studied literature. The level of South African anti-corruption agencies‘ 
successes has been limited, attributing that to weaknesses such as fragmentation, 
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insufficient coordination, poor delineation of responsibility, and assimilation of 
corruption work into a broader mandate. Ways of addressing shortcomings identified 
include a clear definition of the roles, powers and responsibilities of ACAs in order to 
increase their efficiency; establishment of formal coordinating and integrating 
mechanisms within the national executive and between departments and agencies 
involved in anti-corruption work; well-defined accountability arrangements for all the 
institutions (departments and agencies); increased institutional capacity of 
institutions (departments and agencies), in particular the competencies of 
employees, and a focus on prevention and/or establishment of an anti-corruption 
agency. 
 
3.3 ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION 
 
According to the World Bank (2001:1), having anti-corruption legislation in place is 
an obvious first step when embarking on an anti-corruption programme. Authors 
such as Heilbrunn (2004), Messick and Kleinfeld (2001), Del Mar Landette (2002), 
Theobald (1990), Kaplow (1992), Mollah and Uddin, (2002) and others, including 
organisations such as Transparency International, the World Bank, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the DPSA have identified key 
factors that determine the effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation. 
 
Mollah and Uddin (2002:23) argue that while a well-functioning, competent and 
clean judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law on a day-to-day basis, anti-
corruption laws turn out to be an effective means of an anti-corruption strategy. 
According to Messick  and Kleinfeld  (2001:1), achieving objectives such as informed 
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and vigilant citizenry, and government employees imbued with a service ethic takes 
time, while enacting an anti-corruption law is a relatively speedy and inexpensive 
way to address the problem.  
 
3.3.1 Elements of Effective Anti-Corruption Legislation 
 
The above-mentioned authors identify other characteristics such as detection, 
investigation and prosecution of cases, and punishment, prevention and 
enforcement aspects as imperative for effective anti-corruption laws. Del Mar 
Landette (2002:23) highlights specific anti-corruption legislation that defines public 
standards of behaviour and their enforcement through investigation and prosecution 
as a requirement while Messick and Kleinfeld (2001), Mollah and Uddin (2002), and 
Hin (2011) emphasise the prevention of corruption.  
 
Messick and Kleinfeld (2001:1) states that an obvious first step is to ensure that laws 
are in place to deter corruption. Prevention is regarded as better than cure. 
According to the DPSA Report (2006:22), the costs of preventing corruption are far 
less than investigating it, holding disciplinary inquiries, and taking cases to court. In 
Singapore the principal law is the Prevention of Corruption Act which governs the 
primary offences of corruption and the powers of the enforcement agency (Hin, 
2011: 124). The World Bank Group (2007:3) explains that anti-corruption laws work 
to deter corrupt actions, prosecute corruptors and resurrect a sense of justice. 
However, Transparency International (2007: Online) argues that although it is widely 
recognised that the prevention of corruption should be at the forefront of reform 
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efforts, effective detection and punishment through relevant anti-corruption laws and 
proceedings is equally important.  
 
Mollah and Uddin (2002:23) add that anti-corruption laws work to resurrect a sense 
of justice which has become a rare commodity in endemically corrupt countries, 
while the USAID Handbook (2002:11) promotes the application of sanctions to 
corrupt acts as an important step towards establishing accountability. The World 
Bank (2001:1) supports this notion and argues that laws that punish bribery and 
other forms of corruption have proliferated throughout the developing world (World 
Bank, 2001:1). 
 
Messick and Kleinfeld (2001:2) identify three aspects of effective anti-corruption law. 
Anti-corruption laws should contain bright-line rules, be tailored to enforcement 
capacity, and be supported by complementary measures. The World Bank (2001: 2-
3) advises that countries with weak enforcement institutions should consider 
including the following bright-line rules in their anti-corruption laws: 
 
I. No government employee may receive any gift, payment, or anything of value 
in excess of a small sum from anyone who is not a member of that person‘s 
immediate family. 
II. No employee may hold, directly or indirectly (that is, through family or other 
agents), an interest in a corporation or other entity affected by that 
employee‘s decision. 
III. Every year all employees above a certain pay level must publicly disclose all 
assets they hold directly or indirectly. 
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IV. No employee may hire a relative (with a precise specification on how distant a 
relation must be before he or she is a ‗relative‘).  
V. All employees must disclose any relationship with people hired and with firms 
or entities to which they award a contact or concession. (Since in many 
countries the pool of talented workers and qualified firms is small, this rule 
leaves decisions about ‗corruption‘ to public opinion.) 
 
Those who formulate anti-corruption legislation need to ensure clarity and non-
ambiguity of the law: that it is simple to apply, and that it demands little or no 
judgment in determining its applicability (Messick & Kleinfeld, 2001:2). Laws written 
this way are said to contain ―bright-line rules‖ and are contrasted with those 
containing standards that are open to interpretation by enforcement agencies 
(Kaplow, 1992:557–629). When drafting such acts, the instinct is to list every activity 
that can conceivably be considered corrupt, and to avoid deliberate 
misinterpretation, as people are creative in finding ways to enrich themselves or their 
friends and family at the public‘s expense (World Bank, 2001:1). 
 
According to Messick and Kleinfeld (2002:2), bright-line rules are easy to 
understand, simple to apply, and demand little or no judgment in determining their 
applicability. This statement is supported by Kaplow (1992:557-629) who states that 
such laws are contrasted with those which contain standards that are open to 
interpretation by enforcement agencies. The World Bank (2001:1-2) is also against 
broadly drawn provisions that set out a general standard such as the provision found 
in the laws of several nations making the ―abuse of public office for private gain‖ a 
crime. 
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Sanctions are centred on legislation that criminalises corruption (USAID, 2002:11). 
The aim of imposing stiff penalties is to make corruption a high-risk activity. 
Adequate anti-corruption legislation should, apart from the normal bribery offences, 
create two unique offences: 
 
I. An offence for any civil servant to accept gifts, loans, discounts and passage, 
even if there are no related corrupt dealings, unless specific permission is 
given. 
II. An offence for any civil servant to be in possession of assets disproportionate 
to his/her official income; or living above his or her means (Man-wai, 
2006:200). 
 
The World Bank Group (2007:1) provides the following considerations that should be 
taken into account when creating anti-corruption laws: 
 
I. The laws should match the enforcement capacity of the country's institutions. 
Since the level of integrity and capacity will be rather low in most countries 
where corruption is rampant, a law should be easy to understand and 
unequivocal in its applicability.  
II. Bright-line rules should be introduced: they are easy to understand and apply 
but come at the cost of reduced flexibility. Examples include a ban on the 
hiring of relatives or friends regardless of qualification and a ban on receiving 
any gift in excess of a small set value or a mandatory declaration of assets. 
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Having reviewed anti-corruption legislation in 21 countries, (Australia, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, the Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, 
Singapore and Vanuatu), Chêne (2010:7) concludes that good practice examples of 
anti-corruption laws have been developed in Singapore, Hong Kong and, to some 
extent, in Malaysia. 
  
Chêne (2010:7) identifies the following highlights about each country‘s legislation: 
Singapore‘s Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) was enacted in 1960. The law 
explicitly defines corruption in terms of various forms of ―gratification‖ and combines 
extensive prevention measures with severe sanctions and penalties. Hong Kong‘s 
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance 1970 (POBO) is a comprehensive piece of 
legislation that covers all types of bribery, both in the public and the private sectors, 
and Malaysia‘s Anti-Corruption Act 1997 provides for offences and penalties for 
private and public sector corruption, including active and passive bribery, attempted 
corruption and abuse of office, corruption through agents and intermediaries, 
corruption in public procurement and electoral corruption. 
 
3.3.2 Enforceability of Legislation 
 
Having tough laws is no guarantee that there is effective enforcement (Hean, 
2010:151). Supporting this view, Del Mar Landette (2002:25) states that regardless 
of how well-written and well-intentioned anti-corruption laws are, they are completely 
ineffective without enforcement, making it essential that civil and criminal laws are 
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used consistently to enforce and penalise corrupt activities. If there are tough laws 
but lax enforcement, corruption will still flourish because the corrupt escape 
detection and investigation (Hean, 2010:151).  
 
Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999:101) point out that independent enforcement 
mechanisms should be implemented to increase the likelihood of corruption being 
detected and punished. The law must define what constitutes corrupt offences, and 
their punishment, and identify the powers of enforcement against them (Hin, 2011: 
124). Stapenhurst and  Kpundeh (1999:101) suggest that investigators, prosecutors, 
and adjudicators must be able to perform their professional duties in a transparent 
independent fashion and enforce the rule of law against all who breach it, whatever 
their positions (thus depoliticising law enforcement). 
 
Theobald (1990:85) and Del Mar Landette (2004:25) further underscore the issue of 
de-politicisation of anti-corruption legislation enforcement as another factor that 
contributes towards its effectiveness. According to Theobald (1990:85), the 
experience of many developing countries, including Nigeria, suggests that the main 
weakness of legal reforms and instruments in combating corruption is that they 
ultimately depend on the will and perseverance of political leaders. Where political 
power is used to shield corrupt activities of family, friends or political supporters, no 
laws, codes or punishment will have an impact on corruption (Del Mar Landette, 
2004:25). Moreover, the employees of implementing institutions are often easily 
manipulated for political purposes (The World Bank, 2001:1-2). World Bank surveys 
have found the police and other enforcement agencies to be some of the most 
corrupt and least trusted government agencies (The World Bank, 2001:1-2). 
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Hean (2010:150) asserts that enforcement of such laws is vital as corruption 
offences are particularly difficult to deal with. Corrupt practices are consensual in 
nature, with both the giver and the taker motivated by mutual interests (Lian, 
2008:4). Unlike general crime where there is a victim who reveals what happened, in 
corruption offences both the giver and the receiver are guilty parties who have the 
motivation to hide and not tell the truth, which makes investigation and evidence- 
gathering more challenging (Hean, 2010:150). Effective laws are enforcement-
friendly laws that provide the necessary authority which is particularly necessary 
because corrupt practices, by their very nature, make the eventual conviction in a 
court of law difficult (Lian, 2008:6).  
 
The World Bank (2001:1-2) further suggests questions that should be asked by 
those who draft anti-corruption legislation: They are as follows: 
 
I. What is the capacity of the institutions that will enforce the law? Are the 
police, prosecutors, courts, and other enforcement agencies staffed by 
honest, technically competent professionals?  
II. Are they independent of the executive in theory?  
III. Are they independent of the executive in practice?  
IV. To whom, and in what ways, are they accountable?  
 
3.3.3 Complementary Measures 
 
Statutes outlawing bribery, nepotism, and other corrupt acts should be 
complemented by laws that help bring corruption to light (The World Bank, 2001:3). 
The World Bank Group (2007), the TI Source Book (2000) and Mollah and Uddin 
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(2002) are in agreement that legislation supporting the transition towards a 
corruption-free society includes a freedom of information law, a whistleblower 
protection law, conflict of interest laws, procurement laws, and party financing laws. 
To this list the World Bank (2001:3) adds media freedom.  
 
The entire legislative anti-corruption framework should be supplemented with laws 
such as the following: 
 
I. Criminal laws including the relevant offences; elements of criminal procedure; 
laws governing the liability of public officials, as well as laws governing the 
tracing and seizure of the proceeds of corruption and, where applicable, other 
property used to commit, or in connection with, such offences; 
II. Elements treated as regulatory or administrative law by most countries, 
including relevant public service standards and practices and regulations 
governing key functions;  
III. Legislation governing court procedures and the substantive and procedural 
rules governing the use of civil litigation as a means of seeking redress for 
malfeasance or negligence attributable to corruption; and 
IV. Any area of professional practice governed by established rules, whether 
enacted by the state or adopted by the profession itself, may also be open to 
internal or external review (United Nations, 2004:76). 
 
Anti-corruption legislation should also work with existing civil service rules, 
regulations and codes of conduct by clarifying and increasing the effectiveness of 
these legal instruments (Del Mar Landette, 2002:23). Anti-corruption laws generally 
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encompass a variety of statutes that prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, 
and favouritism in the awarding of contracts or the provision of government benefits 
(The World Bank, 2001:1). Anti-corruption legislation should work with existing civil 
service rules, regulations and codes of conduct by clarifying and increasing the 
effectiveness of these legal instruments (OECD, 1999:15). 
 
The Handbook on Fighting Corruption (1999:9) avows that freedom of information 
legislation improves accountability by enhancing the transparency of financial 
management systems and audit government operations; counteracts official secret 
acts and claims of national security that impede corruption inquiries; requires 
government to disclose information about its activities at the request of any citizen 
and can be used by watchdog groups to monitor government behaviour; and informs 
citizens of the procedures for government service, curtailing attempts to subvert the 
system or to demand gratuities for information that legally should be public. To fight 
corruption, many governments have passed laws designed to increase transparency 
in government services (Hanna, Bishop, Scheffler & Durlacher, 2011:13). 
 
Freedom of information laws, whereby citizens can demand the disclosure of 
information regarding government activities and a whistleblower protection law in 
order to encourage the reporting of corruption cases can further reinforce the impact 
of increased transparency on accountability (Kameswari, 2006:30). In recent years, 
several countries have adopted whistleblower protection laws which encourage 
government employees to reveal, without fear of retaliation, corrupt acts uncovered 
in the course of their work. A whistleblower protection encourages the reporting of 
corruption cases (World Bank Group, 2007:1).  
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Each of the provisions of whistleblower protection legislation should be designed 
with one or more of the following objectives in mind: 
 
I. protection of whistleblowers;  
II. ensuring that disclosures are properly dealt with; 
III. protection from exposure of identity;  
IV. protection from detrimental/reprisal action;  
V. protection from liability (for example, from any criminal or civil liability arising 
out of the disclosure); and  
VI. redress for detriment or reprisal (for example, damages in tort or 
compensation) (Sinha, 1994:131). 
 
The experience of many developing countries suggests that the main weakness of 
legal reforms and instruments in combating corruption is that they ultimately depend 
on the will and perseverance of political leaders (Theobald, 1990:85). Where political 
power is used to shield corrupt activities of family, friends or political supporters, no 
laws, codes or punishment will have an impact on corruption (Del Mar Landette, 
2002:23). 
 
Sinha (1994:131) states that public procurement is the most common procedure 
where corruption occurs. A lack of transparency in the management of state 
resources, in budgetary processes and resources allocation facilitates the possibility 
for corrupt activities (Del Mar Landette, 2002:23). Therefore, reforms in this area are 
geared at improving financial management systems to serve as tools for preventing, 
discovering and punishing fraudulent operations (Del Mar Landette, 2002:23). 
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The Asian Development Bank (2006:26-27) suggests that the comprehensive 
legislation for public procurement as a central precondition of clear, transparent and 
fair public procurement should be considered to increase the effectiveness of the 
legal and institutional frameworks for curbing corruption. Effective financial 
management systems set clear responsibilities for managing resources, and 
facilitate the audit of expenditures, reducing the opportunities for the unofficial use of 
resources (Del Mar Landette, 2002:23). 
 
Kameswari (2006:30) advises that disclosures should be made at the time of the 
bidding and again within six months of the completion or abandonment of a contract. 
Competitive procurement removes personal discretion from the selection of 
government suppliers and contractors by prescribing an open bidding process, 
thereby guarding against corruption (USAID, 2002:36-37). The consolidation and 
standardisation of multiple government agency rules into a single public sector 
procurement code can help to execute procurement decisions in an efficient, fair, 
impartial, transparent and accountable manner, and can also facilitate the detection 
and punishment of corrupt actions (Del Mar Landette, 2002:23). 
 
If effective, procurement laws can act both as an important deterrent to corruption 
and as a contribution to an environment in which further remedies can be developed 
(World Bank Group, 2007:1). The OECD Report (2004:1) stresses that there is a 
need for developing a comprehensive, integrated and multi-disciplinary approach 
that includes measures from raising awareness and prevention to effective 
sanctioning of corruption in public procurement. 
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Anti-money laundering regulations also contribute towards curbing fraudulent 
practices (Mollah & Uddin, 2002:23). The UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, (2004:429) 
affirms that money-laundering statutes can contribute significantly in the detection of 
corruption and related offences by providing the basis for financial investigations. 
Banking secrecy laws are also a serious obstacle to successful corruption 
investigations.   
 
Besides known criminal acts that are involved in corruption, the Global Programme 
against Corruption (2004:429) identifies other behaviours that are worth sanctioning 
by means of criminal or administrative law. These are the following:  
 
I. Favouritism and nepotism;  
II. Conflicts of interest;  
III. Contributions to political parties;   
IV. Creation of slush funds;  
V. The accumulation of assets ‗off the books‘ with the purpose of using such 
funds to pay bribes; and 
VI. Possession of unexplained wealth by introducing offences that penalise any 
(former) public servants who are, or have been, maintaining a standard of 
living or holding pecuniary resources or property that are significantly 
disproportionate to their present or past known legal income and who are 
unable to produce a satisfactory explanation.  
 
Jayawickrama, Pope and Stolpe (2002:24) point out additional measures that are 
needed to complement anti-corruption laws such as providing for more innovative 
evidence-gathering procedures, such as integrity testing; amnesty regulations for 
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those involved in the corrupt transaction; and the abolition and/or limiting of 
enhanced banking .Effective implementation of mutual legal assistance instruments 
and legislation is not possible without personnel who are well-trained with respect to 
the applicable laws, principles and practices (United Nations, 2004:562). 
 
While many measures can be implemented without laws, many major or 
fundamental changes require a basis in national constitutions or statute law such as 
the following: 
 
I. Basic judicial independence and separation-of-powers safeguards; 
II. Basic human rights such as the freedoms of association and expression; 
III. Rules to protect the independence of key groups such as the media; and 
IV. The creation of independent anti-corruption institutions (United Nations, 
2004:296). 
 
3.3.4 State of Anti-Corruption Legislation in South Africa  
 
The United Nations (2003), Godi (2007), the Gauteng Anti-Corruption Strategic 
Framework (2009), Chêne, (2010) and Woods (2011) all commend South Africa for 
having a relatively sophisticated and comprehensive legal framework which deals 
with corruption, transparency in procurement, and financial management. However, 
the above authors also identify flaws in these laws when assessing their 
effectiveness, while several provide measures of how to mitigate these failures. 
 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2003:6), South Africa 
has unique legislation which empowers the general public to require information 
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from the public sector (and to a lesser extent from the private sector) and to 
challenge administrative decisions. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(2003:6) further expounds the fact that these laws greatly enhance transparency and 
contribute to clean government, and provide state-of-the-art protection to whistle- 
blowers in a workplace. The Gauteng Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework (2009:8) 
argues that the elements of an effective anti-corruption framework exist in South 
Africa and in Gauteng.   
 
The existing South African anti-corruption legislative framework is stable (DPSA, 
2002:12). However, it is fragmented; there are capacity constraints in complying with 
it. It has proven to be ineffective; since the common law crime of bribery was 
repealed by this Act, prosecution of bribery cases has been insignificant. There are 
serious weaknesses and shortcomings in the capacity and will of public sector 
bodies to implement and to comply with the laws and there are overlapping 
mandates which affect the law enforcement agencies and the constitutionally 
created bodies (United Nations, 2003:6).  
 
According to Godi (2007:6), the public sector has uneven capacity to enforce and 
comply with the legislation; the courts are overloaded and struggle to retain 
experienced prosecutors; and the legislative mandates of some law enforcement 
and other agencies overlap. These laws do not function optimally and are not 
effectively adhered to; South Africa continues to rank amongst the highest in terms 
of levels of corruption and perceptions of corruption; and there are inefficiencies 
within and between institutions with anti-corruption mandates, a lack of effective 
follow-up on complaints of corruption, inefficient application of disciplinary systems, 
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underdeveloped management capacity in some areas and societal attitudes which 
weaken anti-corruption efforts (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2009:8).  
 
Regarding the effectiveness of this law-directed anti-corruption approach, every 
indication has been that corruption, particularly in the public sector, continues to 
escalate and has now reached the point where South Africa is widely perceived as 
having one of the highest levels of public sector corruption in the world (Woods, 
2011:1). Woods (2011:5) attributes this failure to poor management which results in 
weak application of laws and regulations, and subsequently deteriorating application 
of internal systems which, in turn, leads to opportunities for corruption. 
 
The DPSA (2002:12) recommends that review and consolidation to improve its 
efficiency is required. In particular, the process of review and consolidation must 
focus on the following: 
 
I. Establishing a workable legal definition of corruption; 
II. Extending the scope of legislation to all officials in public bodies, 
corruptors and their agents; 
III. Reinstating the common law offence of bribery; 
IV. Creating presumption of prima facie proof to facilitate prosecution of an 
offence under the revised legislation; 
V. Establishing extra-territorial application and jurisdiction, and 
compliance with international conventions to which South Africa is a 
signatory; 
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VI. Improving the civil and recovery elements of the legislative framework, 
in particular tax legislation that prohibits rebates related to bribes, the 
applicability of Sections 297 and 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
recovery of losses in terms of the Public Finance Management Act of 
2003, prevention of organised crime, recovery from pension provisions, 
freezing of assets and return of assets to institutions that incurred 
losses; 
VII. Enabling the State and individuals to claim for damages; 
VIII. Prohibiting corrupt individuals from further employment in the public 
sector as well as prohibit corrupt businesses (including principals and 
directors of such businesses) from gaining contracts funded from state 
revenue; 
IX. Regulating post-public service employment; 
X. Establishing responsibility for maintaining the witness protection 
system; and 
XI. Making legislation easy to understand and apply in terms of the public 
service anticorruption strategy (DPSA, 2002:12-13). 
 
The United Nations (2003:6) recommends that proper legislative changes are 
needed to better define the mandates and facilitate co-ordination in the fight against 
corruption; legislative efforts are needed to provide for the inclusion of certain 
corporate governance measures; and finally, promulgation of adequate legislation 
and regulatory mechanisms for the private funding of the political parties and political 
campaigns is needed. Godi (2007:6) suggests that this failure should be resolved by 
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organisational and structural means, clarification of roles, and improved co-operation 
and co-ordination. 
 
DPSA (2002) suggests that South Africa‘s anti-corruption legislation should establish 
the following offences and obligations: 
 
I. Offences of accepting undue gratification; giving undue gratification; 
accepting or giving undue gratification by or to an agent; fraudulent 
acquisition of private interest; using office or position for undue gratification; 
dealing with, using, holding, receiving or concealing gratification in relation to 
any offence; and offences in respect of tenders as well as attempt, 
conspiracy, preparation and abetting; 
II. Offences related to bribery of public officers, foreign public officials, bribery in 
relation to auctions, and bribery for giving assistance, in regard to contracts; 
III. Corruption of witnesses and deliberate frustration of investigations; 
IV. Possession of unexplained wealth; and 
V. The obligation to report corrupt transactions (DPSA, 2002:13). 
 
It is clear that among characteristics that make anti-corruption legislation successful 
are detection, investigation and prosecution of cases, and punishment, prevention 
and enforcement aspects as being imperative for the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
laws.  While having anti-corruption legislation in place has proven to be an apparent 
first step, it has been revealed that there are other complementary measures that 
are needed, such as informed citizens; a need to foster and sustain high levels of 
professional and ethically imbued civil servants; and legislation that supports the 
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transition towards a corruption-free society. Such measures should include a 
freedom of information law; a whistleblower protection law; conflict of interest laws, 
procurement laws, and party financing laws. For laws to be effective they need to be 
enforceable.  
 
It has been established that effective implementation and enforcement of legislation 
is a critical step in efforts to achieve their effectiveness; as well the capacity of the 
institutions that will enforce the law; the honest and technical competency of the 
police, prosecutors, courts, and other enforcement agencies professionals; the 
independence of the executive in theory and in practice, and accountability of the 
executive (to whom and how). A literature examination of the status quo with regard 
to anti-corruption legislation in South Africa has revealed that it has not been 
successful, highlighting additional Acts that need to be regarded as offences by 
legislation itself. 
 
3.4 THE COUNTRY‘S PROGRESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
In Chapter 1 pieces of legislation passed and anticorruption agencies established to 
support the government‘s fight against corruption were mentioned.  Other significant 
strides that the government has made include the following: 
 
I. Reformed management practices, including appointment and 
disciplinary procedures;  
II. Instituted financial disclosure requirements and performance systems 
for managers in the public service;   
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III. Established a new, fair and transparent supply chain management 
system to prevent corruption in procurement;  
IV. Introduced a Public Service National Anti-Corruption Hotline System; 
and   
V. Instituted stringent financial management, risk management and fraud 
prevention requirements for public bodies. 
 
A National Anti-Corruption Strategy was also formulated. As part of its 
implementation, in September 2003 the Cabinet decided to require all public service 
departments and entities to have a minimum level of anti-corruption capacity 
(Department of Public Service and Administration, 2006:7). In 2006, Guidelines for 
Implementing the Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirement in Departments 
and Organisational Components in the Public Service were developed.   
 
Notwithstanding all the above-mentioned measures, according to the National 
Planning Commission, (2011:401) evidence gathered by the commission indicates 
that South Africa suffers from high levels of corruption that undermine the rule of law 
and hinder the state‘s ability to effect development and socio-economic 
transformation. Research from the Transparency International‘s Corruption 
Perception Index indicates that South Africa has fallen from a respectable 34th place 
in world rankings in 2000, to 64th place in 2011 (Corporate Governance Framework 
Research Institute 2012:42). 
 
Echoing the same sentiments, Cronin (2012:1) states that, the challenges of 
corruption have escalated significantly in South Africa over the past decade 
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threatening democratic achievements, undermining the capacity of the state to 
advance socio-economic transformation, and eroding the solidarity culture that once 
underpinned the broad-based anti-apartheid struggle.   
 
The National Planning Commission (2011:401) refers to it as the twin challenges of 
corruption and lack of accountability in our society which require a resilient system 
consisting of political will, sound institutions, a solid legal foundation and an active 
citizenry that is empowered to hold public officials accountable.  Emphasising the 
aspect of accountability, Mary Robinson‘s speech delivered to the Nelson Mandela 
Annual Lecture covered the following: 
 
“In the context of ideas of freedom and democracy, of citizenship and common 
purpose, inherent in the concept of truth is the need for transparency and 
accountability in government action. In order for citizens to remain the stewards of 
democracy, issues of accountability and transparency in governance are key. It is 
therefore with great concern that I have followed the progress of South Africa‟s 
“Protection of State Information” legislation – knowingly styled by its detractors as 
the “Secrecy Act”. Perhaps it is not my place to pronounce on the levels of 
corruption at play in today‟s South Africa. But, from my experience as a human 
rights lawyer, I can give you a certainty: if you enact a law that cloaks the workings 
of state actors, that interferes with press freedom to investigate corruption, that 
stifles efforts by whistleblowers to expose corruption, you are sure to increase those 
levels of corruption tomorrow. The public interest demands that basic truth, of having 
both transparency and accountability in government. Secrecy is the enemy of truth in 
this regard” (Robinson, 2012:2-3).  
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The National Planning Commission (2011:401) agrees that the performance of state 
systems of accountability has been irregular, enabling corruption to thrive. The 
problem statement of the Public Sector Integrity Management Framework regarding 
this reads as follows: 
 
“A myriad of challenges are apparent in the public service as far as implementation 
of ethical and anti-corruption measures is concerned, chief among them is non 
compliance with legislation and lack of enforcement... There is great frustration 
about the delayed response of departments in preventing and combating corruption. 
Sometimes it takes several months for disciplinary processes to even be started. 
Officials are often suspended on full pay for months, if not years. Furthermore, there 
are significant inconsistencies in the type of sanctions applied. Allegations of 
corruption reported to the anti-corruption hotline are referred back to departments for 
follow-up, but because departments do not have sufficient investigative capacity, 
initial investigations are never completed. The ineffectiveness of the Protected 
Disclosure Act, 2000 has also resulted in the lack of confidence in blowing the 
whistle against unethical conduct and corruption. Furthermore, the Country 
Corruption Assessment (CCA) conducted in 2002, amongst others, highlighted gaps 
in our knowledge of corruption in relation to incidents, trends, perceptions, causes as 
well as anti-corruption measures in place to fight corruption. The lack of a central 
database of cases of corruption was also highlighted” (Department of Public Service 
and Administration, 2011: 5). 
According to Pillay (2004:1), corruption is likely to appear on every observer‘s list of 
factors that threaten to obstruct South Africa‘s path towards sustainable 
development. However, rather than diminishing, corruption has proliferated in all 
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segments of the South African National Public Service (SANPS), making it the 
―common cold‖ of South African social ills (Pillay, 2004:1). The importance of 
transparency to public accountability has been demonstrated in theory and in 
practice. Dissatisfaction about lack of access to information on service delivery has 
emerged as a factor in public protests (National Planning Commission, 2011:407). 
 
According to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (2012:102), 
the union has been pushing consistently for decisive steps to be taken, particularly 
by the government, to act against various corrupt practices. Among measures that 
COSATU proposed are the following:  
 
I. developing a framework on post-tenure rules, including a cooling-off period 
during which public representatives and senior officials will be prohibited from 
accepting appointments to a board, employment or any other substantial 
benefit from a private sector organisation that has benefited from a contract, 
tender or partnership agreement with the public service/state in a process that 
the official has participated in; and  
II. setting up measures to ensure politicians do not tamper with the adjudication 
of tenders, that the process of the tendering system is transparent, and that 
there is much stronger accountability of public servants involved in the 
tendering process (COSATU 2012:102). 
 
The National Planning Commission (2011:406) blames increased opportunities for 
corruption on the practice of outsourcing and tendering for services which has 
increased considerably in the last decade. According to Cronin (2012:5), the 
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canonisation of ―BEE‖ as a central programme of government brought into play a 
dangerous nexus between political office, personal enrichment, and established 
capital. The vast range of tender opportunities in the public service has also come 
with increased opportunities for corruption as both officials and contractors use the 
tender system to enrich themselves (National Planning Commission, 2011:406).  
 
At the heart of black economic empowerment (BEE) has been the sale (typically a 
highly leveraged sale) of share-holding stakes in existing corporations to politically-
connected black individuals and consortia (Cronin, 2012:5). Making an example of 
the Arms Deal, the United Democratic Movement (2012:3) states that, the 
government seems recklessly determined to create elite projects that often seem 
designed as nothing more but a way for the ruling party and its cohorts to distribute 
lucrative state tenders among themselves. Tightening up on tendering is critical 
because state procurement through deliberately manipulated tendering processes 
has become a major area for rent-seeking and corruption (Cronin, 2012:11).  
 
The Department of Public Service and Administration (2011:5) states that the 
implementation of anti-corruption and good governance measures has not been 
satisfactory. The DPSA highlights the following implementation gaps: 
 
I. Limited implementation and adherence to the Code of Conduct.  Various 
government reports have identified a culture of unethical and undesirable 
conduct by some public servants; 
II. Non-compliance with the Financial Disclosure Framework. Since the inception 
of the Financial Disclosure Framework in April 2000 and subsequent 
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expanded application to all senior managers in 2001, a hundred percent  
compliance rate has not been achieved;  
III. Non-compliance with Section 30 of the Public Service Act dealing with 
remunerative work outside the public service and Section 31 dealing with 
recovery of losses; 
IV. Non-compliance with the Minimum Anti- Corruption Capacity Requirements; 
V. Non-adherence to supply chain management prescripts which results in 
tender related malpractices, fraud and corruption as a result of improperly 
awarded tenders, goods and services provided at grossly inflated prices, 
officials benefiting from government contracts, unnecessary purchases and 
payments for services not rendered; 
VI. Weak enforcement and inconsistent application of disciplinary measures; 
VII. Resignation and transfer to other departments before disciplinary processes 
could be instituted or concluded; and 
VIII. Ineffective implementation of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000 (DPSA, 
2011:5). 
 
Protection for whistleblowers is essential to create a culture of disclosure of 
wrongdoing.  While the Protected Disclosures Act (2000) provides some protection 
for whistleblowers, it does not do enough. In fact, the percentage of people who 
identify themselves as prepared to ‗blow the whistle‘ has dropped by 10 percent over 
the last four years (National Planning Commission, 2011:404).  
 
The National Planning Commission, 2011:405) further identifies the following 
weaknesses that need to be addressed:   
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I. The scope of protection in law is too narrow.  
II. The range of bodies to which a protected disclosure may be made is too 
narrow. 
III. There is no public body tasked with providing advice and promoting public 
awareness, and no public body dedicated to monitoring whistle blowing. 
IV. The possibility of conditional amnesty for whistleblowers implicated in 
corruption is not clear.  
V. Adequate security for whistleblowers has not been established. Physical and 
economic protection may be required in some cases. Opinions vary on what 
constitutes ‗adequate protection‘. 
 
Martin (2010:19) asserts that whistle blowing in South Africa is regulated and applied 
differently in different contexts and gaps and concerns remain at both a policy and 
implementation level. The Department of Public Service and Administration (2011: 5) 
also identifies the following policy gaps:  
 
I. The ambiguity with regard to the acceptance of gifts found in the Code of 
Conduct (Chapter 2 of the Public Service Regulations, 2001, as amended, 
and the Financial Disclosure Framework (Chapter 3 of the mentioned 
Regulations);  
II. Limited application of the Financial Disclosure Framework, resulting in 
―unregulated public servants‖ having business interests which are in conflict 
with public interest; and  
III. Despite the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy identifying the need to 
regulate post-public employment when it was introduced in 2002, no 
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measures have been put in place in this regard (Department of Public Service 
and Administration, 2011: 5-7). 
 
It has been stated in Chapter 2 by the UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (2004:10) that 
corruption leads to a broad erosion of confidence in good governance, the rule of 
law and economic stability. According to the National Development Plan (2011:408), 
South Africa‘s rule of law is generally in good shape, although more could be done 
to realise the transformative promise of the Constitution. Challenges such as 
inefficiencies in the court administration that deny people the right of access to 
justice, and judicial appointments that call into question the impartiality of selection 
processes must be addressed (National Planning Commission, 2011:408). 
 
The government is duty bound to ensure that an agency responsible for investigating 
corruption should be sufficiently independent to prevent political interference in the 
cases it investigates (Berning & Montesh, 2012:7). However, citing examples, 
authors attribute South Africa‘s failure to fight corruption to political interference.  
Referring to the disbanding of the Scorpions, Berning and Montesh (2012:7) explain 
that intense political pressure as a consequence of pursuing investigations that 
involved high level politicians contributed to the downfall of the DSO. According to 
Rosenberg (2010:4), the politically-tinged firing of the head of the Office of the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Vusi Pikoli, raised serious 
questions about the political independence of senior civil servants in South Africa. 
 
Even if South Africa adopts the best possible statute to establish a truly independent 
anti-corruption agency, a great deal will depend on who is appointed to manage and 
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run it (Berning & Montesh, 2012:2). Again, such failure to fight corruption is ascribed 
to patronage. The Public Service Act (PSA) provides for civil service hiring based on 
―equality and other democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.‖ 
However, merit and open competition are often subordinated to political affiliation 
and nepotism (Rosenberg, 2010:4). A 2006 survey by the Public Service 
Commission found that the favouring of friends and family was the biggest problem 
undermining professionalism in management decisions (Rosenberg, 2010:4).  
 
SUMMARY  
 
This chapter reviewed characteristics of effective anti-corruption legislation and anti-
corruption agencies. Anti-corruption agencies are meant to spearhead the fight 
against corruption. However, it has been established that to be able to serve this 
purpose there are characteristics that must be present. A number of such features 
have been presented by a preponderance of applicable literature.  
 
The literature provides reasons why such agencies fail; briefly identifying types of 
anti-corruption agencies and which rate better than others and concisely discussed 
the Hong Kong ICAC as an anti-corruption agency that writers agree is the best in 
the world. It further clarified the fact that the success of anti-corruption agencies also 
hinges on anti-corruption legislation. The situation regarding anti-corruption agencies 
in the country has proved not to be based on the studied literature. The level of the 
success of South African anti-corruption agencies has been limited, attributed to 
weaknesses such as fragmentation, insufficient coordination, poor delineation of 
responsibility and assimilation of corruption work into a broader mandate.  
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Ways of addressing shortcomings that the writers identified include a clear definition 
of the roles, powers and responsibilities of these institutions in order to increase their 
efficiency; the establishment of formal coordinating and integrating mechanisms 
within the national executive and between departments and agencies involved in 
anti-corruption work; well-defined accountability arrangements for all the institutions 
(departments and agencies); increased institutional capacity of institutions 
(departments and agencies), in particular the competencies of employees and a 
focus on prevention, and/or establishment of an anti-corruption agency.   
 
In the chapter that follows, the methodology that has been followed in conducting the 
study will be presented. The research design, participants, research instruments, 
methods of data collection and analysis as well as ethical considerations will also be 
described. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the methodology followed in the study. It describes the 
research design, participants, research instruments, methods of data collection and 
analysis as well as ethical considerations. The chapter also describes alternative 
relevant methodologies and justifies the methodology employed. Finally, the analysis 
of the empirical data is presented. 
 
4.2 RATIONALE FOR DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data can be obtained by making use of a questionnaire; personal interviewing; 
observation of events as they happen; abstraction, where the sources of information 
are documents, and postal questionnaires, if the targeted geographical area or 
number of respondents is large (Willemse, 1990:8-11). Data was collected through 
self-administered questionnaires from seventy-eight employees of the Eastern Cape 
and Northern Cape Departments of Social Development and interviews were 
conducted with selected senior managers from both provinces.  
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4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section data collection methods and techniques utilised are highlighted and 
justified. A discussion on the advantages and limitations of both the method and 
technique is also presented. 
 
4.3.1 DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
 
In the social sciences, different methods are utilised in order to describe, explore 
and understand social life. Such methods can generally be subdivided into two 
broad categories, the quantitative method, which is concerned with attempts to 
quantify social phenomena and collect and analyse numerical data; and the 
qualitative method which emphasises words over quantification, and is concerned 
with understanding the meaning of social phenomena. 
 
In this empirical study the quantitative and qualitative approaches were employed. 
The questionnaire entailed a qualitative component while semi-structured interviews 
were also used. According to Mouton and Prozesky (2001:270), qualitative research 
is used to provide an emic perspective by studying human action as its primary goal 
is to describe and understand human behaviour.  Quantitative methodology requires 
methods such as experiments and surveys to describe and explain phenomena 
(Brynard & Hanekom, 1997: 29). 
 
A survey was employed for this study because it is appropriate for the topic under 
investigation. However surveys, like any other technique, have advantages and 
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disadvantages. Kelley, Clark, Brown, and Sitzia (2003:262) identify the following 
advantages of surveys: 
 
I. Surveys produce data based on real world observations; 
II. The breadth of coverage of many people or events means that it is more likely 
than other approaches to obtain data based on representative sample, and 
can therefore be generalisable to a population; and 
III. Surveys can produce a large amount of data in a short time for a fairly low 
cost. 
 
However, surveys also have the following disadvantages:  
 
I. The significance of the data can be neglected if the researcher focuses too 
much on the range of coverage to the exclusion of an adequate account of 
the implications of such data for relevant issues, problems, or theories; and 
II. Data produced are likely to lack details or depth on the topic being 
investigated (Kelley, Clark, Brown & Sitzia, 2003:262). 
 
It can be deduced that a survey is a suitable method of collect data in this study. 
Corruption is a phenomenon that cannot be directly observed.  In this instance, a 
survey is employed to assess attitudes and characteristics of a wide range of 
subjects utilising a number of techniques. 
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4.3.2 DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUE 
 
Four frequently used techniques of data collection are scrutiny of relevant literature, 
interviews, questionnaires and observation (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997:31). The 
data for this study was gathered by means of a literature review, questionnaires and 
interviews. 
 
According to Majila (2006:53), literature reviews assist in obtaining a perspective on 
the research findings related to the topic of the research. They also have the 
following advantages:  
 
I. Literature reviews are versatile. They can be conducted for almost any topic 
and can provide information either at the overview level or in depth. 
II. Literature reviews are relatively inexpensive and efficient. A large amount of 
data can be collected quickly at minimal cost. 
III. No scheduling or coordination is involved. The cooperation of others is not 
required. 
IV. The only resources needed are a good library or online database and a 
competent reviewer. 
V. Literature reviews can be an excellent first step in a project or study because 
they provide a conceptual framework for further planning and study (Marrelli, 
2003:43).  
 
Marrelli (2003:43) also highlights the following disadvantages associated with 
literature reviews: 
148 
 
I. An effective literature review requires a high level of skill in identifying 
resources, analysing the sources to identify relevant information, and writing 
a meaningful summary. 
II. Literature reviews are limited to collecting information about what has 
happened in the past, and usually within organisations other than the 
researcher‘s own workplace. They cannot provide data about current actual 
behaviour. 
 
According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:30), questionnaires allow respondents 
time to think about the answers to questions. Palys (1997:144) explains that they 
involve written responses to a document that is prepared ahead of time.  Moreover, 
a large number of respondents distributed over a large geographical area can be 
reached (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997:30). Interviews provide a researcher with a 
―direct personal contact‖ with the respondent who is asked questions relating to the 
research problem, and serve as a qualitative technique to solicit first-hand or primary 
source information (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:104-105). 
 
It becomes clear that combining the above-mentioned techniques maximises 
utilisation of the strengths they each possess in answering the research questions. 
Such assimilation results in a reduction of their individual weaknesses. 
 
4.4 APPLICATION OF THE DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUE 
 
The targeted participants were drawn from the officials of the Eastern Cape and 
Northern Cape Provincial Departments. The total sample size was 108.  The 
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population of 100 officials and eight selected senior managers was targeted.  A 
response rate of eighty-four was achieved. The research findings are based on 79 
completed questionnaires and five interviews. 
 
4.4.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The questionnaire which encompasses the significant indicators identified through 
the literature review is attached as Annexure A. The first page briefly explained the 
purpose of the study and assured respondents of their anonymity. The questionnaire 
utilised in this study was divided into two main sections, as follows: 
 
Section A required biographical details such as gender, age, educational 
qualifications and occupational information; and two open-ended questions 
requesting further input. The open-ended questions provided respondents 
with an opportunity to express their views with regard to the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption agencies and anti-corruption legislation; 
 
Section B contained 29 statements relating to anti-corruption legislation and 
anti-corruption agencies to which respondents responded to, using a five-
point Likert scale; and one request to add additional information. The five-
point Likert scale had the following rating values: 
 
RATING VALUE 
1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE 
2 = DISAGREE 
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3 = NEUTRAL  
4 = AGREE 
5 = STRONGLY AGREE 
 
4.4.2 INTERVIEWS  
 
Guided face-to-face interviews were conducted by the researcher except for one 
interview which was conducted telephonically. Interviews were not recorded owing to 
the sensitivity of the research topic. 
 
The researcher took down detailed field notes during the interviews.  The interviews 
were then summarised as recommended by Lofland and Lofland (1995:88), namely 
that it is generally not necessary to transcribe every word, exclamation, or pause 
that occurs in an interview. In analysing the data the researcher used coding. 
According to Patton (1990:381), coding is the process of identifying, and 
categorising the primary patterns in the data. 
 
During the process of content analysis, the data was labelled with codes and a data 
index was developed. Miles and Huberman (1994:56) refer to codes as tags or 
labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during the study. The data indexing through coding assisted in reducing 
and organising data for analysis. The researcher read through the interview notes. 
As specific words and/or sentences that illustrate a particular code were 
encountered, they would be highlighted and assigned a code.  
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The researcher compiled memos and documented the study as it unfolded. 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985:342), writing memos about coding categories 
can help to uncover properties of that category and develop rules for assigning 
subsequent data to the category. Out of the targeted eight interviews, five were 
conducted: two in the Eastern Cape and three in the Northern Cape. One of the 
Northern Cape interviews was conducted telephonically because the interviewee 
was out of the province during the researcher‘s visit. Analysis of data acquired 
through interviews was done per province. Interview schedules are attached as 
Annexures B and C. 
 
4.5 ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
Results of the empirical study are analysed in this section in order to achieve the set 
objectives. The section provides the result of each statement as presented by 
respondents in terms of figures and percentage, explains the responses using 
descriptive statistics, and presents the participants‘ responses to the interview 
questions. 
 
4.5.1ANALYISIS QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS   
This analysis is divided into two sections, namely Sections A and B. 
 
SECTION A 
The tables and bar charts below illustrate responses according to gender: 
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TABLE 4.1: EASTERN CAPE                      TABLE 4.1: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1: GENDER: EASTERN CAPE 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2: GENDER: NORTHERN CAPE   
 
53%
47% Female 
Male 
63%
37%
Females
Males
Category Frequency table: Gender 
Count Percentage 
Female  19 53 
Male 17 47 
Category Frequency table: Gender 
Count Percentage 
Female 27 63 
Male 16 37 
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In the Eastern Cape 53 per cent of the respondents were female and 47 per cent 
were male, while 63 per cent of the Northern Cape respondents were female and 37 
per cent were male.   
 
The ages of the respondents are shown in the frequency tables below. These are 
also displayed on bar charts. 
 
TABLE 4.2: EASTERN CAPE                      TABLE 4.2: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3: AGE: EASTERN CAPE 
 
 
 
 
 
14%
25%
28%
33%
20-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50+ years
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
20 – 29 years 5 14 
30 - 39 years                 9 25 
40 - 49 years 10 28 
50+ years 12 33 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
20 – 29 years 7 16 
30 - 39 years                 11 26 
40 - 49 years 13 30 
50+ years 12 28 
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FIGURE 4.4: AGE: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
 
33 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents were 50 years and above while 30 per 
cent of the Northern Cape respondents were 40 to 49 years of age. 
 
Respondents‘ education is illustrated in the frequency distribution tables and pie 
charts below.   
 
 
TABLE 4.3: EASTERN CAPE                               TABLE 4.3: NORTHERN CAPE  
 
 
 
16%
26%
30%
28%
20-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50+ years
Category Frequency table: 
Education 
Count Percentag
e 
High School 27 62 
Technical College 6 15 
Tertiary Institution 10 23 
Category Frequency table: 
Education 
Count Percentage 
High School 21 57 
Technical College 3 9 
Tertiary Institution 12 34 
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FIGURE 4.5: EDUCATION: EASTERN CAPE 
 
 
FIGURE 4.6: EDUCATION: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
In both provinces the highest percentages were for respondents who had obtained 
high school education: in the Eastern Cape 57per cent of respondents had obtained 
high school education and in the Northern Cape 62 per cent of respondents 
indicated high school education as their highest level attained. 
57%
9%
34%
Education EC
High School
Technical College
Tertiary Education
62%
15%
23%
High School
Technical College
Tertiary Education
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Frequency tables and pie charts below indicate the number of years respondents 
have been with the departments. 
 
TABLE 4.4: EASTERN CAPE                        TABLE 4.4: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.7: DURATION IN THE DEPARTMENT EASTERN CAPE 
 
8%
11%
31%
50%
1-3 years
4-6 years
7-10 years
10+ years
Category Frequency table: 
Duration in the 
Dept. 
Count Percentage 
1-3 Years 6 13 
4-6 Years 18 43 
7-10 Years 8 18 
10+ Years 11 26 
Category Frequency table: 
Duration in the Dept. 
Count Percentage 
1-3 Years 3 8 
4-6 Years 4 11 
7-10 Years 11 31 
10+ Years 18 50 
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FIGURE 4.8: DURATION IN THE DEPARTMENT NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
In the Eastern Cape, 50 per cent of the respondents have been with the department 
for more than ten years while in the Northern Cape,43 per cent of the respondents 
have been with the department for between four to  six years.  
 
In Section A respondents were also requested to indicate positions they hold and 
(optional) the number of years they have held such positions. Fewer than 50 per 
cent of the responses from both provinces were returned. Of the 48 per cent of 
responses from the Eastern Cape, 30 per cent have held the same position for more 
than ten years, of which 97 per cent are in the lower levels of the hierarchy. Only 3 
per cent hold management positions.  
 
Only 38 per cent of the respondents from the Northern Cape responded to this 
question. The highest percentage was those respondents who have been with the 
13%
43%18%
26%
1-3 years
4-6 years
7-10 years
10+ years
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department for a period of five to ten years. 75 per cent of the respondents occupy 
lower levels while 25 per cent hold management positions. 
 
In this section respondents were also requested to respond to the following: 
 
I. How effective are anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies in 
the province? 
II. If anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the province are 
ineffective, why is this so? 
III. Please add any additional remarks in the space provided below. 
 
Coincidentally, the respondents from both provinces provided similar responses to 
the two questions and the accompanying request in Section A. The responses are 
summarised as follows: 
 
Section A1  
I. The anti-corruption agencies and the anti-corruption legislation are 
ineffective. 
II. Levels of corruption continue to escalate in the country. 
 
Section A2  
I. Persons who are responsible for the implementation of anti-corruption 
measures are those who are mostly involved in committing acts of 
corruption. 
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II. The government does not involve communities in its fight against 
corruption. 
III. Individuals who expose corruption are not protected from victimisation. 
IV. There are no awareness campaigns that provide information and 
feedback to the communities regarding corruption. 
 
Section A3  
I. Anti-corruption initiatives only exist in theory.  
II. Citizens who do not have access to the media should be 
reached through public places such as churches and schools. 
III. Corruption occurs mostly in supply chain management and 
recruitment processes which leads to poor service delivery. 
IV. Corrupt individuals who are suspended and even discharged are 
reinstated within a few months in even higher positions. 
V. Corruption in South Africa has become intertwined with the 
societal fibre. The government needs to take responsibility by 
inculcating good morals. A culture of influencing the youth to 
believe that ‗tenderpreneurship‘ is the best way of accumulating 
wealth must be uprooted.   
 
SECTION B 
In this section, questionnaire responses are presented by means of frequency tables 
per statement per province. 
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Statement B1 
The province enforces anti-corruption legislation. 
 
TABLE B 4.5: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.5: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B2 
Officials are charged under anti-corruption legislation. 
 
TABLE B 4.6: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.6: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 11 30.5 
Disagree 11 30.5 
Neutral 7 19 
Agree 5 14 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 13 30 
Disagree 15 35 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 8 19 
Strongly agree 4 9 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree  10 28 
Neutral 8 22 
Agree 7 19 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 13 30 
Neutral 5 12 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 5 12 
161 
 
Statement B3 
Officials are convicted in terms of anti-corruption legislation. 
 
TABLE B 4.7: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.7: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B4 
Officials generally understand the whistle blowing procedures. 
 
TABLE B 4.8: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.8: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 13 36 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 3 8 
Agree 2 6 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 21 
Disagree 13 30 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 8 19 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree 19 53 
Neutral 4 11 
Agree 4 11 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 15 35 
Neutral 4 9 
Agree 8 19 
Strongly agree 6 14 
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Statement B5 
Officials are free to blow the whistle when they are aware of corrupt activities. 
 
TABLE B 4.9: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.9: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B6 
Whistleblowers are protected in terms of anti-corruption legislation. 
 
TABLE B 4.10: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.10: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 12 33 
Disagree 13 36 
Neutral 5 14 
Agree 5 14 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 16 37 
Neutral 5 12 
Agree 9 21 
Strongly agree 3 7 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree 10 28 
Neutral 15 41 
Agree 2 6 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 11 26 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 10 23 
Agree 6 14 
Strongly agree 4 9 
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Statement B7 
Most prevalent cases of petty corruption practised on a smaller scale involve small 
amounts of money and bribes. 
 
TABLE B 4.11: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.11: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B8 
The most prevalent cases of grand corruption are found where public officials in high 
positions, in the process of making decisions of significant financial value, routinely 
demand bribes or kickbacks to ensure that tenders or contracts are awarded to 
specific contractors. 
 
TABLE B 4.12: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.12: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 1 3 
Disagree 3 8 
Neutral 5 14 
Agree 17 47 
Strongly agree 10 28 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly 
disagree 
5 12 
Disagree 7 16 
Neutral 5 12 
Agree 16 37 
Strongly 
agree 
10 23 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Disagree 4 11 
Neutral 3 8 
Agree 19 53 
Strongly agree 10 28 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Disagree 3 7 
Neutral 2 5 
Agree 26 60 
Strongly agree 12 28 
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Statement B9 
Anti-corruption agencies in the province are financially adequately resourced. 
 
TABLE B 4.13: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.13: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B10 
Anti-corruption agencies are independent of the party in power. 
 
TABLE B 4.14: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.14: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree 11 30 
Neutral 12 33 
Agree 2 6 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 21 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 12 28 
Agree 7 16 
Strongly agree 3 7 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 12 33 
Disagree 14 39 
Neutral 4 11 
Agree 4 11 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 15 35 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 5 12 
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Statement B11 
Anti-corruption agencies are likely to discharge their duties without fear or favour. 
 
TABLE B 4.15: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.15: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B12 
Anti-corruption agencies have political backing at the highest levels of the provincial 
government. 
 
TABLE B 4.16: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.16: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 28 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 4 11 
Agree 5 14 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: 
Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly 
disagree 
8 19 
Disagree 13 30 
Neutral 4 9 
Agree 11 26 
Strongly agree 7 16 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 11 31 
Disagree 18 50 
Neutral 3 8 
Agree 3 8 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 21 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 12 28 
Strongly agree 7 16 
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Statement B13 
Anti-corruption agencies have always retained their credibility. 
 
TABLE B 4.17: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.17: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B14 
Anti-corruption agencies lack transparency. 
 
TABLE B 4.18: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.18: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 28 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 6 17 
Agree 3 8 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 15 35 
Neutral 7 16 
Agree 8 19 
Strongly agree 3 7 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 1 3 
Disagree  4 11 
Neutral 5 14 
Agree 15  42 
Strongly agree 11  30 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 7 16 
Disagree 10 23 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 15 35 
Strongly agree 8 19 
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Statement B15 
Heads of anti-corruption agencies are hired on merit. 
 
TABLE B 4.19: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.19: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B16 
Anti-corruption agencies are free from political interference. 
 
TABLE B 4.20: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.20: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 8 22 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 6 17 
Agree 6 17 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 4 9 
Agree 9 21 
Strongly agree 8 19 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 11 30 
Disagree 15 42 
Neutral 4 11 
Agree 5 14 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 21 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 4 9 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 8 19 
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Statement B17 
Members of the public are free to complain to anti-corruption agencies without fear 
of recrimination. 
 
TABLE B 4.21: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.21: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B18 
Anti-corruption agencies act within a reasonable time regarding corruption 
complaints. 
 
TABLE B 4.22: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.22: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 28 
Disagree 17 47 
Neutral 4 11 
Agree 3 8 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: 
Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly 
disagree 
10 23 
Disagree 13 30 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 11 26 
Strongly agree 6 14 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 28 
Disagree 12 33 
Neutral 7 19 
Agree 5 14 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 7 16 
Disagree 19 44 
Neutral 5 12 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 2 5 
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Statement B19 
Anti-corruption agencies initiate investigations independently. 
 
TABLE B 4.23: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.23: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B20 
Anti-corruption agency employees enjoy independence from political interference in 
the discharge of their duties. 
 
TABLE B 4.24: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.24: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree 18 50 
Neutral 7 19 
Agree 1 3 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 15 35 
Neutral 4 9 
Agree 8 19 
Strongly agree 6 14 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 5 14 
Agree 4 11 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 21 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 4 9 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 8 19 
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Statement B21 
There are no ‗no go‘ areas for certain investigations. 
 
TABLE B 4.25: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.25: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B22 
Anti-corruption agency employees are adequately trained. 
 
TABLE B 4.26: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.26: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 1 3 
Disagree 2 6 
Neutral 3 8 
Agree 18 50 
Strongly agree 12 33 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 7 16 
Disagree 18 42 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 5 12 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 6 17 
Agree 4 11 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 11 26 
Neutral 6 14 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 6 14 
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Statement B23 
Anti-corruption agency employees are adequately remunerated. 
 
TABLE B 4.27: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.27: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B24 
Anti-corruption agency employees dealing with sensitive cases are subject to 
random integrity tests. 
 
 
TABLE B 4.28: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.28: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 28 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 5 14 
Agree 4 11 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: 
Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly 
disagree 
12 28 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 10 23 
Agree 6 14 
Strongly agree 3 7 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 7 19 
Disagree 10 28 
Neutral 16 44 
Agree 2 6 
Strongly agree 1 3 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 21 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 12 28 
Agree 7 16 
Strongly agree 3 7 
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Statement B25 
There are arrangements to ensure that anti-corruption agencies do not become 
corrupt themselves. 
 
TABLE B 4.29: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.29: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B26 
Anti-corruption agencies are accountable to parliament. 
 
 
TABLE B 4.30: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.30: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 25 
Disagree 16 44 
Neutral 9 25 
Agree 2 6 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Category Frequency table: 
Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly 
disagree 
10 23 
Disagree 11 26 
Neutral 8 19 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 4 9 
Category Frequency table: 
Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly 
disagree 
8 22 
Disagree 13 36 
Neutral 13 36 
Agree 2 6 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 9 21 
Disagree 10 23 
Neutral 12 28 
Agree 7 16 
Strongly agree 5 12 
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Statement B27 
I have blown the whistle on alleged corruption. 
 
TABLE B 4.31: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.31: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B28 
I am too afraid to blow the whistle on alleged corruption. 
 
TABLE B 4.32: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.32: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 13 36 
Disagree 15 42 
Neutral 8 22 
Agree 0 0 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Category Frequency table: 
Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly 
disagree 
10 23 
Disagree 12 28 
Neutral 7 16 
Agree 9 21 
Strongly agree 5 12 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 2 5.5 
Disagree 4 11 
Neutral 2 5.5 
Agree 18 50 
Strongly agree 10 28 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 5 12 
Disagree 10 23 
Neutral 1 2 
Agree 15 35 
Strongly agree 12 28 
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Statement B29 
Government is taking the issue of corruption in the public sector seriously. 
 
TABLE B 4.33: EASTERN CAPE                  TABLE 4.33: NORTHERN CAPE 
 
 
 
Statement B1: The province enforces anti-corruption legislation. 
70 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 65 per cent of the Northern Cape 
respondents did not support the statement that the province enforces anti-corruption 
legislation. Although at varying percentages, very few respondents supported the 
statement: the Eastern Cape respondents at 10 per cent and those in the Northern 
Cape at 28 per cent.  
 
These results indicate that enforcement of anti-corruption legislation is poor. The 
Public Sector Integrity Management Framework (2006:5) explains that the 
ineffectiveness of the Protected Disclosure Act, 2000 has resulted in a lack of 
confidence in whistle blowing against unethical conduct and corruption. This requires 
that hurdles that hinder the implementation of this Act are addressed. 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 12 33 
Disagree 14 39 
Neutral 4 11 
Agree 4 11 
Strongly agree 2 6 
Category Frequency table: Age 
Count Percentage 
Strongly disagree 10 23 
Disagree 15 35 
Neutral 3 7 
Agree 10 23 
Strongly agree 5 12 
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Statement B2: Officials are charged under anti-corruption legislation. 
The statement that officials are indicted under anti-corruption legislation was refuted 
at the rate of 53 per cent by both provinces. 19 per cent of the Eastern Cape 
respondents were neutral while 25 per cent supported the statement. 12 per cent of 
the respondents from the Northern Cape were neutral while 35 per cent supported 
the statement. 
 
The responses indicate that few officials are charged under anti-corruption 
legislation. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004 stipulates 
the charging of offenders. Section 26 lists punishable corruption offences and their 
penalties. These include a fine of up to five times the value of the improper benefit, 
or life imprisonment if a sentence is handed down by a High Court. 
 
Statement B3: Officials are convicted in terms of anti-corruption legislation. 
In both the Eastern Cape and the Northern Cape large number of the respondents 
did not support the statement that officials are successfully convicted in terms of 
anti-corruption legislation: in the Eastern Cape 80 per cent held this view, as did  51 
per cent of the respondents in the Northern Cape.12 per cent  of the Eastern Cape 
respondents and 42 per cent of the respondents from the Northern Cape agreed 
with the statement, while eight per cent from the Eastern Cape and seven per cent 
from the Northern Cape remained undecided.  
 
Section 26 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004 provides 
for conviction of those involved in corruption. However, the results indicate that 
officials are not convicted in terms of anti-corruption legislation. 
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Statement B4: Officials generally understand the whistle blowing procedures. 
A vast majority of respondents in both provinces (78 per cent in the Eastern Cape 
and 58 per cent in the Northern Cape) responded negatively to the statement that 
officials generally understand the whistle blowing procedures.11 per cent of the 
respondents from the Eastern Cape and 33 per cent from the Northern Cape 
supported the statement, while 11 per cent  and nine per cent respectively remained  
neutral. 
 
These results indicate that the whistle blowing procedures are not completely 
understood by officials. The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 provides 
procedures in terms of which any employee may disclose information relating to an 
offence or a malpractice in the workplace by his or her employer or fellow 
employees. Unfortunately, few officials are aware of such procedures. It is 
necessary that officials be familiarised with these procedures. 
 
 
Statement B5: Officials are free to blow the whistle when they are aware of 
corrupt activities. 
The statement that officials are free to blow the whistle when they are aware of 
corrupt activities was discounted by 69 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern 
Cape and 60 per cent from the Northern Cape. 17 per cent of the Eastern Cape 
respondents and 28 per cent from the Northern Cape responded positively. 14 per 
cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 12 per cent from the Northern Cape 
remained neutral.    
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The responses indicate that officials are not free to blow the whistle despite the 
provisions in section 2 (1) of the Protected Disclosures Act that stipulate the objects 
of the act are to: 
 
I.  protect an employee, whether in the private or the public sector, from being 
subjected to an occupational detriment on account of having made a 
protected disclosure; 
II.  provide for certain remedies in connection with any occupational detriment 
suffered on account of having made a protected disclosure; and  
III. provide for procedures in terms of which an employee can, in a responsible 
manner, disclose information regarding improprieties by his or her employer. 
 
Statement B6: Whistleblowers are protected in terms of anti-corruption 
legislation. 
Only six per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 23 per cent of the Northern 
Cape supported the statement that whistleblowers are protected in terms of anti-
corruption legislation.41 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 23 per cent 
from the Northern Cape responded impartially; and the majority of both provinces‘ 
respondents, the Eastern Cape at 59 per cent and the Northern Cape at 54 per cent, 
responded negatively. 
 
Section 3 of Protected Disclosures Act prohibits subjecting any employee to any 
occupational detriment by his or her employer on account, or partly on account of 
having made a protected disclosure. However, the responses show that employees 
do not believe that whistleblower protection is provided in terms of this Act.  
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Statement B7: Most prevalent cases of petty corruption practised on a smaller 
scale involve small amounts of money and bribes. 
The statement that most prevalent cases of petty corruption practised on a smaller 
scale involve small amounts of money and bribes was supported by the majority of 
respondents from both provinces, namely the Eastern Cape at 75 per cent and the 
Northern Cape at 60 Per cent. 11 per cent from the Eastern Cape and 28 per cent 
from the Northern Cape contradicted the statement. 
 
These results indicate that individuals accumulate wealth through eliciting small 
bribes. This must not be overlooked. Its pettiness refers only to the size of each 
transaction and not to the damage it causes. In setting out the general offences of 
corruption, section 3 of Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 
2004 includes this kind of corruption.  
 
Statement B8: Most prevalent cases of grand corruption are found where 
public officials in high positions, in the process of making decisions of 
significant financial value, routinely demand bribes or kickbacks to ensure 
that tenders or contracts are awarded to specific contractors. 
81 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 88 per cent of the Northern Cape 
respondents identified with the statement that most cases of grand corruption are 
prevalent where kickbacks are paid to ensure that tenders or contracts are awarded 
to specific contractors. A small percentage discounted the statement, namely 11 per 
cent from the Eastern Cape and 7 per cent from the Northern Cape. Impartial 
respondents from the Eastern Cape amounted to 8 per cent and from the Northern 
Cape, 5 per cent. 
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Concerning the conviction of corruption offenders, section 28 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act provides that enterprises that are involved in 
corrupt offences be endorsed on the Register for Tender Defaulters. This register 
serves to name and shame those convicted of tender irregularities. Despite this Act 
and its provisions, the results indicate that kickbacks are paid to secure tenders and 
contracts. This conclusion is justified because the Register for Tender Defaulters 
does not have any names listed. It has been blank since its establishment. 
 
Statement B9: Anti-corruption agencies in the province are financially 
adequately resourced. 
The statement that anti-corruption agencies in the province are adequately 
financially resourced was discounted by 55 per cent of the respondents from the 
Eastern Cape and 49 per cent of the respondents from the Northern Cape. 33 per 
cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 28 per cent from the Northern Cape 
remained neutral whilst 12 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 23 per 
cent from the Northern Cape supported the statement.  
 
Chapter 14 of the 2030 National Development Plan (2011:447) states that fighting 
corruption requires an anti-corruption system that is well-resourced. However, the 
responses show that anti-corruption agencies in the provinces are financially 
inadequately resourced. This is detrimental to the success of anti-corruption 
initiatives. 
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Statement B10: Anti-corruption agencies are independent of the party in 
power. 
The statement that anti-corruption agencies are independent of the party in power 
was discounted by both provinces: the Eastern Cape respondents by 72 per cent 
and the Northern Cape by 58 per cent. 17 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents 
and 33 per cent from the Northern Cape supported the statement. 11 per cent of the 
Eastern Cape respondents and 7 per cent from the Northern Cape remained neutral.  
 
Anti-corruption agencies in South Africa are accountable to the executive. According 
to Chapter 14 of the 2030 National Development Plan (2011:448), this compromises 
the independence of anti-corruption agencies, since this may leave them vulnerable 
to political pressure and interference. Hence the responses imply that anti-corruption 
agencies are dependent on the party in power. 
 
Statement B11:Anti-corruption agencies are likely to discharge their duties 
without fear or favour. 
72 per cent of the Eastern Cape responses and 49 per cent from the Northern Cape 
disagreed with the statement that anti-corruption agencies are likely to discharge 
their duties without fear or favour.  17 per cent of the Eastern Cape responses and 
42 per cent from the Northern Cape agreed with the statement.  11 per cent of the 
Eastern Cape responses and 9 per cent from the Northern Cape remained impartial. 
 
The results indicate that anti-corruption agencies are unlikely to discharge their 
duties without fear or favour. As shown by responses to statement B10 above, anti-
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corruption agencies depend on the party in power. They are, therefore, unable to 
make credible judgments.  
 
Statement B12: Anti-corruption agencies have political backing at the highest 
levels of the provincial government. 
81 per cent of the Eastern Cape responses and 49 per cent from the Northern Cape 
refuted the statement that anti-corruption agencies have political backing at the 
highest levels of the provincial government; 11 per cent of the Eastern Cape 
responses and 44 per cent from the Northern Cape supported the statement; and 8 
per cent of the Eastern Cape responses and 7 per cent from the Northern Cape 
were neutral. 
 
To tackle corruption, there must be political will and support for anti-corruption 
agencies (Chapter 14 of the 2030 National Development Plan, 2011:449). However, 
the results indicate that anti-corruption agencies do not receive the intended support. 
Chapter 14 of the 2030 National Development Plan (2011:449) describes political 
will as not referring merely to public statements of support, but to providing sufficient 
resources and taking action against corrupt officials. 
 
Statement B13: Anti-corruption agencies have always retained their credibility. 
72 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents and 58 per cent from the Northern 
Cape disproved the statement that anti-corruption agencies have always retained 
their credibility.  11 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 16 per 
cent from the Northern Cape supported the statement while 17 per cent from both 
the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape remained neutral. 
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Chapter 14 of the 2030 National Development Plan (2011:451) proposes that 
integrity systems be improved in order to strengthen the individual accountability of 
public servants. Nevertheless, according to the results, anti-corruption agencies 
have been unable to retain their credibility. 
 
Statement B14: Anti-corruption agencies lack transparency. 
The statement that anti-corruption agencies lack transparency was supported by 72 
per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 54 per cent from the 
Northern Cape. Only 14 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 39 
per cent from the Northern Cape refuted the statement. 14 per cent of the 
respondents from the Eastern Cape and 7 per cent from the Northern Cape were 
neutral. 
 
Chapter 14 of the 2030 National Development Plan (2011:451) advises that it is in 
the best interests of civil society that public officials and elected representatives 
manage public resources in an efficient, transparent and accountable fashion 
However, according to the respondents, anti-corruption agencies lack the required 
transparency.   
 
Statement B15: Heads of anti-corruption agencies are hired on merit. 
66 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 51 per cent from the 
Northern Cape refuted the statement that heads of anti-corruption agencies are 
hired on merit. 17 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 40 per 
cent from the Northern Cape supported it, while17 per cent of the respondents from 
the Eastern Cape and 9 per cent from the Northern Cape remained impartial. 
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The results show that heads of anti-corruption agencies need to be hired on merit. 
This becomes evident, as hiring unqualified personnel has dire consequences for 
any organisation. According to the Country Brief (2012:1), the Council for the 
Advancement of the South African Constitution (‗CASAC‘) has outlined South 
Africa‘s international obligations based on a comprehensive analysis of the 
conventions and protocols as follows:  
 
I. Establish independent anti-corruption agencies; 
II. Ensure that steps are taken to investigate and prosecute corruption; 
III. Prevent corruption by removing obvious opportunities for corruption; 
IV. Educate the public on the harms of corruption;  
V. Ensure transparency and access to information when combating corruption;  
VI. Establish mechanisms that encourage participation by the media, civil society 
and non-governmental organisations, in the fight against corruption;  
VII. Adopt measures that address corruption the public and private sector; and  
VIII. Co-operate with, and assist, other states in criminal matters. 
 
Statement B16: Anti-corruption agencies are free from political interference. 
72 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 49 per cent from the 
Northern Cape did not support the statement that anti-corruption agencies are free 
from political interference. 17 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape 
and 41 per cent from the Northern Cape supported it.  11 per cent of the responses 
from the Eastern Cape and 9 per cent from the Northern Cape remained neutral. 
 
184 
 
The responses indicate that anti-corruption agencies are not completely free from 
political interference and also reflect a lack of credibility. Fighting corruption requires 
an anti-corruption system that is free from political manipulation.   
 
Statement B17: Members of the public are free to complain to anti-corruption 
agencies without fear of recrimination. 
A response rate of 75 per cent from the Eastern Cape and 53 per cent from the 
Northern Cape refuted the statement that members of the public are free to complain 
to anti-corruption agencies without fear of recrimination. 14 per cent of the 
respondents from the Eastern Cape and 40 per cent from the Northern Cape 
supported the statement whilst 11 per cent of the responses from the Eastern Cape 
and 7 per cent from the Northern Cape remained neutral. 
 
A large percentage of responses disagreeing with the statement indicates that 
citizens are afraid to stand up against corruption. This means that stumbling blocks 
that impede the progress in the fight against corruption exist. This, therefore, calls 
for immediate action by the government in emphasising the importance of public 
participation in combating corruption and promoting integrity. Principles of 
participatory democracy as enshrined in section 59(1) (a), 72(1) (a) and 118(1) (a) of 
the Constitution should be adhered to.  
 
Statement B18: Anti-corruption agencies act within a reasonable time 
regarding corruption complaints. 
The statement that anti-corruption agencies act within a reasonable time regarding 
corruption complaints was discounted by 61 per cent of the respondents from the 
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Eastern Cape and 60 per cent from the Northern Cape. The statement was 
supported by 20 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 28 per cent 
from the Northern Cape. 19 per cent from the Eastern Cape and 12 per cent from 
the Northern Cape responded impartially.  
 
The negative response to the statement indicates that complaints are not promptly 
attended to.   This is against the Batho Pele principles that were developed to instil a 
culture of accountability. Furthermore, in promoting accountability the Public Finance 
Management Act and the Municipal Finance Management set out the requirements 
for dealing with public finances at the national, provincial and local government 
spheres of government.  
 
Statement B19: Anti-corruption agencies independently initiate investigations. 
75 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 58 per cent from the 
Northern Cape did not agree that anti-corruption agencies independently initiate 
investigations. Only 6 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 33 per 
cent from the Northern Cape supported the statement. 19 per cent of the 
respondents from the Eastern Cape and 9 per cent from the Northern Cape 
remained neutral.    
 
The results indicate that anti-corruption agencies are unable to initiate their own 
investigations. This shows a lack of independence. It is contrary to the 
recommendation by the CASAC that one of South Africa‘s obligations is to establish 
independent anti-corruption agencies (Country Brief, 2012:1).  
 
186 
 
Statement B20: Anti-corruption agency employees enjoy independence from 
political interference in the discharge of their duties. 
The statement that anti-corruption agency employees enjoy independence from 
political interference in the discharge of their duties was discounted by 69 per cent of 
the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 49 per cent from the Northern Cape. 17 
per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 42 per cent from the 
Northern Cape supported the statement. 14 per cent of the responses from the 
Eastern Cape and 9 per cent from the Northern Cape were impartial.  
 
The high percentage of responses who disagreed with the statement indicates that 
anti-corruption agency employees are unable to discharge their duties without 
political interference. This interferes with their independence. Without employee 
independence, anti-corruption agencies are exposed to exploitation for personal 
benefit.  
 
Statement B21: There are no “no go” areas for certain investigations. 
83 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape refuted the statement that 
there are no ‗no go‘ areas for certain investigations.58 per cent of the respondents 
from the Northern Cape discounted the statement. Only 9 per cent of the 
respondents from the Eastern Cape and 35 per cent of the respondents from the 
Northern Cape supported the statement. 8 per cent of the respondents from the 
Eastern Cape and 7 per cent from the Northern Cape remained neutral. 
 
The majority of responses indicate that not all cases are investigated. Responses to 
statement B16 indicate that anti-corruption agencies are not free from political 
interference. Where political corruption is rampant, political interference hinders the 
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functioning of anti-corruption agencies. Therefore, a mechanism that prevents anti-
corruption agencies from taking instructions from political parties need to be devised.  
 
Statement B22: Anti-corruption agency employees are adequately trained. 
The majority of the respondents discounted the statement that anti-corruption 
agency employees are adequately trained, that is, 69 per cent from the Eastern 
Cape and 49 per cent from the Northern Cape. 14 per centof the respondents from 
the Eastern Cape and 37 per cent from the Northern Cape supported the statement. 
17 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 14 per cent from the 
Northern Cape remained impartial.  
 
These results indicate that anti-corruption agency employees lack adequate training. 
However, according to Jennett and Hodess (2007:2), expertise and continuous 
training are essential if the highest professional standard of an ACA is to be 
maintained. This means that equipping anti-corruption agency personnel with the 
necessary skills is crucial.  
 
Statement B23: Anti-corruption agency employees are adequately 
remunerated. 
72 per cent of the Eastern Cape and 56 per cent of the Northern Cape respondents 
did not support the statement that anti-corruption agency employees are adequately 
remunerated. 14 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 21 per cent 
from the Northern Cape supported the statement. 14 per cent of the respondents 
from the Eastern Cape and 23 per cent from the Northern Cape remained neutral. 
 
188 
 
The majority of the responses disagreeing that the anti-corruption agencies are 
adequately remunerated indicates that these employees can easily be bribed. 
Besides reducing employee resistance to corruption, low salaries also discourage 
skilled individuals from applying for employment. . 
 
Statement B24: Anti-corruption agency employees dealing with sensitive 
cases are subject to random integrity tests. 
The statement that anti-corruption agency employees dealing with sensitive cases 
are subject to random integrity tests was discounted by 47 per cent of the Eastern 
Cape respondents and 49 per cent of the Northern Cape respondents. 9 per cent of 
the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 32 per cent from the Northern Cape 
supported the statement. 44 per cent of the responses from the Eastern Cape and 
28 per cent from the Northern Cape remained neutral.  
 
A large percentage of the responses indicates that random integrity testing of anti-
corruption agency employees is not performed.  Judging by responses to statements 
B15 and B21, it is evident that the integrity of the agencies is not one of the sought-
after characteristics. The fact that heads of these agencies are handpicked by 
corrupt politicians and are instructed not to investigate certain cases is indicative of 
dishonesty. The National Development Plan (2011:402) states that Vision 2030 
promotes a zero tolerant South Africa for corruption where leaders hold themselves 
to high ethical standards and act with integrity. 
 
Statement B25: There are arrangements to ensure that anti-corruption 
agencies do not become corrupt themselves. 
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Respondents from both provinces (the Eastern Cape, 69 per cent and the Northern 
Cape, 49 per cent) refuted the statement that there are arrangements to ensure that 
anti-corruption agencies do not become corrupt themselves. Only 6 per cent of the 
Eastern Cape and 28 per cent of the Northern Cape respondents supported the 
statement. 36 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 28 per cent 
from the Northern Cape remained neutral. 
 
The high negative response to the statement implies that anti-corruption agencies 
are capable of being corrupt themselves. This is supplementary to the outcomes of 
statements such as B10, B11, and B16. Lack of independence, fear of taking 
informed decisions, and hiring puppet heads is disastrous for any organisation. The 
government should ensure that anti-corruption initiatives are depoliticised.    
 
Statement B26: Anti-corruption agencies are accountable to parliament. 
The respondents (the Eastern Cape 58 per cent and the Northern Cape 44 per cent) 
discounted the statement that anti-corruption agencies are accountable to 
parliament. 6 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 28 per cent of 
those from the Northern Cape supported the statement. 36 per cent of the 
responses from the Eastern Cape and 28 per cent from the Northern Cape were 
impartial. 
 
The above responses imply that anti-corruption agencies are not accountable to 
parliament. This is true. However, anti-corruption agencies in South Africa are 
accountable to the executive instead of to parliament. This means that government 
accountability needs to be strengthened. 
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Statement B27: I have blown the whistle on alleged corruption. 
78 per cent of the Eastern Cape and 51 per cent of the Northern Cape respondents 
did not support the statement that they have blown the whistle on alleged corruption. 
Not a single respondent from the Eastern Cape supported the statement. On the 
other hand, 33 per cent of the respondents from the Northern Cape supported the 
statement. 22 per cent of the responses from the Eastern Cape and 16 per cent from 
the Northern Cape were neutral. 
 
Section 34(1) of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
compels persons in positions of authority, particularly senior managers in 
government, parastatals and the private sector to report corrupt activities. However, 
this response shows that employees do not blow the whistle. 
 
Statement B28: I am too afraid to blow the whistle on alleged corruption. 
The respondents supported the statement that they are too afraid to blow the whistle 
on alleged corruption. 78 per cent of the Eastern Cape respondents felt this way, as 
did 63 per cent of the Northern Cape respondents. The statement was refuted by 
16.5 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and by 35 per cent from the 
Northern Cape.5.5per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 2 per cent 
from the Northern Cape returned impartial responses.  
 
These results clearly indicate that employees are afraid to report corruption 
activities. As indicated under statements B5 and B6, these activities do take place 
despite the existence of the protection provided for in the Protected Disclosures Act.  
 
191 
 
Statement B29: Government is taking the issue of corruption in the public 
sector seriously. 
72 per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 58 per cent from the 
Northern Cape discounted the statement that the government is taking the issue of 
corruption in the public sector seriously. 17 per cent of the respondents from the 
Eastern Cape and 35 per cent from the Northern Cape supported the statement. 11 
per cent of the respondents from the Eastern Cape and 7 per cent from the Northern 
Cape returned neutral responses. 
 
This result indicates that the government does not take the issue of corruption 
seriously despite the existence of institutions such as the Public Service 
Commission (PSC). If it did, then prioritised support for anti-corruption reforms would 
be evident.  Particular attention should be given to the implementation of the anti-
corruption legislation and the functions of the anti-corruption agencies. The PSC, an 
oversight body responsible for monitoring and evaluation, is mandated to play an 
active role in evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies and to suggest 
improvements where necessary. 
 
Responses to Section B30 are summarised per province below:  
 
Section B30: Eastern Cape 
Persons who hold the highest positions in government are the most corrupt and are 
seldom investigated. These individuals are involved in tender corruption. Their family 
members, friends and partners are also involved. Recruitment processes are riddled 
with corruption and rampant nepotism. Respondents suggested that the government 
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refrain from issuing tenders. This will promote employment of qualified individuals, 
and subsequently improved service delivery. 
 
Major problems are posed by the lack of communication with whistleblowers, the 
lack of awareness campaigns, and inoperative anti-corruption legislation. The poor 
are punished while the politically connected are untouchable. Because these political 
cronies are rich, they also pay bribes to make cases disappear. 
 
Section B30: Northern Cape 
One respondent narrated a story of intimidation by a police officer who threatened to 
shoot her and her children for reporting a corruption activity. The matter was 
reported at the beginning of 2012. However, nothing has happened to date. The rest 
of the inputs were as follows:  
 
Citizens need to be informed about corruption so that they know which procedures 
to follow when faced with it. Individuals who work in anti-corruption agencies and 
anti-corruption units in government departments need to be empowered with 
relevant skills so that they are able to do their job. More information about 
procedures for reporting corruption as well as motivation why reporting of corruption 
is essential, is needed. The authorities have a direct interest in tendering and filling 
of vacant posts. 
 
The government is unable to deliver on its mandate because unqualified individuals 
hold high positions and tenders are awarded to consultants who do not have the 
required expertise to provide the necessary services. Individuals who hold high 
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political and government positions are above the law. Anti-corruption agencies are 
governed by the ruling party. 
 
4.5.2 ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW RESULTS  
 
The researcher anticipated to interview four senior managers per province. 
However, owing to unforeseen circumstances, two interviews were conducted in the 
Eastern Cape and three in the Northern Cape. Two of the targeted senior managers 
in the Eastern Cape were unavailable. In the Northern Cape, the senior manager 
whom the researcher interviewed was the person responsible for the three targeted 
functions in the department as a result of organisational restructuring subsequent to 
the establishment of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). Through 
snowballing, one interview was conducted with one of SASSA‘s senior managers. 
 
The participants were asked twelve questions. They were also requested to provide 
reasons for their responses.  Yes / No responses were further interrogated.  
 
The responses for the Eastern Cape interviewee to each of the questions are 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. Are citizens able to complain to relevant anti- corruption agencies without fear 
of recrimination?  
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Yes. However, it is only those who are literate and/or reside in urban and 
semi-urban areas that are able to do so. Persons in rural areas do not know 
what to do and where to go to.  
Anti-corruption agencies only exist in cities but they are not accessible, even 
to those who reside in these cities. The only place that individuals can go to in 
order to report corruption is a police station. The problem with this is that 
corruption is not a priority to the police. Police officers are not even equipped 
to deal with corruption cases.  
 
2. Describe the enforcement of anti-corruption strategies in this province.  How 
effective are the units in carrying out their mandate?   
 
The participants did not know of any anti-corruption strategies in this 
province. Anti-corruption units are ineffective. They exist for compliance 
purposes. They do not fulfil the rationale for their existence. The units are not 
well resourced.  The participant made an example of the unit in their 
department. The unit comprises only two officials. This makes it difficult to 
resolve cases. Furthermore, the function is not even decentralised to the 
seven districts of the department. 
 
3. What role does the South African Police Force play in combating corruption in 
the province?   
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The police play a role to some extent. As previously indicated, they are not 
trained to handle corruption related complaints. Numerous reported cases 
remain uninvestigated.  
 
4. Are the correct protocols and procedures followed when reports of alleged 
corruption are made? 
 
The procedures are incorrect. For example, a person who is not trained in this 
area of work cannot be expected to deal with such complaints. They are 
unable to implement the provisions of the legislation. 
 
5. Do you think information is freely available and directly accessible to those 
who will be affected by decisions and their enforcement? 
 
There are no awareness campaigns to inform citizens about corruption and 
how they can report it. Everything has been made complicated for an average 
South African citizen.  
 
6. Are corrupt officials held liable for their actions in the province?  Please 
provide reasons for your answers. 
 
No, this only happens in high profile cases. Examples were made of Messrs 
Bheki Cele and Jacki Selebi. However, the view is that corruption is 
corruption, regardless of the amount of money involved. Individuals who steal 
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small amounts from pensioners are as corrupt as those who receive bribes 
amounting to millions of rands. An example was made of the arms deal. 
 
The emergence of political factions further complicated the fight against 
corruption in South Africa. Persons who affiliate to a faction that holds power 
are protected from being charged. Those who belong to a rival faction are 
made examples of. This has cascaded down to the administrative level. 
Officials have turned into politicians so that they are protected from being 
charged. This is the reason that charging people for corruption is seen as a 
mechanism to punish detractors, and/or as publicity stunts. 
 
7. What is your experience about the existence of anti-corruption agencies in the 
provinces? 
 
No personal experience, but the observation is that there is nothing much to 
say about them. Individuals hear about the anti-corruption agencies but they 
are unsure exactly what it is that they do.  
 
8. Are these agencies effective in carrying out their mandate? 
 
The agencies are selective in carrying out their mandate. Poor citizens are 
prosecuted. However, decisions are taken by the ruling faction not to take 
legal action against those who commit major corruption in the country. 
Sometimes, for whatever reason, affiliates of the ruling party are made 
examples of or charged as a way of getting back at them.  
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9. Does your department have an anti-corruption unit or officials responsible for 
anti-corruption strategies? If yes, please explain. If no, why not? 
 
Yes, an ineffective one. The unit is unable to service the districts which are 
closer to the people. This leads to justice being delayed or denied. The 
citizens have lost hope. 
 
10. In your opinion, are these units or officials able to execute their duties without 
interference? 
 
Interference is always prevalent. Corruption has permeated every facet of our 
society. Those who are in power use public funds in: 
 
I. Mobilising smear campaigns against whistleblowers, portraying them 
as  disgruntled employees; and 
II. Using propaganda to influence society into thinking that whistleblowers 
are guilty. 
 
11. What is your view on government‘s intervention strategies relating to 
corruption? 
 
As previously stated, the government‘s anti-corruption strategies are 
ineffective. Anti-corruption agencies need to be visible and accessible; and 
information needs to be readily available and accessible to every citizen. A 
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strategy needs to be implemented and must not merely exist on paper. No 
implementation is visible. 
 
12. Is there anything else relating to corruption in your province that you might 
wish to add? 
 
Our province is well-known for corruption. The government needs to ensure 
that agencies are independent and not aligned to any political party and are 
well resourced. Public awareness campaigns need to be conducted.  
 
One of the directors admitted to being unaware of the fact that an anti-corruption toll 
free number exists in the province.  
 
A summary of the Northern Cape responses to each of the questions is provided 
below: 
 
1. Are citizens able to complain to relevant anti- corruption agencies without fear 
of recrimination?  
 
Not in all instances: individuals are still scared of losing their jobs and being 
targeted for victimisation.  They use the Hotline (toll free line).  
 
2. Describe the enforcement of anti-corruption strategies in this province.  How 
effective are the units in carrying out their mandate?   
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A provincial anti-corruption strategy does not exist. It was drawn up at some 
stage but has not been adopted. Good strategies do exist in the country. 
However, not everyone is informed about them owing to language diversity in 
the province. The units that implement the strategies lack independence and 
this impacts negatively on their execution.   
 
3. What role does the South African Police Service (SAPS) play in combating 
corruption in the province?   
 
To some extent they try, but they are ineffective. Their performance has 
deteriorated and they are incompetent. Investigating standards and the 
training they receive have declined. A general lack of respect for human rights 
and the society has prevailed. In-fighting, professional jealousy and 
indifference are also rampant. Extensive lack of proper management and lack 
of trust also exist in the police force. Individuals are appointed to take up 
positions for which they do not qualify. From a personal experience, the 
Independent Complaints Directorate does not provide feedback. 
 
4. Are the correct protocols and procedures followed when reports of alleged 
corruption are made? 
 
Yes. The correct protocols and procedures are followed. Although individuals 
are afraid to reveal their identities, they know what procedures to follow. The 
information from the Hotline goes to the Director-General in the Office of the 
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Premier. The Director-General‘s office dispatches the information to the 
heads of relevant departments to pursue the cases.  
 
5. Do you think information is freely available and directly accessible to those 
who will be affected by decisions and their enforcement? 
 
Yes. Awareness campaigns are constantly conducted to provide necessary 
information to the communities. A manual that guides citizens on the 
implementation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act has also been developed. However, 
language and distance pose barriers for the rural citizens of the province to 
access such information. To overcome such obstacles, the province uses 
community radios to reach rural areas.  
 
6. Are corrupt officials held liable for their actions in the province?  Please 
provide reasons for your answers.  
 
Some corrupt officials are held liable for their actions (an example was made 
of employees that were dismissed from the Department of Education). 
However, most cases are not pursued, particularly those that involve high 
profile individuals. Conversely, there are some authorities who are not afraid 
to stand their ground. In one instance an official made an example of his 
boss). 
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7. What is your experience about the existence of anti-corruption agencies in the 
provinces? 
 
From personal experience, individuals do report cases to the Public Protector 
and the SAPS. There have been cases of whistle blowing in the departments. 
However, in the SAPS the anti-corruption unit no longer exists. Another 
problem is the lack of political will to support the agencies. 
 
8. Are these agencies effective in carrying out their mandate? 
 
They do not have adequate capacity. Specialised skills are lacking. 
Corruption cases reported to the police are deprioritised. The Public Protector 
is preferable even though it is ineffective. However, it is a better option than 
the other agencies. 
 
9. Does your department have an anti-corruption unit or officials responsible for 
anti-corruption strategies? If yes, please explain. If no, why not? 
 
Yes, the Internal Audit unit is responsible for anti-corruption in the Department 
of Social Development. SASSA has an internal investigation unit that works 
closely with law enforcement agencies. Officials that are charged with this 
responsibility are supposed to conduct investigations. However, it is difficult 
because there is no strategy in place to implement. Unfortunately, the 
personnel do not possess the necessary skills. Individuals are charged. 
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However, owing to the manner in which cases are handled, culprits escape 
the long arm of the law. 
 
10. In your opinion, are these units or officials able to execute their duties without 
interference? 
 
No. Political and administrative authorities always influence their actions. 
They are not given an opportunity to do their work without interference. 
Sometimes they are instructed to stop doing their work. Support is lacking.  
 
11. What is your view on the government‘s intervention strategies relating to 
corruption? 
 
South Africa needs to practise what it preaches. It is among those countries 
that are known worldwide for having an abundance of anti-corruption 
agencies and legislation. While corruption is escalating, fewer cases are 
taken to court and fewer convictions are made. The country needs to 
establish a capacitated specific agency that deals only with corruption. 
Instructions are given not to investigate ‗important people‘ who are involved in 
corruption. There is inconsistency in the way corruption is being fought.   
 
12. Is there anything else relating to corruption in your province that you might 
wish to add? 
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Whistleblowers should be protected. There is no information-sharing amongst 
departments. Knowledge about matters in other departments might assist 
with investigations, since corrupt individuals tend to work in syndicates on 
most occasions. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, data was analysed to show whether anti-corruption legislation is 
being effectively enforced. This data also sought to shed some light on whether anti-
corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the Eastern Cape and Northern 
Cape provinces deal effectively with corruption. The data gathering method as well 
as the data gathering technique utilised were discussed. The response rate of 
seventy-eight per cent was considered reasonable and satisfactory.  The findings 
will be provided in Chapter 5 following the interpretation of responses that will link 
them to the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapters.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPIRICAL SURVEY AND FINDINGS OF THE 
STUDY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION    
 
This chapter identifies and explains themes that emerged during the survey. The 
chapter also interprets responses in association with the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapters 1, 2 and 3.  In interpreting these, the analysis of the empirical 
study and the literature review will be divided into three themes:  perceptions 
towards anti-corruption legislation, perceptions towards anti-corruption agencies, 
and perceptions towards complementary measures.  The themes are now discussed 
below. 
 
5.2 DISCUSSION OF THEMES 
 
Participants‘ narratives revealed a common pattern about the constraints and 
frustrations around the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies and anti-corruption 
legislation in South Africa. The following converging themes emerged as responses 
from the participants and were analysed: 
 
I. Corrupt systems;  
II. Political interference;  
III. Exclusion of citizens; 
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IV. Incompetence and incapacitation; and  
V. Unprotected and victimised whistleblowers. 
 
5.2.1 Corrupt Systems 
 
Participants associated acts of corruption more with systems than with individuals.  
Respondents stated that ―Corruption in South Africa has become intertwined with the 
societal fibre.” Procurement, recruitment and law enforcement systems were 
identified by participants as corruption-prone areas. The statement ―Corruption 
occurs mostly in supply chain management and employment processes which leads 
to poor service delivery”, revealed this reality. 
 
The public sector is obligated by law to act with absolute integrity and impartiality. 
These two elements require transparency. Transparency is an integral part of in 
public procurement systems. Transparent procurement processes are essential in 
order to reduce corruption.  
 
In terms of corrupt recruitment systems, a respondent had this to say: “Recruitment 
processes are riddled with corruption and insurmountable nepotism”. Respondents 
also added that ―The government is unable to deliver on its mandate because 
unqualified individuals hold high positions and tenders are awarded to consultants 
who do not have the required expertise to provide the necessary services.” It 
becomes evident that as nepotism becomes pervasive, qualified individuals are 
marginalised in favour of relatives and friends.  
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With regard to the corrupt law enforcement systems, participants responded as 
follows: 
 
“Persons who affiliate to a faction that holds power are protected from being 
charged. This has cascaded down to the administrative level. Officials have turned 
into politicians so that they are protected from being charged”. 
 
“The agencies are selective in carrying out their mandate. Poor citizens get 
prosecuted. However, those who commit major corruption in the country, decisions 
are taken by the ruling faction not to take legal action. Sometimes, for whatever 
reason affiliates of the ruling party are sacrificed or charged as a way of getting back 
at them”.  
 
―Persons who hold highest positions in government are the most corrupt and are 
seldom investigated”. 
 
This area is characterised by issues such as erosion of the rule of law, selective 
applicability of legal prescriptions, arbitrary government, and impartiality. When the 
rule of law is eroded, citizens are subjected to the capricious rule of men. Laws 
cease to apply equally to everybody. In support of good governance, laws need to 
be enforced fairly and impartially.  
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5.2.2 Political Interference  
 
The interviews revealed that investigations into corruption are open to political 
interference. Participants also highlighted politically motivated withdrawals of 
corruption charges against politically connected culprits. Respondents stated that 
―The poor are punished while the politically connected are untouchable”.  
 
This shows that politicians make decisions that are influenced by vested interests on 
behalf of the agencies. As indicated above, such decisions are made to protect 
some individuals.  It becomes clear that politically aligned anti-corruption agencies 
end up being inefficient and misdirected.  Individual and group interests become the 
main concern over communal needs. 
 
5.2.3 Exclusion of Citizens  
 
Respondents emphasised the exclusion of citizens from decisions that affect them. 
In this regard, participants stated that “The government does not involve 
communities in its fight against corruption”. The government‘s evasion of community 
involvement includes denying them participation in, awareness of and access to 
information. Participants also mentioned the following: “There are no awareness 
campaigns that provide information and feedback to the communities regarding 
corruption”. 
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This indicates that participation as one of the pillars of good governance results in 
organised civil society. The public needs to be mobilised against corruption in order 
to promote civic engagement in governance processes.  
 
This kind of accountability augments contact between citizens and governments. In 
this way transparency, accountability and good governance are amplified. In turn the 
chances that power is abused by those in authority are decreased. 
 
5.2.4 Incompetence and Incapacity 
 
Participants indicated that anti-corruption agency employees are obstructed by 
incompetence. The study revealed that personnel are often incompetent owing to 
the hiring of unqualified individuals. In this regard respondents had this to say: 
“Individuals are hired to occupy positions they do not qualify for”. 
 
“… a person who is not trained in this area of work cannot be expected to deal with 
such complaints”. 
 
Responses also showed that the agencies themselves are incapacitated. To this 
account, the participants stated the following:  
“... do not have enough of the required capacity. Specialised skills are lacking”.  
 
This is attributed to a lack of political will which leads to a lack of operational 
independence, increased political interference, and inadequate resources. 
Participants also stated the following: 
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“Another problem is lack of political will to support the agencies”. 
 
“Anti-corruption agencies are governed by the ruling party”. 
 
“Interference is always prevalent”. 
 
“Persons who affiliate to a faction that holds power are protected from being 
charged. Those who belong to a rival one are made examples of. This has cascaded 
down to the administrative level. Officials have turned into politicians so that they are 
protected from being charged. This is the reason charging people for corruption is 
seen as a mechanism to punish detractors ...”. Because anti-corruption agencies 
need to be able to exercise their power, free from political influence, and have 
adequate resources, participants had this to say: “… need to ensure that agencies 
are independent, not aligned to any political party and are well resourced”. 
 
Statements by the participants also show that the agencies‘ incompetence is also 
caused by the fact that the agencies are induced into refraining and are directed 
away from their apparent task.  
 
5.2.5 Victimisation of unprotected whistleblowers 
 
While whistleblowers are often perceived as martyrs who are committed to 
promoting integrity in the country‘s governance, less gratitude is shown by the 
government. This becomes evident as participants indicated that whistleblowers 
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undergo victimisation for their selfless actions. Participants stated that “Individuals 
who expose corruption are not protected from victimisation”. 
 
“Those who are in power use public funds in 
I. mobilising smear campaigns against whistleblowers, portraying 
them as just disgruntled employees; and  
II. using propaganda to influence the society into thinking that 
whistleblowers are the guilty ones”. 
 
Individuals who observe corrupt acts choose not to report these. Fear of retaliation is 
cited as the reason for withholding such information. Participants stated that“... 
individuals are still scared of losing their jobs and being targeted for victimisation”. 
This shows that whistleblowers are vilified instead of being lauded. 
 
Whistleblowers are supposed to be protected by law against retaliation. However, 
the mere existence of a whistleblower protection law is useless if it is incorrectly 
applied or is not applied at all. This deters whistleblowers from reporting acts of 
corruption. If whistleblowers do not have confidence in the investigating agency, they 
shy away from reporting acts of corruption. Whistleblowers‘ loyalty does not mean 
faithfulness to the authorities but to the government and its values. Whistleblowers 
act in the best ethical interests of the public.  
 
It can be deduced that systemic corruption is not much different from organised 
crime. This kind of setup has its own corresponding system of recruitment and chain 
of command. It also has its arrangement of incentives and punishment. Fighting 
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systemic corruption necessitates a politically shrewd and firm leadership. To 
paralyse enforcement of this illegal system the government needs to devise effective 
ways of involving societies, enabling answerability, decreasing discretion, and 
increasing transparency. 
 
5.3 INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSES 
 
The trend of both provincial responses has been similar. The only difference has 
always been varying percentages. For this reason interpretations will not be done 
per province. As the study unfolded, it emerged that there are complementary 
measures that the legislation and anti-corruption agencies cannot do without. These 
emerged with the literature review and when the questionnaires were being 
compiled, when the questions for the interviews were formulated and when the 
responses were received. 
 
5.3.1 PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION 
 
There is evidence that existing anti-corruption legislation is failing to accomplish its 
objective. Despite numerous pieces of legislation passed to support the 
government‘s fight against corruption, progress is not commendable. This was the 
emerging theme when high percentages of respondents from both provinces did not 
support the statement that the provinces enforce anti-corruption legislation. This 
again became apparent when the Department of Public Service and Administration 
(2011:5) highlighted the fact that chief among challenges in South Africa is non-
compliance with anti-corruption legislation and the lack of its enforcement. 
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Some of the characteristics of effective anti-corruption legislation identified by 
authors are detection, investigation and prosecution of cases, punishment, 
prevention and enforcement. Responses refuting both statements, namely that 
officials are indicted under anti-corruption legislation and officials are successfully 
convicted in terms of anti-corruption legislation proved that the country‘s legislation 
does not possess the essentials. This is supported by the Department of Public 
Service and Administration (2011:5). The frameworkstates that there are significant 
inconsistencies in the type of sanctions applied. Stork, Hasheela and Morrison 
(2004:11-13) write that corruption associated with social causes thrives where 
punishment for offenders is lenient. Along the same lines, Zuhua (2006: Online) 
adds that another factor that encourages corruption is the fact that corrupt officials 
go unpunished. 
 
The literature reviewed revealed that the Protected Disclosures Act (PDA) (No. 26 of 
2000), also called the Whistleblowers Act, was passed to encourage employees to 
disclose information about unlawful and irregular behaviour in the workplace. It 
added that the Act offers protection from victimisation for whistleblowers, as long as 
they meet the requirements and follow the procedures set out in the Act. This has 
not proven to be the case as the Public Sector Integrity Management Framework 
(2011:5) states that the ineffectiveness of the PDA has resulted in a lack of 
confidence in ‗blowing the whistle‘ against unethical conduct and corruption. 
 
This has been supported by a negative response to the statements that officials 
generally understand the whistle blowing procedures, that officials are free to ‗blow 
the whistle‘ when they are aware of corrupt activities and thirdly, that whistleblowers 
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are protected in terms of anti-corruption legislation. It is also justified by the assertion 
by the Public Sector Integrity Management Framework (2011: 5) that there is non-
compliance with and ineffective implementation of the Financial Disclosure 
Framework.  
 
The National Development Plan (2011:404) supports the above assertion and 
reveals that the percentage of people who identify themselves as prepared to ‗blow 
the whistle‘ has dropped by ten percent over the last four years. Weaknesses of the 
PDA that the National Development Plan (2011:405) highlighted are that the scope 
of protection in law is too narrow; the range of bodies to which a protected disclosure 
may be made is too narrow; there is no public body tasked with providing advice and 
promoting public awareness, and no public body dedicated to monitoring whistle 
blowing; the possibility of conditional amnesty for whistleblowers implicated in 
corruption is not clear, and adequate security for whistleblowers has not been 
established. According to Caiden (2003:6), some of the characteristics of systemic 
corruption are the terrorising and discrediting of prospective whistleblowers; the 
protecting and treating of violators leniently and the victimising of accusers for 
revealing hypocrisy. 
 
The fact that the majority of respondents identified themselves with the statements 
that most prevalent cases of petty corruption practiced on a smaller scale involve 
small amounts of money and bribes, and that most prevalent cases of grand 
corruption are found where public officials in high positions, in the process of making 
decisions of significant financial value, routinely demand bribes or kickbacks for 
ensuring that tenders or contracts are awarded to specific contractors, shows reality. 
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This is supported by Pillay‘s (2004:1) statement that rather than diminishing, 
corruption has proliferated in all segments of the South African National Public 
Service, making it the ―common cold‖ of South African social ills. 
 
The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2004:5) corroborates 
this revelation as it explains that while the two may affect particular target groups 
and aspects of a country‘s governance and development processes to a different 
degree, the overall damaging impact of grand or petty corruption is equally serious. 
The National Development Plan (2011:401) adds that evidence gathered by the 
National Planning Commission indicates that South Africa suffers from high levels of 
corruption that undermine the rule of law and hinder the state‘s ability to effect 
development and socio-economic transformation. 
 
Negative responses to all the anti-corruption legislation-related statements is an 
indication that the statement by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(2003:6), namely that  South Africa has unique legislation which empowers the 
general public to require information from the public sector and to challenge 
administrative decisions, is not necessarily true. This, then, is contrary to the 
suggestion by the United Nations (2003:6) that proper legislative changes are 
needed to better define the mandates and facilitate co-ordination in the fight against 
corruption.  
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5.3.2 PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES  
 
According to respondents, anti-corruption agencies are not adequately financially 
resourced. This is detrimental to the country‘s fight against corruption. Important 
requirements identified by Camerer (1999:2) for an anti-corruption agency to 
function effectively include sufficient staff and resources with specific knowledge and 
skills.  
 
Anti-corruption agencies are not independent of the party in power. This has been 
highlighted by the majority of respondents who refuted the statement posed.  Again, 
interview participants stressed the need for agencies not to be aligned with any 
political party. Authors such as Camerer (1999:2), Heilbrunn (2004:18), The 
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2004:5-6) and Stapenhurst 
and Langseth (1997:324-325) emphasise independence, both operationally and 
politically, as one of the crucial elements for an anti-corruption agency. Heilbrunn 
(2004:18) also adds that the government should be committed to enacting reforms 
that may be politically difficult. 
 
The statement that anti-corruption agencies are likely to discharge their duties 
without fear or favour was strongly challenged by respondents. This was also 
supported by respondents‘ contributions that anti-corruption agencies are governed 
by the ruling party.  
 
Disproval of the statement that anti-corruption agencies have committed political 
backing raises concern. Pope (2000:95) identified weak political will as one of 
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reasons why anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) fail. Where there is a lack of political 
will, ‗leaders‘ engage in corruption as a means of sustaining themselves or to protect 
themselves as they may be engaged in corruption. When corruption becomes a 
means for survival owing to prevailing circumstances or any other reason it becomes 
an acceptable norm and the political will to fight or oppose corruption is absent 
(Stork, Hasheela & Morrison, 2004: 11-13). 
 
Jennett and Hodess (2007:2) advise that the integrity of staff is crucial to the 
credibility and effectiveness of an ACA. However, the statement that anti-corruption 
agencies have always retained their credibility was refuted by the majority of 
respondents. This is also supported by interview participants who raised the 
following issues: poor ordinary citizens are prosecuted; and when it comes to those 
who commit major corruption in the country, decisions are taken not to prosecute.  
 
Pope and Vogel (2000:8) suggest that appointment procedures need to address the 
issue of whether persons of integrity are given the leadership; and that they are 
protected from political pressures while they are in office. Staff members at all levels 
should, therefore, undergo some form of integrity checks to minimise the risk of staff 
undermining the agency's role in curbing corruption (Pope and Vogel, 2000:8). 
 
Pope (2000:104) suggests that appointing procedures for the head of the agency 
should ensure that he or she is competent and independent of the party in power. 
Pope (2000:104) discourages what is referred to as fear of the consequences. 
Jennett and Hodess (2007:2) add that some agencies have their own internal 
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oversight body to investigate breaches of their code of conduct, or a body that 
monitors and reviews all complaints against the ACA.  
 
The literature review revealed that the Promotion of Access to Information Act (No. 2 
of 2000) gives effect to Section 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 by setting out how one can obtain access to information held by the 
state. By doing this, it promotes transparency and prevents the government from 
operating in secret. Again it was pointed out by Robinson (2012:2-3) that in order for 
citizens to remain the stewards of democracy, issues of accountability and 
transparency in governance are paramount. 
 
However, responses strongly indicated that anti-corruption agencies lack 
transparency. This is supported by Robinson (2012:2-3) who states that enacting 
Protection of State Information legislation (Secrecy Act) cloaks the workings of state 
actors, interferes with press freedom to investigate corruption, and stifles efforts by 
whistleblowers to expose corruption, and will surely increase levels of corruption. 
The public interest demands that basic truth, having both transparency and 
accountability in government (Robinson, 2012:2-3). 
 
Responses further indicated that heads of anti-corruption agencies are not hired on 
merit. This is confirmed by interview participants who explained how the government 
cannot deliver on its mandate because unqualified people are holding high positions. 
This is contrary to Pope and Vogl‘s (2000:8) opinion that national anti-corruption 
agencies should not be run by hand-picked supporters of politicians in power, as 
such leaders could be deployed to intimidate political opponents.  
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Jennett and Hodess (2007:2) identify making executive appointments to anti-
corruption agencies as a challenge since it fails to ensure that persons of integrity 
are selected, that they enjoy independence from political (and private sector) 
interference  or are held to account for their actions. Stork, Hasheela and Morrison 
(2004:11-13) explain that excessive power vested in the executive wing of the 
government is likely to be abused and will even hinder the effort of the government 
institutions established to fight corruption.  
 
Pope (2000:95) reveals that one of the reasons anti-corruption agencies fail is 
political interference. This has been evident in this study with the majority of 
respondents refuting the statement that anti-corruption agencies are free from 
political interference. Pope (2000:95) again states that where there is political 
interference, the agency is not allowed to do its job independently, least of all to 
investigate officials at the higher and highest spheres of government.  
 
Citing examples, authors attribute South Africa‘s failure to fight corruption 
predominantly to political interference. Referring to the disbanding of the Directorate 
of Special Operations (Scorpions), Berning and Montesh (2012:7) explain that 
intense political pressure as a consequence of pursuing investigations that involved 
high level politicians contributed to the downfall of the Scorpions. According to 
Rosenberg (2010:4), the politically tinged firing of the head of the Office of the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Vusi Pikoli, raised serious 
questions about the political independence of senior civil servants in South Africa. 
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Alam (1995:419) indicates that where civil society is weak, citizens and private 
interests are vulnerable to exploitation by political or bureaucratic monopolies, or 
both. This is authenticated by the vast majority of responses that disagrees with the 
statement that members of the public are free to complain to anti-corruption 
agencies without fear of recrimination. The TI Sourcebook (2000:95) warns that anti-
corruption agencies fail owing to failure to win the involvement of the community. 
 
In the literature review Stork, Hasheela and Morrison (2004:11-13) highlight the fact 
that when the existing legal and institutional frameworks are faced with a number of 
inadequacies, such as insufficient power to enforce the laws, insufficient funding, 
insufficient manpower or a lack of autonomy, they are not able to function effectively. 
The study revealed that the majority of respondents disagree that anti-corruption 
agencies act within a reasonable time regarding corruption complaints.  
 
Pope and Vogel (2000:6) state that anti-corruption agencies may lack the power to 
prosecute. This was confirmed by the majority of responses who disagreed that anti-
corruption agencies independently initiate investigations or that anti-corruption 
agency employees enjoy independence from political interference in the discharge of 
their duties. Del Mar Landette (2002:56) stresses that ACAs‘ independence of 
resources, structure and power should guarantee their freedom of action. 
Stapenhurst and Langseth (1997:324-325) argue that to operate successfully, an 
anti-corruption agency should have leadership which is publicly perceived as being 
of the highest integrity. 
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According to the responses there are no ‗no go‘ areas for certain investigations. This 
is supported by Pope and Vogl (2000:6) who state that anti-corruption agencies may 
be so beholden to their political masters that they dare not investigate even the most 
corrupt government officials. Among variables that reduce the effectiveness of an 
anti-corruption agency identified by Heilbrunn (2004:14) are the absence of laws 
necessary for its success a lack of independence from interference by the political 
leadership, unclear reporting hierarchy, and the absence of oversight committees. 
 
Pope (2000:95) identifies the following integrity pillars for an anti-corruption agency: 
adequately trained employees; adequately remunerated employees; random 
integrity testing of employees; arrangements to ensure that anti-corruption agencies 
do not themselves become corrupt; and accountability of agencies to parliament as 
pillars for anti-corruption agencies. However, owing to negative responses to related 
statements it is clear that the country‘s agencies lack such support systems. 
 
Stapenhurst and Langseth (1997:324) expound the view that if the appointing 
mechanism ensures consensus support through parliament, rather than government; 
and an accountability mechanism exists outside government (for example, a 
parliamentary select committee on which all major parties are represented), the 
space for abuse for non-partisan activities can be minimised.  
 
Jennett and Hodess (2007:2) add that expertise and continuous training are 
essential if the highest professional standard of an ACA is to be maintained, and 
adequate salary levels are necessary to maintain staff morale and to act as a 
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disincentive to engagement in corrupt activities. Pope (2000:95) again explains that 
an anti-corruption agency fails if the agency itself becomes corrupt. 
 
The statement that the government is taking the issue of corruption in the public 
sector seriously was rejected by the majority of respondents. This is not surprising 
as respondents‘ contributions and interview participants indicated that the public is 
not involved in anti-corruption initiatives. De Sousa (2010:12) asserts that being 
known by and accessible to the public at large is one of requisites that need to be in 
place for a particular agency to be classified as an ACA.  
 
5.3.3 PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES 
 
As the study proceeded, a number of supporting mechanisms that have been 
devised by the government to support the fight against corruption became 
prominent. These complementary measures that emerged throughout the study are 
the following: 
 
I. The Batho Pele (People First) principles; 
II. National Anti-Corruption  Strategy; 
III. Public Service National Anti-Corruption Hotline System; 
IV. Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirement; 
V. Financial Disclosure Framework; 
VI. Financial management and procurement systems; and  
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VII. Civil service rules, regulations, codes of conduct and statutes that prohibit 
bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and favouritism in the awarding of 
contracts or the provision of government benefits, or both. 
 
According to the literature review and the empirical survey, these have not proved to 
be assisting as well as intended.  The Batho Pele (People First) principles that were 
meant to set out the required levels of professional ethics in the public service in 
terms of service delivery do exist. However, according to the respondents‘ 
contributions, despite its existence, public servants still generally lack moral values.  
 
Participants indicated that there are no provincial anti-corruption strategies.  The 
minimum anti-corruption capacity requirement, which was meant to assist in the 
implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy, is not being complied with 
(Department of Public Service and Administration, 2011: 5). 
 
One of the participants admitted to not having known that an anti-corruption toll free 
number existed in the province. The Department of Public Service and 
Administration (2011:5) complains that allegations of corruption reported to the anti-
corruption hotline are referred back to departments for follow-up, but because 
departments do not have sufficient investigative capacity, initial investigations are 
never completed. 
 
Although the literature reveals that financial disclosure requirements and 
performance systems for managers in the public service have been instituted, 
participants revealed that public servants are often involved in government tenders. 
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This is supported by the Department of Public Service and Administration (2011:5), 
which accentuatesnon-compliance with the Financial Disclosure Framework.  
 
Interview participants highlighted the fact that corruption mostly occurs in supply 
chain management and in the filling of vacant posts. Supporting this notion, the 
Department of Public Service and Administration (2011:5) states that supply chain 
management prescripts are not adhered to; fraud and corruption is widespread as a 
result of improperly awarded tenders; goods and services are provided at grossly 
inflated prices; officials benefit from government contracts; unnecessary purchases 
are made; and payments are made for services that have not been rendered. 
 
The literature review further revealed that in 1997 the Code of Conduct for the Public 
Service, which sets the standards of integrity for public servants, was adopted. 
Notwithstanding its existence, the interview participants have highlighted high levels 
of bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and favouritism. This is confirmed by the 
Department of Public Service and Administration (2011:5), which elucidates the fact 
that there is limited implementation of and adherence to the Code of Conduct. The 
Department of Public Service and Administration (2011:5) also reveals that certain 
public servants display a culture of unethical and undesirable conduct. 
 
5.4 FINDINGS 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main aim of the study was to conduct a comparative 
analysis of anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the Eastern 
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Cape and Northern Cape provinces in order to deal effectively with corruption. 
Specifically the study sought to address the following:  
 
I. To examine the nature and extent of corruption in the two provinces;  
II. To identify factors affecting the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
legislation and agencies;  
III. To compare and analyse the effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation 
and agencies in both the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces; 
and 
IV. To identify and analyse factors associated with compliance or non-
compliance with the anti-corruption legislation in the two provinces. 
 
This has been achieved through the analysis in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 
above. The study compared two provinces and the findings reveal that there has not 
been much difference realised in the manner in which the two provinces perform. 
Two distinctions that could be acknowledged are around the magnitude of negative 
and impartial responses. Majority responses from both provinces would disprove.  
However, Eastern Cape percentages were always higher than those of the Northern 
Cape ones. Again, there were always more impartial Eastern Cape responses than 
those of the Northern Cape.  
 
Consequently, the positive response percentage from the Northern Cape was a little 
higher than that of the Eastern Cape, which did not cause any significant difference 
as the negatives remained higher. This is attributed to the fact that the Northern 
Cape respondents were not completely ignorant about the subject.  The study 
225 
 
revealed that, although not at a satisfactory level, there are information-sharing 
initiatives that the province is employing. Key findings are as follows: 
 
5.4.1 Corruption that exists in the country is systemic. 
 
Corruption in the country is a symptom of deeper problems of how a political 
leadership administers the key financial functions of the state. It is 
concentrated among the wealthy individuals in the country, and has reached 
kleptocracy level which often involves the systematic theft of public funds and 
property by public officials.  
 
It is aggravated to a degree where the incompleteness of the formal system 
enables perpetrators to pursue their corrupt activities subtly protected by 
secrecy; and can continue reproducing themselves in the shadow of the 
formal system.   
 
There is a systematic use of public office for private benefit that results in a 
reduction in the quality or availability of public goods and services. Networks 
and alliances exist that use elements of the state and the political system to 
mediate their corrupt exchanges which they rely on to meet their objectives.  
Political leaders and top bureaucrats often set an example of self-enrichment 
over public ethics which causes lower level officials and members of the 
public to follow suit.  
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5.4.2 Most corruption occurs in procurement and recruitment 
processes. 
 
There is overwhelming evidence that public procurement activities are most 
vulnerable to corruption in the country. A lack of transparency and 
accountability were recognised as major threats to integrity in public 
procurement practices. 
 
Irregularities in recruitment and selection manifest themselves through 
patronage, nepotism, cronyism, favouritism and spoils system. The study 
reveals that opportunities and jobs are often not awarded on the basis of 
merit.  
 
Principles of merit and competition in civil service recruitment and promotion 
are being violated. Again there is evidence that public office is often used as a 
reward for political party work and spoils system, the motivation of which is to 
secure jobs for party activists.  
 
5.4.3 There is a lack of a clear, strong and enforceable legal framework. 
 
The legislation lacks the bright-line rule in order to be easily understood and 
simple to apply. It contains standards that are open to interpretation by 
enforcement agencies, which makes it vulnerable to deliberate 
misapprehension. This has led to unprotected whistleblowers being victimised 
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as a result of blowing the whistle and has also resulted in communities who 
are too afraid to blow the whistle on alleged corruption.  
 
Clearly, tough anti-corruption legislation exists in the country. However, 
having such laws does not guarantee effective enforcement. Therefore, 
without enforcement, corruption will continue to thrive because the culprits are 
neither detected nor investigated. Well-written legislation with good intentions 
is incapable of being effective without being adequately enforced.   
 
Besides implementation gaps, the study has revealed that anti-corruption 
legislation enforcement is being politicised. When this happens, whether laws 
should be enforced in an appropriate manner ultimately depends on the will 
and determination of political leaders. Political power is used to shield corrupt 
activities of family, friends, or political supporters, or both.  
 
5.4.4 There is no devotion by agencies to fighting corruption. 
 
Although the country is suffering from systemic corruption in which high-level 
officials are often implicated, no agency is completely devoted to investing 
and prosecuting the corrupt. Existing agencies are unable to perform the 
necessary functions adequately.  
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5.4.5 There is a lack of political will towards anti-corruption initiatives. 
 
The findings from the study further reveal that the government is not taking 
the issue of corruption seriously. This has been attributed to insufficient 
political support in the implementation of anti-corruption measures.  The 
country lacks the political will to fight corruption at the level it should.  
 
Although political will is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective 
anti-corruption initiatives, there is no demonstrated credible intent by the 
government to fight corruption successfully at a systemic level. Where there is 
no political will, it is proposed that public service reform, transparency and 
accountability strengthening will simply be reduced to oratory statements.  
 
5.4.6 There is limited access to information. 
 
Access to information is another basic civil right that hampers the 
implementation of anti-corruption initiatives. The country upholds a culture of 
secrecy where little information is released to the public at large and which 
forbids public scrutiny of government agencies. Despite the existence of a 
relevant act of parliament that is meant to set out how people can obtain 
access to information held by the state, citizens are still not empowered with 
the knowledge that they have a right to such information.   
 
The Act should promote transparency and prevent the government from 
operating in secret. However, the study has revealed that access to 
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information is minimal, which encourages a lack of government transparency 
and accountability. This also promotes mismanagement and misuse of public 
funds due to insufficient checks and balances in place to ensure 
accountability. 
 
5.4.7 The ACAs are functionally and technically incapacitated. 
 
The ACAs suffer a lack of core capacities, that is, capacities that are 
necessary for managing anti-corruption agencies, which are linked to the core 
issues and challenges of anti-corruption agencies, and capacities that are 
associated with particular areas of professional expertise or knowledge, which 
are mostly linked to specific functions of anti-corruption agencies. This might 
be because anti-corruption agency employees are inadequately trained and 
remunerated which might demotivate them from performing their functions 
effectively. 
 
5.4.8 Anti-corruption agencies lack credibility independence and 
accountability. 
 
Generally speaking, anti-corruption agencies do not appear to be credible in 
the provinces which formed part of this study.  This has manifested itself 
through low levels of professional and ethical standards, and limited 
independence and accountability. Communities have lost trust in them owing 
to their behaviour. They are not seen as institutions that conform to human 
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rights norms and standards. Employees of these implementing agencies are 
often easily manipulated for political purposes.   
 
The rule of law which encompasses checks and balances and accountability 
to sovereign authority often does not apply. These are reasons anti-corruption 
agencies are unable to initiate investigations independently, and are 
accountable to the executive, which leaves them open to manipulation.   
 
SUMMARY 
 
Based on the literature study and the empirical survey responses, the study has 
revealed that both anti-corruption legislation and the agencies have failed to achieve 
their set objectives. The results were interpreted against the backdrop of the major 
assumption that the struggle against corruption is best approached by developing a 
system of laws, institutions and supporting practices which promote integrity and 
make corrupt conduct a high-risk activity, as explained in Chapter 1 and which 
motivated the researcher to undertake the study.  
 
In the chapter that follows, recommendations on how to mitigate problems that are 
responsible for this failure will be presented and then the chapter will conclude the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SYNOPSIS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter 5 described the findings of the study after an analysis of the data gathered. 
This chapter seeks to present a summary of the findings and conclusions drawn 
from the findings, as well as the limitations of the study. Recommendations for the 
improvement of anti-corruption legislation and agencies will also be provided. 
Lessons learnt as well as examples of best practices will be highlighted. Areas for 
future research will also be identified. To guide the flow of recommendations that will 
be provided in this chapter, a summary of the findings is presented below.   
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Subsequent to the analysis of literature, questionnaire responses and interview 
results, a number of findings became apparent. The findings are summarised below.   
 
It became evident that there is systematic use of public office for private benefit. This 
results in inferior quality or the unavailability of public goods and services. This is 
facilitated by networks and alliances that use the political system and state 
resources to sustain unethical behaviour.  A precedent of promoting self-enrichment 
over public ethics has emerged from the findings of this research. It appears that 
certain political leaders and top bureaucrats are involved. 
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It was also found that public procurement and recruitment are the sectors most 
prone to corrupt behaviour. This was attributed to a lack of transparency and 
accountability. It became clear from the study that principles of merit and competition 
in recruitment and promotion are being violated owing to the extensive levels of 
patronage, nepotism, cronyism, favouritism and the spoils system. 
 
The survey established that, in addition to implementation lacunae, anti-corruption 
legislation enforcement is being politicised. Abusing their power, certain political 
leaders prescribe the manner in which legislation is implemented so that the 
corruption of their family members, friends and political supporters is shielded. It is 
proposed that existing anti-corruption agencies are unable to devote their efforts in 
their entirety to perform the necessary functions to fight corruption.  
 
A glaring lack of political will towards anti-corruption initiatives has emerged as a 
finding from this study. This was identified as the main cause of failure of anti-
corruption initiatives in the country. Access to information was also identified as one 
of the major impediments to the success of anti-corruption initiatives. This was 
ascribed to the country‘s practice of upholding a culture of secrecy.  
 
It was also revealed that anti-corruption agencies are functionally and technically 
incapacitated. Anti-corruption agencies appear to lack credibility, independence and 
accountability. The empirical component of this study revealed that employees of 
anti-corruption agencies are inadequately trained and inadequately remunerated. 
The survey further revealed that the rule of law is not applied as stringently as it 
should be in South Africa. It is proposed that a lack of fear for any criminal 
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prosecution is a further reason why anti-corruption agencies are open to 
manipulation. As the study unfolded, its limitations became palpable and these are 
briefly discussed below.  
 
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
In Chapter 1 it was stated that this study focused on assessing the effectiveness of 
the anti-corruption agencies and legislation in relation to public sector corruption. 
The study was approached from a governmental (public sector) perspective only. 
 
The study was also conducted in only two provinces.  For this reason, it is difficult to 
draw generalisations on the findings. However, because all provinces in South Africa 
are governed by the same anti-corruption agencies and legislation, these findings 
are capable of providing a synopsis on how effective these agencies are. In this 
process a number of lessons were learnt and these now follow. 
 
6.4 LESSONS LEARNT 
 
Firstly, conducting research on corruption has proven to be extremely difficult. 
Problems ranged from the researcher not being allowed to mention the term 
―corruption‖ to participants not being completely willing to open up. During the early 
days of the study it was not easy to discuss corruption without startling those 
present. It is most commendable that the issue of corruption is currently being more 
widely discussed in the country.  It is hoped that this is the beginning  of making the 
issue of corruption more public. 
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Secondly, it was learnt that public organisations regard junior employees as a threat 
when corruption-related research is undertaken. The researcher experienced this 
firsthand, especially during the data collection phases.  Permission was granted to 
conduct the research in the selected departments and provinces.  However, when 
the time came for the phase of data collection, the researcher experienced certain 
challenges.  However, these challenges were eventually resolved and the process of 
data collection proceeded. 
 
Thirdly, when conducting similar studies to this one, it is not advisable to separate 
public sector corruption from private sector corruption. A perception that corruption 
occurs only in the public sector is misleading. Most of the private sector corruption 
appears to go unnoticed by the relevant authorities or media. This creates the 
impression that corruption in the private sector is not as widespread as it is in the 
public sector. 
 
Fourthly, a country‘s political system can significantly determine the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption initiatives in that particular country. The mere existence of legislation 
and agencies does not guarantee that corruption will be successfully curbed.  
Success lies in the genuineness with which the efforts are being pursued, the 
enforcement of the rule of law and other legislative prescriptions including codes of 
conduct for public functionaries. 
 
As lessons were learnt, further areas of study were identified. These are presented 
below. 
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6.5 FURTHER AREAS OF STUDY 
 
As previously stated, it is suggested that those who conduct similar studies in future 
should not separate private corruption from public corruption. Since corruption 
reaches across all sectors of society, eradicating it would require a combined effort 
from all sectors. The private sector plays a pivotal part in perpetuating corruption. 
When corrupt acts take place, the supply chain is fed largely by the private sector.  
Furthermore, besides paying bribes to public servants, corruption also happens 
between one private organisation and another. 
 
6.6 SYNOPSIS   
 
This study sought to conduct a comparative analysis of the ability of anti-corruption 
legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape 
provinces to deal effectively with corruption. In carrying out the investigation, a 
survey was employed. The data gathered for this study was achieved by means of a 
literature review, the administration of questionnaires and interviews. The 
triangulation methodology was accordingly deemed the most appropriate method to 
achieve the primary aims and objectives of the research. 
 
As the literature was reviewed and the empirical study analysed, it was revealed that 
there are hurdles that hamper the effectiveness of the country‘s anti-corruption 
legislation and anti-corruption agencies. The investigation was based on the major 
assumption stated in Chapter 1, namely that the struggle against corruption is best 
approached by developing a system of laws, institutions and supporting practices 
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which promote integrity. The rationale for the study was depicted in Chapter 1  as 
well as the research questions.   
 
6.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
 
6.7.1 Chapter 1 
 
This chapter provided a general introduction to the entire study. The background, 
rationale for conducting the study, research questions, scope and limitations of the 
study as well as the research methodology were also discussed. 
 
6.7.2 Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 focused on the definitions and analyses of corruption. This chapter also 
provided a comprehensive approach to the understanding of the nature of 
corruption, and a survey of relevant literature on corruption was undertaken. This 
was done by discussing the extent, forms, causes and effects of corruption.  
 
6.7.3. Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 outlined properties of effective anti-corruption legislation and anti-
corruption agencies. Attention was given to what anti-corruption legislation and anti-
corruption agencies should be, rather than the somewhat abstract study of 
corruption itself.  
 
237 
 
6.7.4. Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 outlined the methodology followed in the study. It also described the 
research design, participants, research instruments, methods of data collection and 
analysis, as well as ethical considerations. 
 
6.7.5 Chapter 5  
 
Chapter 5 outlined and discussed the findings obtained from the analysis of the 
qualitative and quantitative data. 
 
6.7.6 Chapter 6  
 
Chapter 6 presented a summary of the findings, the conclusions drawn from the 
findings and the limitations of the study. Recommendations for the improvement of 
anti-corruption legislation and agencies were also presented. Lessons learnt as well 
as examples of best practice were highlighted. In addition, Areas for future research 
were identified. 
 
6.8 EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE 
 
In Chapter 3, good practice examples of anti-corruption laws were identified as those 
of Singapore, Hong Kong and, to some extent, Malaysia. The following highlights 
were reviewed: Singapore‘s Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) was enacted in 
1960. The law explicitly defines corruption in terms of various forms of ―gratification‖ 
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and combines extensive prevention measures with severe sanctions and penalties. 
Secondly, Hong Kong‘s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance 1970 (POBO) is a 
comprehensive piece of legislation that covers all types of bribery, both in the public 
and the private sectors. Finally, Malaysia‘s Anti-Corruption Act 1997 provides for 
offences and penalties for private and public sector corruption, including active and 
passive bribery, attempted corruption and abuse of office, corruption through agents 
and intermediaries, corruption in public procurement and electoral corruption. 
 
The literature review has revealed that good practice examples of anti-corruption 
ACAs are Hong Kong‘s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), 
Singapore‘s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), and Botswana‘s 
Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC). The New South Wales 
Independent Commission against Corruption was also mentioned as a parliamentary 
model. 
 
Based on the evidence gathered, it is suggested that a single anti-corruption agency 
should be established in South Africa. The literature review revealed that reasons 
cited in the past for objecting to this opinion were, among others: 
 
I. Perceived un-affordability of a single agency;  
II. Confusion over where it would best be located, how it would be funded and 
what its mandate would be; 
III. Establishing whether existing agencies could be restructured and transformed 
before planning the establishment of a new body;  
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IV. Risks involved in establishing a new single agency including the addition of 
another layer of bureaucracy to the law enforcement sector; 
V. The diversion of already scarce resources from existing agencies and other 
government priorities; and 
VI. Weaknesses such as fragmentation, insufficient coordination, poor 
delineation of responsibility and assimilation of corruption work into a broader 
mandate. 
 
The researcher supports the view of authors who propose the adoption of a single 
anti-corruption agency. The literature and the survey revealed that criminal 
investigations are central to a single anti-corruption agency‘s mandate. Its 
investigation activities are supported by a well-resourced police force and criminal 
justice system. It also acts within a ―supportive‖ political environment. These are 
regarded as befitting the criteria which underlie an effective anti-corruption agency.  
 
South Africa should establish an agency that will be able to address systemic 
corruption instead of the Multi-Agency Model that addresses gaps, weaknesses, and 
new opportunities for corruption. In addition, the model which South Africa has 
adopted is used by wealthy countries such as the United States of America and 
most of Western Europe, while South Africa is a developing country. As revealed by 
the literature review, South Africa‘s scarce resources would better be utilised 
optimally by one agency towards strengthening its functionality in promoting anti-
corruption strategies instead of being distributed over twelve anti-corruption 
agencies. 
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6.9 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendations consistent with the findings drawn from the empirical study and 
literature review are proposed below: 
 
Recommendation One: Develop and implement an articulate systemic anti-
corruption framework 
 
To address the manner in which the major institutions and processes of the state are 
taken over and exploited by corrupt individuals and groups, a systemic approach 
should be embarked upon. This approach must be undertaken to ensure enhanced 
transparency, dismantled monopolistic powers, restricted discretionary powers and 
the elimination of impunity.  
 
Recommendation Two: Increase transparency in order to curb corruption  
 
It is essential that the access to information right enshrined in the 1996 Constitution 
is upheld for all. Espousing this right augments democratic principles of openness, 
transparency and accountability. Like many countries around the world, South Africa 
has passed freedom of information legislation, for example, the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act and The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. The former sets 
out the procedure to obtain access to information held by the state while the latter 
ensures that decisions that affect the public are taken in a way that is procedurally 
fair. These two Acts are meant to promote transparency and prevent the government 
from operating in secret. 
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Nevertheless, this study has revealed that transparency is still lacking in South 
Africa.  Access to information is another basic civil right that when infringed upon, 
hinders the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives. The country should reverse 
the apparent culture of secrecy.  When little or no information is released to the 
public, the scrutiny of government agencies becomes difficult. In order to enhance 
levels of trust between communities and the government, the public should be 
further mobilised against corrupt behaviour by public officials and politicians at all 
spheres of government. 
 
Recommendation Three: Dismantle monopolistic powers should   
 
While the researcher acknowledges that monopoly of power is possibly linked to 
corruption of the political system, it is strongly suggested that, for the benefit of the 
country‘s survival, no political party should have exclusive control over power. 
Domination of South Africa's political environment by one political party for an 
extended period has led the current government to use its means to its own ends.  
Where systemic corruption exists, the longer the same political party remains in 
power, the more the processes are influenced on their behalf.  
 
The influence persists to ensure that anti-monopoly measures are not undertaken or 
that, if they are undertaken, they are merely superficial, taken to strengthen and 
extend the ruling party‘s monopoly position and to weaken legislation in order to 
entrench its philosophy. It has been revealed by the study that because excessive 
power has been vested in the executive wing of government, it is being abused. 
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Recommendation Four: Restrict discretionary powers of politicians and 
bureaucrats 
 
Discretion is a vital tool in management. It is meant to enable decision-makers to 
make decisions which represent a responsible choice. However, too much discretion 
exacerbates corruption. The research has revealed that those in positions of power 
abuse this enabling instrument in order to sustain corruption. For this reason, in 
order to promote transparency and effective control systems, excessive 
discretionary powers should be limited. 
  
Recommendation Five: Increase salaries of anticorruption agency’s 
employees 
 
Employees of the anti-corruption agency should be paid adequate remuneration. 
This will possibly promote motivation and commitment amongst employees. By so 
doing, officials will be discouraged from finding other sources of income and could 
rather be encouraged to concentrate on their primary duties in terms of fighting 
corruption.  
 
Recommendation Six: Eliminate conflicting incentives 
 
As stated in Chapter 5, corruption investigations are open to political interference. 
Politically motivated withdrawals of corruption charges against politically connected 
culprits have become prevalent. Professional judgment should not be unduly 
influenced by personal interest. 
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Recommendation Seven:  Eradicate the culture of impunity 
 
According to the literature reviewed and the findings from the empirical survey, 
professional ethics in the public service have deteriorated despite the existence of 
measures such as the Batho Pele principles and codes of conduct. Excessive levels 
of loss of moral values were emphasised. This behaviour is associated with the 
erosion of the rule of law, selective applicability of law, arbitrary government and 
partiality.  It appears that certain laws have ceased to apply equally to everybody. 
Politically connected individuals are exempted from punishment.  In support of good 
governance, all legislation should be enforced fairly and impartially.  
 
Recommendation Eight: Strengthen the national procurement systems 
 
Government procurement is subject to bid-rigging, kickbacks and official collusion in 
over-invoicing. Despite existing detailed arrangements for the conduct of public 
institutions around the procurement of goods and services, high levels of corruption 
crimes are committed. The vulnerability of public procurement to corruption should 
be eliminated through the strengthening of transparency and accountability.   
 
Recommendation Nine: Immunise recruitment processes against corruption 
 
Merit-based appointment of government employees is the basis for the public 
service. The Public Service Commission developed a Toolkit on Recruitment and 
Selection in the public service. The toolkit is meant to provide guidance in selecting 
the most competent persons available, within the parameters of legislation on 
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Affirmative Action and Employment Equity. It encourages merit-based recruitment 
for senior civil service positions. It is recommended therefore that the Public Service 
Commission Toolkit on Recruitment and Selection in the public service be complied 
with, together with all other prescripts in the public service.  This should be 
stringently monitored and controlled. 
 
Recommendation Ten: Instill a political will towards anti-corruption 
initiatives 
 
The government itself should take the issue of corruption seriously. Sufficient 
political support should be provided for the implementation of anti-corruption 
measures and strategies.   
 
Recommendation Eleven: Develop clear, strong and enforceable anti-
corruption legislation 
 
As revealed by the survey, the existing anti-corruption legislation is ineffective. 
Limited compliance with anti-corruption legislation and a lack of enforcement thereof 
are the major problems. According to the respondents the current anti-corruption 
laws in South Africa fail to detect, investigate, prosecute, punish, prevent or enforce 
as they are expected to. Significant inconsistencies in the type of sanctions applied, 
lenient punishments, non-punishment and loopholes that lead to offenders getting 
away without being prosecuted were also stressed.   
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The legislation must be written in a manner that makes it easy to understand. It 
should also be straightforward to apply. The vulnerability of legislation to deliberate 
misinterpretation should be avoided. Enforceability of anti-corruption legislation will 
enhance the protection of whistleblowers from victimisation, encourage communities 
to blow the whistle when necessary, and facilitate successful investigations. 
 
Results also revealed that, in addition to the implementation gaps, anti-corruption 
legislation enforcement is being politicised. Political leaders interfere with the 
enforcement of laws in shielding those who are close to them. It is therefore 
recommended that the implementation of anti-corruption legislation be depoliticised.   
 
Taken further, the anti-corruption legislation should also be amended.  This needs to 
be done through broadening the scope of protection in the whistleblower law and the 
range of bodies to which a protected disclosure may be made. An organisation that 
is tasked with providing advice and promoting public awareness and a public entity 
dedicated to monitoring whistleblowing should be established. Anti-corruption laws 
should be able to protect whistleblowers from being terrorised and discredited. It 
should avoid ambiguities that lead to protection and the soft treatment of culprits and 
ill-treatment of whistleblowers for revealing hypocrisy. 
 
Recommendation Twelve: Establish a devoted anti-corruption agency 
It is recommended that South Africa should establish a centralised anti-corruption 
agency tasked with deterrence, prevention, education and prosecution of corruption 
cases. 
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The literature review revealed that Hong Kong‘s Independent Commission against 
Corruption (ICAC) symbolises a universal model. Functions of the universal model 
are investigation, prevention and communication. These functions have been 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  The New South Wales Independent Commission 
against Corruption takes a similar approach to fighting corruption as the Hong 
Kong‘s Independent Commission against Corruption. However, the New South 
Wales Independent Commission against Corruption reports to parliament and is 
independent from the executive and judicial branches of state.  
 
South Africa takes a multi-agency model that includes a number of offices which are 
meant to be individually distinct, but together weave a web of agencies to fight 
corruption. However, this is not happening. As exposed by the literature review, the 
model is riddled with the following problems: 
 
I. Fragmentation;  
II. Insufficient coordination;   
III. Poor delineation of responsibility;  and  
IV. Under-resourcingand under-capacitating.   
 
Moreover, of the 12 agencies, only the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) has an 
exclusive anti-corruption mandate, with no power to promote a holistic approach to 
fighting corruption. Based on this exposé, a suitable model for South Africa is 
provided below as part of the recommendations.  
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6.10 THE RECOMMENDED MODEL 
 
Based on the discussion of anti-corruption models in Chapter 3, the following model 
is recommended for South Africa:  
 
Figure 6.1: The Proposed Model 
 
The Hong Kong‘s ICAC: the 
Universal Model 
The New South Wales ICAC: 
the Parliamentary Model 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
EXECUTIVE 
PARLIAMENT 
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 Corruption 
Prevention  
 Community 
Relations  
 
 Investigation 
 Corruption 
Prevention 
 Corporate Services 
 Legal 
 
 
Prosecuting 
mandate 
Suggested Single Anti-
Corruption Agency for South 
Africa 
Functions of the Hong Kong‘s ICAC: the 
Universal Model + Reporting Style of the 
New South Wales ICAC: the 
Parliamentary Model + prosecuting 
Mandate 
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The model is derived from primarily two models, the Hong Kong‘s ICAC: the 
Universal Model and the New South Wales ICAC: the Parliamentary Model. 
As indicated above, the two Independent Commissions against Corruption 
almost have the same core functions. The difference between the two is that 
the Hong Kong‘s ICAC accounts to the executive while the New South Wales 
ICAC accounts to the parliament.  
 
Neither of the ICACs has a prosecuting mandate. Owing to the findings 
highlighted in Chapter 5 that relate to the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption 
agencies, the suggested anti-corruption agency needs to be authorised to 
prosecute individuals implicated in corruption. The findings have shown that 
when prosecutions begin to implicate politically connected individuals, the 
functioning of the agency is often manipulated by those who have authority. 
 
The agency should emulate the Hong Kong ICAC‘s functions, that is, 
deterrence, prevention and education.  As depicted by Figure 6.1, the agency 
should be divided into three departments: the Operations Department; the 
Corruption Prevention Department and the Community Relations Department. 
 
The Operations Department would be responsible for investigating alleged 
corruption. The Corruption Prevention Department would examine the 
systems and procedures in the public sector, identify corruption opportunities 
and make recommendations to eradicate ambiguity and inadequacy in the 
anti-corruption legislation. The Community Relations Department would focus 
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on educating the public against the immorality of corruption and soliciting their 
support and partnership in combating corruption. 
 
The agency should allocate sufficient resources to the Operations 
Department. This would indicate the government‘s commitment to fighting 
corruption as this division would deal with investigations. The agency should 
also ensure that its personnel are highly skilled in their various tasks.  
 
The agency‘s strategy to ensure effective enforcement should consist of an 
effective public complaint system to encourage the reporting of corruption by 
members of the public and referrals from other institutions; a quick response 
system to deal with complaints; proper investigation of all reports of alleged 
corruption, irrespective of whether they seem to be serious or minor in nature; 
a  review system that ensures that all investigations are professionally and 
promptly investigated; and the publication of successful enforcement in the 
media to demonstrate effectiveness and to deter the corrupt. 
 
The agency should have a corruption prevention strategy which will reduce 
corruption opportunities in government departments and public entities 
through improved systems control, improved staff integrity, streamlined 
procedures, proper supervisory checks and control, efficiency, transparency 
and accountability, and the promotion of a staff codes of conduct and ethics. 
 
The agency should have a wide range of education strategies in order to 
enlist the support of the entire community in a partnership to fight corruption. 
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These should include media publicity; media education; school ethics 
educational programmes; community education; ethics development 
seminars for public officials and the private sector; the issuing of anti-
corruption prevention best practices and guidelines; websites for publicity and 
reference; and youth education.   
 
The country‘s anti-corruption legislation should be adequately 
comprehensive.  In terms of offences apart from the normal bribery offences, 
it should add acceptance by any public officials of gifts, loans, discounts and 
passage, even if there are no related corrupt dealings, unless specific 
permission is given; and for any civil servant to be in possession of assets 
disproportionate to his or her official income, or living above his or her means, 
as offences.  
 
In terms of investigative power, the agency should have powers to search, 
arrest and detain; check bank accounts; require witnesses to answer 
questions under oath; restrain properties suspected to be derived from 
corruption; and hold the suspects‘ travel documents to prevent them from 
fleeing the jurisdiction of the investigation. Employees of the agency should 
not only be empowered to investigate alleged corrupt offences in the 
government and the private sector. They should investigate all crimes which 
are connected with possible corruption. 
 
With the provision of wide investigative powers, there should be an elaborate 
system of checks and balances to prevent the abuse of such powers.  The 
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agency should place equal emphasis on public and private sector corruption 
in order to prevent double standards in society. Effective enforcement against 
private sector corruption will safeguard foreign investment and ensure the 
maintenance of high levels of integrity in the business environment.  
 
Ideally the agency should adopt a partnership approach to organise all 
sectors to fight corruption together. The key strategic partners of the agency 
should be all government departments, the business community, professional 
bodies, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, 
institutions of higher learning the mass media and international organisations. 
  
South Africa should demonstrate the political will for the agency to succeed in 
the eradication of corruption. Such political support should be translated into 
the provision of sufficient resources, both human and financial. The Hong 
Kong ICAC, which the suggested agency seeks to emulate, is one of the most 
expensive anti-corruption agencies in the world. 
 
In terms of reporting the agency should resemble the New South Wales 
ICAC. It should be accountable to parliament. This will ensure that the agency 
is free from any interference in discharging its mandate. As in the case of the 
NSW ICAC reporting to the Premier, it is proposed that while independent of 
the politics of government, the agency would report informally to the 
president. 
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Committees that would be responsible for checks and balance would also be 
appointed by parliament. For example, in the case of Hong Kong ICAC, the 
Operations Review Committee is a high-powered committee, with the majority 
of its members from the private sector. However, it is appointed by the Chief 
Executive. This committee reviews each report of corruption and investigation 
to ensure that all complaints are properly dealt with and that there is no 
―whitewashing‖. It publishes an annual report to be tabled before the 
legislature for debate. The Hong Kong ICAC also has an independent 
Complaints Committee where members of the public can lodge any complaint 
against the ICAC or its officers, or both, and there will be an independent 
investigation. It also publishes an annual report to be tabled before the 
legislature.  
 
None of the effective agencies highlighted in Chapter 3 have the power to 
prosecute. However, it is recommended that the proposed agency be 
authorised to prosecute. It is crucial that the agency is granted power to 
prosecute in order to uphold a coherent sequence in handling anti-corruption 
cases. This will also facilitate holding the agency accountable for being 
ineffective.  
 
6.11 CONCLUSION    
 
This study conducted a comparative analysis of anti-corruption legislation and anti-
corruption agencies in dealing effectively with corruption in the Eastern Cape and 
Northern Cape provinces. It examined the nature and extent of corruption in the 
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Eastern Cape and Northern Cape Provincial Departments of Social Development; 
identified factors affecting the effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation and 
agencies; compared and analysed the effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation and 
agencies in both the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces; and identified and 
analysed factors associated with compliance or non-compliance with the anti-
corruption in these provinces.  
 
An examination of relevant literature relating to anti-corruption legislation and anti-
corruption agencies expounded the view that anti-corruption initiatives fail in most 
countries.  The literature attributed this situation to the following impediments: 
 
I. Weak political will; 
II. Lack of resources;  
III. Political interference;  
IV. Inadequate laws;  
V. Insufficient accountability; and  
VI. Failure to involve the community. 
 
The study highlighted acute interference by politicians in investigations pertaining to 
corruption. This hinders the functioning of anti-corruption agencies. The more 
politicians make decisions that are influenced by vested interests on behalf of the 
anti-corruption agencies, the more these agencies are likely to become ineffective. 
Other obstacles that anti-corruption initiatives are faced with are the exclusion of 
citizens from decisions that affect them; the lack of political will; incompetent agency 
employees and the victimisation of whistleblowers. 
254 
 
Unless a suitable and effective mechanism for fighting systemic corruption is 
devised, South Africa will not succeed in improving the effectiveness of anti-
corruption agencies and anti-corruption legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
1. PUBLISHED SOURCES  
 
1.1 BOOKS  
 
Alatas, S. H. 1968. The Sociology of Corruption: The Nature, Function, Causes and 
Prevention of Corruption. Singapore, Hong Kong: Donald Moore Press. 
 
Babbie, E and Mouton, J. 2003. The Practice of Social Research. Cape Town, 
Oxford University Press South Africa. 
 
Bless, C. and Higson-Smith, C. 2000. Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: 
An African perspective. Cape Town: Juta. 
 
Brynard, P.A. and Hanekom S. X. 1997. Introduction to research in Public 
Administration and related disciplines. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik. 
 
Denzin, N. 1989. The Research Act. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall   
 
Denzin, N.K. 1978. Interpretative Interactionism. Newbury Park, C A: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Denzin, N.K. and  Lincoln, Y.S. 2000.  Handbook of Qualitative Research. London: 
Sage Publications.  
256 
 
Drew, E. 1999. The Corruption of American Politics. Woodstock, NY: The 
Overlook Press. 
 
Doig, A. and Theobald, R. 2000. Corruption and Democratisation. London: Frank 
Cass.  
 
Dzvimbo, K.P. 1996. Research in Education Study Guide. Johannesburg: Rand 
Afrikaans University. 
 
Etizoni, A. 1984. Capital Corruption: The New Attack on American Democracy. 
Harcourt Publishers: New York.  
 
Glaser, B. G. 1998. Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions. Sociology 
Press, MillValley, Calif. 
 
Goel, S. 2009. Crisis Management: Master the Skills to Prevent Disasters. New 
Dehli: Global India Publications. 
 
Gould, D.J. 1980. Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third 
World: The Case of Zaire. New York: Pergaman. 
 
Gould, D.J. 1991. "Administrative Corruption: Incidence, Causes and Remedial 
Strategies" in A. Farazmand ed. Handbook of Comparative and Development Public 
Administration. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc. 
257 
 
Hammersley, M., and Atkinson, P. 1983. Ethnography, principles in practice. 
London, NewYork: Tavistock. 
 
Heidenheimer, A.J., and Johnston, M. 2002. Political Corruption: Concepts and 
Contexts. New Jersey:  Transaction Publishers. 
 
Hope K. R. and Chiculo, C. B. (Eds.) 2000. Corruption and Development in Africa: 
Lessons from Country Case-Studies. London, England: Macmillan Press Limited. 
 
Huther, J. and Shah, A.  2001. Anti-corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework 
for Evaluation. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Knafl, K.A.  and Breitmayer, B.J. 1989. 'Triangulation in qualitative research: issues 
of conceptual clarity and purpose', in Morse, J.M. (ed.) Qualitative nursing research: 
as contemporary dialogue. Rockville, MD, Aspen. 
 
Leff, H.N. 1979. Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption in M.U. 
Ekpo Ed. Bureaucratic Corruption In Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward A Search for 
Causes and Consequences. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. 
 
Leys, C. 1970. ―What is the Problem about Corruption?‖ In A.J. Heidenheimer Ed. 
Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Perspective, New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
 
258 
 
Liff, S. 2010. The Complete Guide to Hiring and Firing Government Employees. 
Broadway, New York. 
 
Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Newbury Park, AC: Sage. 
Lofland, J. and Lofland, L.H. 1995. Analysing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative 
Observation and Analysis, 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.   
 
Luo, Y. 2000. Guanxi and Business. London, UK: World Scientific Publishing. 
 
Luo, Y. 2002. Multinational Enterprises in Emerging Markets. Copenhagen: 
Business School Press. 
 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook (2nded,) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Moody-Stuart, G. 1997.  Grand Corruption. Oxford, Worldview Publishing. 
 
Mouton E.B.J. and Prozesky, P.V.B. 2001.The Practice of Social Research. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Palys, T. 1997. Research Decision: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives. 
Harcourt Brace and Company: Canada. 
 
Patton, M.Q. 1990. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (2nd ed.). Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
259 
 
Richter, W.L. and Burke, F. 2007. Combating Corruption, Encouraging Ethics: A 
Practical Guide to Management Ethics. The American Society for Public 
Administration, USA: Lanham, Maryland. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1978. Corruption a Study in Political Economy. Academic Press: 
New York.  
 
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1997. Corruption and Development. New York: Academic Press.  
 
Rogow, A.A. and Laswell, H.D. 1970. The Definition of Corruption in A.J.  
Heidenheimer Ed. Political Corruption: Readings In Comparative Analysis, New 
York: Holt Rinehart And Winstan. 
 
Rosenberg, Y. M. 2010. Countries at the Crossroads 2010: An Analysis of 
Democratic Governance. Freedom house: New York, Washington DC. 
 
Rudestam, K.E. and Newton, R.R. 1995. Surveying your Dissertation: A 
Comprehensive Guides to Content and Process. London: Sage Press. 
 
Scott, J.C. 1972. Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Princeton  
Hall, Inc. 
 
Shah, A. 2006. Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance.  World Bank: 
Washington, DC. 
 
260 
 
Small, M. L. 2005. Lost In Translation: How Not to Make Qualitative Research More 
Scientific. Princeton University: Princeton, New Jersey. 
 
Theobald, R. 1990. Corruption Development and Underdevelopment. London:  
Macmillan Press. 
 
Thobaben, G. R., Denna, M. S. and Funderburk, C. 1991. Issues in American 
Political Life. Money, Violence, and Biology. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Tilman, R.O. 1970. Black Market Bureaucracy In A.J. Heidenheimer Ed. Political 
Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt,  
Renehart and Winston. 
 
Willemse, I. 1990. Statistical methods and financial calculations. Cape 
Town: Juta and Company Ltd. 
 
Yin, R. K. 1989.Case Study Research: Design and Methods, revised ed. Newbury 
Park: CA: Sage Publications.  
 
1.2 JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS  
 
Abbey, J.L.S. 2005. The Growth and Corruption Correlation: Its Impact on the 
Achievement of Middle Income Status. British Council Hall, Accra Centre for Policy 
Analysis in Collaboration with the World Bank: Ghana.  
 
261 
 
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. 1996. Causes and Consequences of Corruption. Institute 
of Development Studies Bulletin 27, 2. 
 
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. 1997. The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey And 
Some New Results. Political Studies 45, No. 3. 
 
Adsera, A. Boix, C, and Payne, M. 2003. Are You Being Served? Political 
Accountability and Quality of Government. Journal of Law Economics & 
Organization 19 (2).  
 
Aidt, T.S. 2003. Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. Economic Journal No. 
113.  
 
Alam, M.S. 1995. A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications. Kyklos, 
Vol. 48, (3). 
 
Amundsen, I., Sissener, T. and Søreide, T. 2000. Research on Corruption A Policy 
Oriented Survey. Chr. Michelsen Institute (Cmi) & Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (Nupi) Final Report, December 2000. 
 
Anderson, J., Azfar, O., Kaufmann, D., Lee, Y., Mukherjee, A., and Ryterman, R. 
1999. Corruption in Georgia: Survey Evidence.  Washington, DC.  
 
Andvig, J.C. 1989. Korrupsjon I Utviklingsland (Corruption in Developing Countries). 
23 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Politisk Ekonomi. 
262 
 
Argandona, A. 2003. Private-To-Private Corruption. Journal of Business Ethics  47.  
 
Arora, D. 1993. Conceptualizing the Context and Contextualising the Concept: 
Corruption Reconsidered. Indian Journal of Public Administration (IJPA), Vol.39, No. 
(1)  
 
Bac, M. 1998. The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption. International Review of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 18, No. (1). 
 
Bac, M. and Bag, P. K. 2001. Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 29, (4). 
 
Bardhan, P. 1997. Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of 
Economic Literature. 35. 
 
Bailey, B.M. 2004.  Govnet Workshop on Lessons Learned In Anti-corruption OECD. 
Paris 18-19 February 2004. 
  
Berning, J and Montesh, M. 2012. Countering Corruption in South Africa - the Rise 
and Fall of the Scorpions and Hawkssa Crime Quarterly No 39, March 2012. 
 
Björsson G., Fransson, K., and Lindh, S. 2006. Corruption – A Tango for Two  Or 
Stop Corruption at the Source!  Africa Groups of Sweden SIDA Magazine 
Omvärlden, 3/2006-04-28 
263 
 
Boone, R. 2002. Corruption & Anti-Corruption in Southern Africa. United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime. 
 
Brinkerhoff, D.W. 2000. ‗Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An 
Analytical Framework‘. Public Administration and Development 20 (3). 
 
Brinkerhoff, D.W. and Goldsmith, A.A. 2002.  Clientelism, Patrimonialism and 
Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and 
Programming. Abt Associates Inc. Bethesda, USA. 
 
Buscaglia, E. 2001. Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and 
Economic Consequences. United Nations Office: Vienna, March 2001. 
 
Buscaglia, E. 1997. Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America. Policy Studies 
Journal 17, (4). 
 
Caiden, G.E. 1991.  What Really Is Public Maladministration? IJPA, Vol. 37, (1). 
 
Caiden, G.E. 1988. Toward A General Theory of Official Corruption. Asian Journal of 
Public Administration, Vol. 10, (1)   
 
Caiden, G.E. and Caiden, N. 1977. Administrative Corruption. Public Administration 
Review, Vol.37, (3). 
 
264 
 
Camerer, L. 1999. Tackling the Multi-Headed Dragon - Evaluating Prospects for a 
Single Anti-Corruption Agency in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Chêne, M. 2010. International good practice in anti-corruption legislation. 
Transparency International. 
 
Chipkin, C.M. 1997. Representing Architecture in South Africa. The International 
Journal of African Historical Studies, 30, (2). 
 
Clarke, G., Xu, S.Y. and Xijun, Z. 2010. Strategies for Combating Medical Insurance 
Fraud. Social Security Reform Co-operation Project, EU China. 
 
Clarke, G.R.G. and Xu L.C. 2004. Privatization, Competition, and Corruption: How 
Characteristics of Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribes to Utilities. Journal of 
Public Economics 88. 
 
Cronin, J. 2012.  ―We‘ve been Structured to be Looted‖ (A Senior Public Sector 
Manager) Some Reflections on the Systemic Underpinnings of Corruption in 
Contemporary South Africa. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.  
 
Cull, P. 2005. 160 guilty of grant fraud in East Cape. Special Investigation Unit 
News, 22 November 2005. 
 
Davoodi, H.D and Tanzi, V. 1997. Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth 
International Monetary Fund  Working Paper 97/139, Washington.  
265 
 
Del Mar Landette, M. 2002. Combating Corruption: What the Ecuadorian Anti-
Corruption Agency Can Learn From International Good Practice. University of 
Birmingham School of Public Policy International Development Department. 
 
De Sousa, L. 2010. Anti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and 
irrelevance. Crime Law Social Change, 53, (1). 
 
Duffy, M.E. 1887. Methodological Triangulation: A Vehicle for Merging Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research Methods. IMAGE: Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 19 (3). 
 
Eggers, H.W. 2006. Planning and Evaluation: Two Sides of the Same Coin. Journal 
of Multi-Disciplinary Evaluation, Number 6 ISSN 1556-8180 November 2006. 
 
Elliott, K. A. 1997. Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and 
Recommendations. In K. A. Elliott (Ed.), Corruption and the Global Economy, 
Washington Dc: Institute for International Economics. 
 
Ellison. 2006. Community Action toward Children‘s Health ―working together for the 
healthy development of children in the early years‖. CATCH Community Dialogue 
Framework: Wesbank, British Columbia (July 1st 2006), Version 14. 
 
Ferreira, I.W. 2005. Corruption and the Development of Organizational Ethic since 
the 1996 Constitution. A Paper presented at the 66th Annual ASPA Conference. 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA. 2 April to 5 April 2005. 
 
266 
 
Ferreira, I.W. and Bayat, M. S. 2005. Curbing Corruption in the Republic of South 
Africa. The Public Manager, Summer 2005. 
 
Frazier, J.E. 1999. Final Report:  South Africa Is Building an Effective Programme 
but Administrative Operations Need Improvement. Public Release: U.S. Department 
of Commerce. 
 
Friedrich, C. J. 1966. Political Pathology. The Political Quarterly, 37. 
 
Gaviria A. 2002. Assessing the Effects of Corruption and Crime on Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Latin America. Emerging Market Review, 3.   
 
Gerring, J. and Strom C. T. 2004. Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of 
Unitarism and Parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science 34 (2). 
 
Godi, T. 2007. Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity. Global Forum V, 
Sandton: South Africa. 
 
Golden, M.A. 2000. Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption in Postwar 
Italy. Department of Political Science, Los Angeles: University of California. 
 
Goudie, A.W. and Stasavage, D. 1997. Corruption: The Issues. OECD Development 
Centre Working Paper No. 122 (Formerly Technical Paper No. 122) By Research 
Programme On: Political Economy and Development in Africa January 1997.  
 
267 
 
Gould, D.J. and Amaro-Reyes, J.A. 1985. The Effects of Corruption on 
Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries. World Bank 
Staff Paper No. 580, Washington, D.C.  
 
Gray, C. and Kaufmann, D. 1998. Corruption and Development. Finance & 
Development (March):7-10. 
 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. 1998. Does Corruption Affect Income 
Inequality and Poverty? International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C.  
 
Hanna, R., Bishop, S., Nadel, S., Scheffler, G., and Durlacher, K. 2011. The 
Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What Has Worked, What Hasn‘t, And What 
We Don‘t Know–A Systematic Review. Institute Of Education: University of London. 
 
Hean, S. K.  2010. Corruption Control in Singapore. Resource Material Series 
No.80. 
 
Heath, W.H. 2001. Investigating and Prosecuting Corruption in Government 
Departments. ICC Durban 3-7 December 2001. 
 
Heilbrunn, J. R. 2004. Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to 
Fight Corruption?  World Bank Institute: Washington DC.  
 
Heymans, C. and Lipietz, B. 1999. Corruption and Development. ISS Monograph 
Series, No. 40. 
268 
 
Hin, K.T. 2011. Corruption Control in Singapore. United Nations Asia and Far East 
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) 
Resource Material Series No. 83. 
 
Hoffmann, F.  2001.  Behaviour in Business a Guide to Integrity in Business 
Transactions.  La Roche Ltd Corporate Law Basel: Switzerland. 
 
Holmes, L. 1993. The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaign and 
Legitimation Crisis, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hoon, P. 2003. Determinants of Corruption: A Cross-National Analysis. Multinational 
Business Review, 2003. 
 
Hosen, N. 2004. This is the War on Corruption. The Jakarta Post, November 3, 
2004. 
 
Huberts, L.W.J.C. 2001. National Integrity Systems 2001 National Integrity Systems 
Country Study Report. The Netherlands 2001 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: 
Netherlands. 
 
Huntington, S.P. 1968. Political Order In Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Institute for Security Studies. 2003. Scorpions have been Stung. Umqol‟uphandle SA 
Corruption Briefing, Issue No. 005, 26 June 2003. 
269 
 
Jain, A. K. 2001. Corruption: A Review, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 71-121. 
 
Jayawickrama, N. 1998. Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights? Transparency 
International Berlin: Germany.  
 
Jayawickrama, N., Pope, J., and Stolpe, O. 2002. Legal Provisions to Facilitate the 
Gathering of Evidence in Corruption Cases: Easing the Burden of Proof. Forum on 
Crime and Society,  2, (1).  
 
Jennett, V. and Hodess, R. 2007. The Criteria for Selecting Appointees for Anti-
Corruption Agencies. Transparency International. 
 
Johnston, M. 1996. The Search for Definition: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue of 
Corruption. International Social Science Journal, 149: 321-335. 
 
Jones, S., Dietsche, E. and Weinzier, S. 2006. Corruption: Measuring Prevalence. 
Oxford Policy Management: UK March 2006. 
 
Kameswari, G. 2006. Anti-Corruption Strategies - Global and Indian Socio-Legal 
Perspectives.  ICFAI University Press, India. 
 
Kaplow, L. 1992. ―Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis.‖ Duke Law 
Journal, 42 (3). 
 
270 
 
Kaufmann, D. 1997. Corruption: The Facts.  World Bank Institute Governance & 
Anti-Corruption Washington, D.C. 
 
Kelley, K., Clark, B., Brown,V. And Sitzia, J. 2003. Good practice in the conduct and 
reporting of survey research. International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 15 (3). 
 
Kernaghan, K. and Langford, J. 1990. The Responsible Public Servant Canadian. 
Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique, 23, (3). 
 
Key, Jr., V. 1935. Methods of Evasion of Civil Service Laws. Reprint 4, South-
western Social Science: Quarterly. (1935, March). 
 
Khan, M.M. 2004. Political and Administrative Corruption: Concepts, Comparative 
Experiences and Bangladesh Case. A Paper prepared for Transparency 
International - Bangladesh Chapter Department of Public Administration University 
of Dhaka: Bangladesh. 
 
Klitgaard, R.E. 1988. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press: 
Berkeley. 
 
Kovács, P. and Tisné, M. 2004. Local Government Brief: Anti-Corruption at the 
Crossroads. Policy Journal of the Local Government and Public Service Reform 
Initiative: Budapest, Hungary.  
 
271 
 
Kutwa, N. 2005. African Anti-Corruption Commitments: A review of eight NEPAD 
countries African. Africa Human Security Initiative (AHSI). Paper N07. January 2005.   
 
Lanyi, A. and Azfar, O. 2005. Tools for Assessing Corruption & Integrity in 
Institutions: A Handbook IRIS Center: University of Maryland. 
 
Leff, N. 1964. Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 8 (3). 
 
Leiken, R. S. 1996. Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic. Foreign Policy 5, 55-
73. 
 
Lian, A. S. 2008. Singapore Experience – Dealing With Governance and Corruption 
Corrupt Practices. Investigation Bureau, Singapore – Lisbon. 
 
Lincoln, A. 2000. Building Political Will. TI Source Book.  Transparency International, 
Berlin Germany. 
 
Lo, T.W. 1993. Corruption and Politics in Hong Kong and China. Buckingham: Open 
University Press.  
 
Lokanc, M. 2007. The Extractive Industries as a Primer for Economic Growth – 
Getting Around the Resource Curse. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
 
272 
 
Luo, Y. 2005. An Organizational Perspective of Corruption. Management and 
Organization Review, 1 (1). 
 
Magilavy, B. 2001.  Sustainable City: Working Toward a Sustainable Future for San 
Francisco Citizens. San Francisco Advisory Committee: San Francisco.   
 
Man-wai, T.K. 2006. Formulating an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy – The 
Experience of Hong Kong ICAC.  United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders Resource Material Series 
No.69. 
 
Marrelli, A. F. 2003. Literature Reviews. Performance Improvement, 44 (7). 
 
Martin, P. 2010. The Status of Whistle blowing in South Africa: Taking Stock. Open 
Democracy Advice Centre, Cape Town. 
 
Mason, J. 2002. Public Administration Reform and Local Governments. United 
Nations Development Programme: Zagreb, Croatia. 
 
Mauro, P. 1995. Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 
(3). 
 
McCourt, W. 2000. Public Appointments: From Patronage to Merit. Institute For 
Development Policy And Management, University Of Manchester Precinct Centre: 
Manchester, UK. 
273 
 
Meagher, P. 2005. Analytical Tools for USAID Anti-corruption Programming In the 
Europe & Eurasia Region. Iris Center, University Research Corporation 
International: University Of Maryland. 
 
Meagher, P. and Voland, C. 2006. Anti-corruption Agencies. United States Agency 
for International Development. 
 
Meir, A. 2005. Praise of Patronage? Xcuses Mere Fig-Leaf for Political 
Appointments. Business Ethics Center: Jerusalem. 
 
Messick, R.E. and Kleinfeld, R. 2001. Writing an Effective Anti-Corruption Law.  
Public Sector, PREM Network, World Bank. 
 
Mollah, A.H. and Uddin, N. 2002. Combating Corruption in Bangladsh: Some 
Strategies.  Dept. of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi. Bangladesh. 
 
Moody-Stuart, G. 2004. The Good Business Guide to Bribery: Grand Corruption in 
Third World Development. Washington: Transparency International. 
 
Nelson, C.M. 1996. Pat 101: Principles of Patronage Issue. A Journal of Opinion, 24 
(1).  
 
Noël, S.J.R. 2006. Patronage. The Canadian Encyclopedia Historica Foundation: 
Canada. 
 
274 
 
Nye, J. S. 1967. Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
American Political Science Review, 6. 
 
Nye, J.S. 1979. Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis In 
M.U. Ekpo Ed. Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a Search for 
Causes and Consequences. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. 
 
Onyejekwe, O. 2000. The Role of Good Governance in the National Implementation 
of the Bpoa: The Need for a Capable State. Paper Presented to the National Focal 
Points on the Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action for the Least 
Developed Countries 17-21 May 2004, New York. 
 
Ouma, O.A. 1991.  Corrruption In Public Policy and its Impact on Development: The 
Case of Uganda since 1979. PAD, 11 (5). 
 
Orac, J. and J. Rinne. 2000. Patronage. Paper Presented to the World Bank Group 
Administrative and Civil Service Reform, July 24. 
 
Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L., and Wynne, S. 1993. Institutional Incentives and 
Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press.  
 
Paldam, M. 2002. The Cross-Country Pattern of Corruption: Economics Culture and 
the Seesaw Dynamics. European Journal of Political Economy, 18. 
 
275 
 
Panday, D.R. 2005. Democracy and Corruption Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, 1 
(2).  
 
Partners in Transition. 2002. The Rule of Law. USAID: Bulgaria. 
 
Paul, S. 1979. Corruption: Who Will Bell the Cat? Economic and Political Weekly, 
June 7: 1350-1355.  
 
Paul, S. 2000. Making Voice Work: the Report Card on Bangalore‘s Public Services. 
Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore: India.  
 
Pavarala, V. 1996. Interpreting Corruption: Elite Perspectives. India, New Delhi: 
Sage.  
 
Pillay, S. 2004. Corruption - the challenge to good governance: a South African 
perspective. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 7 (7). 
 
Pollock, J. K. 1937. The Cost of the Patronage System. Sage Publications, Inc.  
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 189, Improved 
Personnel in Government Service (Jan., 1937).  
 
Pope, J. 2000. Confronting Corruption: The Elements Of A National Integrity 
System. Transparency International: Berlin, Germany. 
 
276 
 
Pope, J. and Vogl, F. 2000. Making Anti-Corruption Agencies More Effective. 
Finance & Development a Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, 37 (2). 
 
Punt, W. 2006. Case Story: Eastern Cape – Introduction of regional anti-corruption 
programmes. Ethics Institute of South Africa.   
 
Quah, J. 1999. ‗Corruption in Asian Countries: Can it be Minimized?‘ Public 
Administration Review 59 (6). 
 
Quick, S. 1980. ‗The Paradox of Popularity: ―Ideological‖ Program Implementation In 
Zambia‘. In Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, Ed., M. Grindle. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Robinson, M. 2012. Freedom, Truth, Democracy: Citizenship and Common Purpose. 
Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, Houghton. 
 
Rosser, M. 2000. Promoting Transparency And Accountability: USAID‘s Anti-
Corruption Experience Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research 
U.S. Agency for International Development Washington, D.C. 20523-3100. 
 
Saidi, N. 2004. Ethics and Governance in Lebanon. Network and Knowledge for 
Economic Growth. Lebanese International Business Council: Beirut July 2004.  
 
Sajo, A. 2002.  Clientelism and Extortion: Corruption in Transition in Political  
Corruption in Transition Budapest.  New York : Central European University Press. 
277 
 
Schaefer, M. 2002. Corruption and Public Finance: Sartorial Perspective on 
Corruption. USAID November 2002  
 
Schacter, M. and Shah, A. 2001. Look before You Leap: Notes for Corruption 
Fighters. Policy Brief No. 11 - Institute on Governance, Ottawa, Canada. 
 
Schneider, F. and Enste, D. 2002. Hiding In the Shadows the Growth of the 
Underground Economy. International Monetary Fund: March 2002 Economic Issue 
No.  30. 
 
Scott, J.C. 1972. Comparative Political Corruption. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey. 
 
Senturia, J.J. 1931. Corruption, Political. Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol.4 
(1931): 448-452. 
Sheepchaiisara, K. 1999. Corruption and Development. Think Centre: Asia. 
 
Sheifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. 1993.  Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
108: 599-617.  
 
Singh, G. 2003. Corruption, Transparency and the Good Governance Agenda in 
India. European Institute for Asian Studies: Crown Plaza: Europa, Brussels. 
 
Sinha, N. P. N. 1994. Inventory of Measures for Curbing Corruption in Public 
Procurement in Asia-Pacific. Asian Development Bank. 
278 
 
Sokomane, A. 2005. Money in Southern African Politics: the Party Funding 
Challenge In Southern Africa. African Security Review, 14 (4). 
 
Stapenhurst, R. and Kpundeh, S.J., 1999. Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for 
Building National Integrity. The World Bank, Washington DC, USA. 
 
Stapenhurst, F. and Langseth, P. 1997. The role of the public administration in 
fighting corruption Economic Development Institute. International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, 10 (5).  
 
Stuart, G. 1997. The Management of Ethics and Conduct in the Public Service Office 
of Government Ethics. United States (The United States Federal Government). 
  
Stork, C., Hasheela, E. and Morrison, W.  2004. The National Integrity Survey 2004 
NEPRU Research Report No. 29. Office of the Ombudsman and USAID: Namibia. 
 
Subramuniyaswami, S.S. 2006. Living With Siva. Himalayanacademy: India. 
 
Sung, H.E. 2004. Democracy and Political Corruption: A Cross-National 
Comparison.  Crime, Law and Social Change 41 (2). 
 
Surapaneni, N. 2006. Tracking Corruption in India-5005: Towards Sustaining Good 
Governance. Centre for Media Studies: India.  
 
279 
 
Tanzi, V. 1998. Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and 
Cures.  International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45:4 (December 1998). 
 
Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. 1997. Corruption Public Investment, And Growth. 
International Monetary Fund: Washington D.C. 
 
Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. 1998. Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public 
Investment Hurts Growth. International Monetary Fund: Washington D.C. Economic 
Issue No.12 March 1998. 
 
Treisman, D. 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. Journal of 
Public Economics 76: 399-457. 
 
Upadhyay, S.N. 2002. The Anti-Corruption Initiative For Asia-Pacific and the 
Nepalese Drive Against Corruption.  Inter-American Development Bank Washington, 
DC. 
 
Van Vuuren, H. 2004. Small Bribes, Big Challenge, Extent and Nature of Petty 
Corruption in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies  
Published In Crime Quarterly No 9 2004. 
 
Van Vuuren, H. 2005.  National Integrity Systems. Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS): Cape Town, South Africa. 
 
280 
 
Voskanyan, F. 2000. A Study of the Effects of Corruption on Economic and Political 
Development of Armenia Graduate School of Political Science and International 
Affairs. American University of Armenia, November 2000. 
 
Wasserstein, R.L. and Davis P.L. 2001. Recommendations regarding new 
Hampshire equalisation Procedures. New Hampshire Department of Revenue 
Administration: New Hampshire. 
 
Wedeman, A. 1997. Looters, Rent-Scrapers and Dividend Collectors: Corruption and 
Growth in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines. The Journal of Developing Areas, 
31(4).  
 
Wescott, C. 1997. The Role of Civil Society in Combating Corruption 
United Nations Development Programme. Speech to Suva North Rotary Club 11 
November. 
 
Williams, J. W. and Beare, M. 1999. The Business of Bribery: Globalization, 
Economic Liberalization and the ―Problem‖ of Corruption. Crime, Law and Social 
Change, 32:115-146. 
 
Woods, G. 2011. Anti-Corruption Legislation – A Failed Response to Procurement 
Corruption. Paper presented to the Public Procurement Regulation in Africa 
Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
 
World Book Encyclopedia. B v. 2. 1985. Chicago, Illinois: World Book Inc. 
281 
 
Zeller, T. 2006. If You‘re Thinking Of Living In Albania … Bring Bribe Money. The 
LEDE December 7, 2006, 
 
Zuhua, Z. 2006. Anti-Corruption Campaigns are Ineffective. The Epoch Times July 
27, 2006. 
 
1.3 DICTIONARIES  
 
Dictionary of World History. 2000. High Beam Research Oxford University Press.  
 
1.4 GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS  
 
1.4.1 ACTS OF PARLIAMENT  
 
South Africa: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Act 108 of 1996. 
Pretoria: Government Printer.  
 
South Africa: The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
South Africa: The Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998a. Pretoria: Government 
Printer. 
 
South Africa: The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998b. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
 
282 
 
South Africa: The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. Pretoria: Government 
Printer. 
 
South Africa: The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000a. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
 
South Africa: The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000b. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
 
South Africa: The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000c. Pretoria: Government 
Printer.  
 
South Africa: The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. Pretoria: Government 
Printer. 
 
South Africa: The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication related Information Act 70 of 2002. Pretoria: Government Printer.  
 
South Africa: The Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria: 
Government Printer. 
 
South Africa: The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
Pretoria: Government Printer. 
 
 
283 
 
1.4.2 REGULATIONS, GUIDELINES, REPORTS AND SPEECHES 
 
AAPAM. 1991. Ethics and Accountability In African Public Services, Report of The 
13th Round Table of the African Association For Public Administration and 
Management (AAPAM) Held At Mbabane, Swaziland, December 2-6. 
 
African Union Convention. 2003. African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption. Maputo, 11 July 2003. 
 
Asian Development Bank. 2006. Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement in Asia 
and the Pacific: Progress and Challenges in 25 countries. The Asian Development 
Bank Manila, Philippines. 
 
ACPO. 2003. Corruption Prevention Strategy.  London: UK 
 
Canada. 2001.  Assessment of the Health of the Merit System from a Values-Based 
Perspective Public Service Commission of Canada. 
 
CMS. 2005. Tracking Corruption in India towards Sustaining Good Governance 
Centre for Media Studies (CMS). Research House Saket Community Centre, New 
Delhi. 
 
Corporate Governance Framework Research Institute. 2012. Fighting Corruption to 
Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS). Johannesburg. 
 
284 
 
COSATU.  2012. Political Report t to the COSATU 11th National Congress. 
COSATU House, Johannesburg. 
 
Department of Public Service and Administration. 2011. The Public Sector Integrity 
Management Framework. Pretoria  
 
Department of Public Service and Administration. 2006. Minimum Anti-Corruption 
Capacity Requirement. Pretoria. 
 
Department of Public Service and Administration. 2002. The Public Service Anti-
corruption Strategy. Pretoria. 
 
Department of Public Service and Administration and United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime. Country Corruption Assessment Report, 2003. Pretoria.  
 
Gauteng Provincial Government. 2009. Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework. 
Johannesburg. 
 
Hand book on Fighting Corruption. 1999. Center for Democracy and Governance 
Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research U.S. Agency for 
International Development Washington, D.C. 
 
National Planning Commission. 2011. National Development Plan. Pretoria 
 
285 
 
OECD Anti-corruption Division. 2002. Developing Effective and Transparent 
Systems for Public Service. Organisation for Economic Cooperation, Singapore. 
 
OECD Report. 2004. Fighting Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Public 
Procurement. 29-30 November 2004, Global Forum on Governance, Paris. 
 
Public Service Commission. 2002. State of the Public Service Report. South Africa 
 
Public Service Commission. 2001. A review of South Africa‘s national anti-corruption 
agencies. South Africa. 
 
South Africa. 2002. The National Anti-Corruption Forum. Braamfontein: South Africa.  
 
South Africa. 2005. Address of the President of South Africa, at the opening of the 
Second National Anti-Corruption Summit. CSIR, Brummeria, Tshwane. 22 March 
2005. 
 
South Africa Yearbook. 2004-2005. Government Communication and Information 
System, Pretoria. 
 
The Country Brief. 2012. Anti-Corruption Strategy for the Legal Profession. 
International Bar Association, Asia Office: South Korea. 
 
The Presidency. 2005. Address of the President of South Africa at the Opening of 
the Second National Anti-Corruption Summit: CSIR. South Africa.  
286 
 
Transparency international Sourcebook. 2000. Independent Anti-Corruption 
Agencies. Transparency International, Berlin Germany. 
 
Transparency International. 2004. Press Release Global Corruption Barometer, 9 
December 2004. 
 
Transparency International. 2005. Corruption Perceptions Index. Transparency 
International: London / Berlin. 
 
Transparency international. 2006. Using the Right to Information as an Anti-
Corruption Tool. Berlin Germany. 
 
United Kingdom. 2003. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) of England and 
Wales Corruption Prevention Strategy Corruption Prevention Strategy: Professional 
Standards in Policing. 
 
United Nations. 1990. Corruption in Government, Report of an Interregional Seminar 
held in The Hague, the Netherlands on December 11-15, New York: The United 
Nations. 
 
United Nations. 2004. UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit. The Global Programme Against 
Corruption  3nd Edition, Vienna, September. 
 
United Nations Anti-Corruption Toolkit. 2004. The Global Programme against 
Corruption. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. 
287 
 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP). 2006. What is Good Governance? Bangkok, Thailand.  
 
United Nations Information Services. 2003. Projects. UNODC Press, 4 April.  
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2003.  Country Corruption Assessment 
Report. Department of Public Service and Administration, South Africa. 
 
United States. 1999. The Merit System Principles Training Module. United States 
Office of Personnel Management July 1999. 
 
United States Trade Representative (USTR). 2004. National Trade Estimate Report 
on Foreign Trade Barriers.  Washington, D.C: USTR. 
 
UNODC Anti-Corruption Toolkit, Volume 1, General Introduction, 2002. United 
States Sixth Annual Report on Enforcement and Monitoring of the OECD: 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions. 2004. United States Department of State Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs. 
 
Urban Governance Toolkit Series. 2004. UN-Habitat (United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme) and Transparency International.  Nairobi, March. 
 
USAID. 2005a. Tools for Assessing Corruption and Integrity in Institutions: A 
Handbook IRIS Center: University Of Maryland.     
288 
 
USAID. 2005b. Anti-Corruption Strategy.  Washington, D.C. January 2005. 
 
USAID. 1999. Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Center for Democracy and 
Governance Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research U.S. Agency 
for International Development Washington, D.C. 
 
US Working Group on Bribery. 2004. US Sixth Annual Report on Enforcement and 
Monitoring of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.  OECD Publishing. 
 
World Bank. 1997a. The State in a Changing World: World Development Report 
1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
World Bank. 1997b. World Bank Report Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
World Bank. 1999. The Fight against Corruption: A World Bank Perspective. 
Washington, D.C. 
 
World Bank. 2000. Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World 
Bank since 1997.  Washington DC. 
 
World Bank. 2001. Writing an effective anti-corruption law. Public Sector Premnotes 
No.58. 
 
World Bank. 2007a. Institutional Restraints of Power. Washington DC. 
289 
 
World Bank Group. 2007b. Institutional Restraints on Power. The World Bank: 
Washington, DC. 
 
2. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES  
 
2.1 DISSERTATIONS AND THESES  
 
Alserhan, B.A. 2011. The Principles of Islamic Marketing. United Arab Emirates 
University, UAE. 
 
Buscaglia, E. 1999. Judicial Corruption In  Developing Countries: Its Causes and 
Economic Consequences Berkeley Program In Law & Economics. Working Paper 
Series University of California, Berkeley. 
 
Caiden, G. E. 2003. The Burden on Our Backs; Corruption in Latin America. 
University of Southern California. 
 
Cwati, Z. T. 2004.  Comparing Anti-Corruption Strategies in South Africa‘s Western 
and Eastern Cape Provinces.  Cape Town: University of the Western Cape. 
 
Doublet, J. A. 2002. The Significance of Structure Plan Policies on the Natural 
Environment in Malta. Aberystwyth, University of Wales. 
 
290 
 
Fritzen, S. 2006. Beyond ―Political Will‖: How Institutional Context Shapes the 
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policies. Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy: 
National University of Singapore. 
 
Golden, M.A. 2000. Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption in Post-war 
Italy. University of California: Los Angeles. 
 
Hanna, R., Bishop, S., Nadel, S., Scheffler, G., and Durlacher, K. 2011. The 
Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What Has Worked, What Hasn‘t, And What 
We Don‘t Know–A Systematic Review. Institute Of Education: University of London. 
 
Johnston, M. 1997. Fighting Systemic Corruption: Social Foundations for Institutional 
Reform. Department of Political Science Colgate University: Hamilton, NY 13346, 
USA. 
 
Lo, S. S. H. 2006. Ethical Governance and Anti-Corruption in Greater China: A 
Comparison of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao. Department of Political 
Science, University of Waterloo. 
 
Majila, V. T. 2006. Factors Influencing the Attainment of Senior Positions by Women 
with Reference to the Eastern Cape Department of Public Works. Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University. 
 
Tavits, M. 2005. Causes of Corruption: Testing Competing Hypotheses. Nuffield 
College:  University of Oxford.   
291 
 
2.2 INTERNET  
 
Internet 1:  Online Dictionary [Accessed on June. 6, 2006] from Word Wide Web: 
http://dict.die.net.    
 
Internet 2:  Wordreference.com [Accessed on June 6, 2006] from Word Wide Web: 
http://www.wordreference.com.  
 
Internet 3:  Answers.Com [Accessed on June 6, 2006] from Word Wide Web: 
http://www.answers.com.    
 
Internet 4:  Wikipedia [Accessed on June 6, 2006] from Word Wide Web:  
http://en.wikipedia.org.       
 
Internet 5:  Urban Dictionary [Accessed on June 6, 2006] from Word Wide Web: 
http://www.urbandictionary.com.   
 
Internet 5: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. [Accessed on May 04, 
2006] from World Wide Web: www.unodc.org. 
 
Internet 6:  The Habermas' Social Theory. [Accessed on May 05, 2006] from World 
Wide Web:  http://www.habermasonline.org.  
 
Internet 7: The Anti-Corruption Gateway for Europe and Eurasia. [Accessed on June 
14, 2006] from World Wide Web: http://www.nobribes.org.                                
292 
 
Internet 8: The Anti-Corruption Conceptual Glossary. [Accessed on June 06, 2006] 
from World Wide Web: http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfm.      
 
Internet 9: Legal Dictionary. [Accessed on June 14, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Self-Dealing.     
 
Internet 10:  Answers.com Dictionary. [Accessed on June 14, 2006] from World 
Wide Web: http://www.answers.com/topic/bribery.  
 
Internet 11:  Answers.com Dictionary. [Accessed on June 24, 2006] from World 
Wide Web: http://www.answers.com/topic/patronage.                                     
 
Internet 12: Encyclopaedia. [Accessed on June 24, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
http://experts.about.com.     
 
Internet 13: U-S-history.com. [Accessed on June 24, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
http://www.u-s-history.com.    
 
Internet 14: The Canadian Encyclopaedia.  [Accessed on June 30, 2006] from World 
Wide Web: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com                                
 
Internet 15: Spoils System. [Accessed on June 24, 2006] from World Wide Web:  
 http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0018528.html                                   
 
293 
 
Internet 16: The Free Dictionary. [Accessed on July 03, 2006] from World Wide 
Web:  http://www.thefreedictionary.com. 
 
Internet 17: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. [Accessed on July 03, 2006] from 
World Wide Web: http://www.u4.no 
 
Internet 18: Transparency International. [Accessed on August 10, 2006] from World 
Wide Web: http://www.transparency.org.  
 
Internet 19: U4 Helpdesk Query. [Accessed on August 21, 2006] from World Wide 
Web: www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query72.cfm.                               
 
Internet 20: Anti-Corruption Conceptual Glossary. [Accessed on September 07, 
2006] from World Wide Web:  http://www.U4.No/Document/Glossary.Cfm. 
 
Internet 21: Anti Corruption Internet Database. [Accessed on September 07, 2006] 
from World Wide Web:  http://www.antigraft.org. 
 
Internet 22: United Nations. [Accessed on September 04, 2006] from World Wide 
Web:  http://Unpan1.Un.Org/Intradoc/Groups/Public/Documents.   
 
Internet 23: U4 Anti-Corruption Conceptual Glossary. [Accessed on September 07, 
2006] from World Wide Web:  http://www.u4.no/document.    
 
294 
 
Internet 24:  Shinnyo-en Foudation.  [Accessed on October 02, 2006] from World 
Wide Web: www.sef.org.                                  
 
Internet 25: American Folklore Society. [Accessed on October 13, 2006] from World 
Wide Web:   http://www.afsnet.org/aboutfolklore/aboutFL.cfm.  
 
Internet 26: Ripon College. [Accessed on October 27, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
http://www.ripon.edu.  
 
Internet 27: Wordnet. [Accessed on October 13, 2006] from World Wide Web:  
http://www.wordnet.princeton.edu 
 
Internet 28: Glossary-Brazil. [Accessed on October 27, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/brazil/br_glos.html.   
 
Internet 29: Answers.com. [Accessed on November 08, 2006] from World Wide 
Web: http://www.answers.com/topic/patron. 
 
Internet 30: Brazil; Glossary Index. Accessed on May 04, 2006] from World Wide 
Web: www.photius.com/countries/brazil/glossary. 
 
Internet 31: Answers.com. [Accessed on November 20, 2006] from World Wide 
Web: www.historycentral.com/Civics/M.html. 
 
295 
 
Internet 32: Industrial Relations Terms. [Accessed on November 20, 2006] from 
World Wide Web: http://www.sfn.saskatoon.sk.ca/business/sdlc/mp.html.    
 
Internet 33: Investor dictionary.com. [Accessed on November 22, 2006] from World 
Wide Web: http://www.investordictionary.com.  
 
Anti-Corruption Gateway for Europe and Eurasia. [Accessed on November 20, 2006] 
from World Wide Web: http://www.Nobribes.Org.   
 
Camerer, L. 2002. Consequences of Corruption. [Accessed on November 20, 2006] 
from World Wide Web: http://www.odiousdebts.org.  
 
Canada Historica Foundation. [Accessed on June 14, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
Http://Www.Thecanadianencyclopedia.Com. 
 
CBS News. 2006. Top Shanghai Leader Removed from Office. [Accessed on June. 6, 
2006] from Word Wide Web: http://www.cbsnews.com. 
 
Criminal Law lawyer Source. Extortion. [Accessed on November 20, 2006] from 
World Wide Web: http://www.criminal-law-lawyer-source.com.   
 
Doig, A., Riley, S. 1988. Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues and Case 
Studies from Developing Countries. [Accessed July 08, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
Http://Magnet.Undp.Org.   
 
296 
 
Doig, A., Watt, D. and Williams, R. 2005. Measuring ‗Success‘ In Five African Anti-
Corruption Commissions - The Cases of Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda & 
Zambia. [Accessed July 08, 2006] from World Wide Web:  
http://www.u4.no/themes/aacc/finalreport.pdf. 
 
Global Corruption Barometer 2003.  [Accessed on September 07, 2006] from World 
Wide Web: http://www.Transparency.Org.  
 
Gururaj, B. 2006. The Hindu. Indian National Paper: [Accessed on July 14, 2006] 
from World Wide Web: http://www.hindu.com.  
 
Hecter, L.T. 2001. The Economic Laws of Corruption. [Accessed on June 14, 2006] 
from World Wide Web: http://www.candw.ag.   
 
Politics and Public Service: The Spoils System Versus the Merit System, Public 
Office Reward. [Accessed on May 04, 2006] from World Wide Web: http://Www.U-S-
History.Com. 
 
Kenya Urban Bribery Index.  [Accessed on September 07, 2006] from World Wide 
Web: http://www.U4.No/Helpdesk/Helpdesk/Queries.  
 
Encyclopaedia. [Accessed on July 07, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
http://Experts.About.Com/E/P/Pa/Patronage.Htm. 
 
297 
 
Farha, M. 2006. The Hindu. Indian National Paper. [Accessed July 08, 2006] from 
World Wide Web: http://www.hindiu.com.  
 
KwaZulu-Natal Task Group. 2006. Dealing with White Collar Crime. [Accessed on 
June. 6, 2006] from Word Wide Web: http://www.whitecollarcrime.co.za.  
 
Kpundeh, S.J. 2006. Political Will in Fighting Corruption.  [Accessed on June 14, 
2006] from World Wide Web:  http://magnet.undp.org. 
 
McPhillips, C.V. 2003. International Bribery: Playing by the Rules When Everyone 
Else is Cheating. [Accessed on June 14, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
http://www.kaufmanandcanoles.com. 
 
Mutthirulandi, R.  June 15, 2003. Corruption: A Very Severe Handicap for Human 
Rights. [Accessed on June. 6, 2006] from Word Wide Web: 
http://www.boloji.com/opinion/0003.htm#top.  
 
Orac, J. 2000. Patronage. The World Bank Group. [Accessed on June 14, 2006] 
from World Wide Web: http://web.worldbank.org. 
 
PR-Inside. 2007. Polish deputy premier dismissed amid corruption allegations; 
government future in question.  [Accessed on August 9, 2007] from Word Wide Web: 
www.pr-inside.com. 
 
298 
 
Skweyiya, Z. 2005. Partnerships in KwaZulu-Natal are Winning the Battle Against 
Corruption in the Social Grant System. [Accessed on July 14, 2006] from Word Wide 
Web: http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/0512011145.htm.  
 
Soong, R. 2002. Corruption in Latin America: [Accessed July 08, 2006] from World 
Wide Web:  http://www.zonalatina.com. 
 
Stevens, M. L. O. 2006. What Is 'Active' and 'Passive' Bribery? [Accessed July 08, 
2006] from World Wide Web: www.worldbank.org.    
 
The United Nations and Action against Corruption: A Global Response to a Global 
Challenge. [Accessed on June 14, 2006] from World Wide Web: 
Http://www.Unodc.Org. 
 
Voice of America. Burma‘s Drug Menace. 2007. [Accessed on August 9, 2007] from 
Word Wide Web: http://www.voanews.com.  
 
Webster‘s Dictionary. Definition: blacklist. 2006. [Accessed on July 9, 2007] from 
Word Wide Web:  http://www.websters-dictionary-online.com/definition/blacklist. 
 
Wikipedia. Political Corruption. 2006. [Accessed on July 9, 2007] from Word Wide 
Web: http://en.wikipedia.org. 
 
299 
 
World Money Watch. World leaders - List of current world leaders and world 
organizations. 2006. [Accessed on July 9, 2007] from Word Wide Web:  
http://www.worldmoneywatch.com. 
 
Zakiuddin A. 2000.  Corruption in Bangladesh an Analytical and Sociological Study. 
A Paper for Transparency International Bangladesh Chapter [Accessed on June 14, 
2006] from World Wide Web: http://www.ti-
bangladesh.org/docs/research/CorBang1.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 
 
ANNEXURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
301 
 
ANNEXURE ―A‖ 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
I am studying for a Doctoral degree in Public Administration at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University. My study entails conducting a comparative analysis of anti-
corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the Eastern Cape and Northern 
Cape Provinces to deal effectively with corruption. 
 
You are humbly requested to spend approximately 20 minutes of your time 
completing the attached questionnaire. The information you provide will be kept 
strictly confidential and only aggregate figures will be reported on. 
 
Kindly place the completed questionnaire in the box that has been provided in your 
department for this purpose. 
 
Thank you for your co-operation.  It is much appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely  
 
………………………….. 
Ms VT Majila 
(PhD) Researcher  
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SECTION A 
 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS 
 
 
 
1. Gender                                               Female                                  Male 
 
                                                                             
2. Age level                           20-29              30-35              36-39                40-50             51-55    
 
 
3. Highest level of education                      High school     Technical college    Tertiary institution 
(Specify) 
 
4. How long have you been working in this department   1-3 yrs    4-6yrs   7-10 yrs   10+ yrs 
 
 
5. Present position                       _________________________________________________ 
 
 
6. Number of years in the position              _______________ 
 
 
 
7. (a) How effective is anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the province? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(b) If anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies in the province are ineffective, 
why?          
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. Please add any additional remarks in the space provided below. 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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SECTION B:     QUESTIONNAIRE:          PLEASE MARK THE APPROPRIATE BLOCK WITH 
                                                                   AN “X”                     
LEGEND: 
 
1.           =          Strongly disagree 
2.           =          Disagree 
3.           =          Neutral 
4.           =          Agree 
5.           =          Strongly agree 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. The province enforces anti-corruption legislation.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
2. Officials are indicted under anti-corruption legislation. 
 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
3. Officials are successfully convicted in terms of anti-corruption 
legislation. 
 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
4. Officials generally understand the whistle blowing procedures.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
5. Officials are free to blow the whistle when they are aware of 
corrupt activities. 
 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
6. Whistleblowers are protected in terms of anti-corruption 
legislation. 
 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
7. Most prevalent cases of petty corruption practiced on a smaller 
scale, involve small amounts of money and bribes. 
 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
8. Most prevalent cases of grand corruption are found where public 
officials in high positions, in the process of making decisions of 
significant financial value, routinely demand bribes or kickbacks 
for ensuring that tenders or contracts are awarded to specific 
contractors. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
304 
 
LEGEND: 
 
1.           =          Strongly disagree 
2.           =          Disagree 
3.           =          Neutral 
4.           =          Agree 
5.           =          Strongly agree 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
9. Anti-corruption Agencies in the province are adequately 
financially resourced. 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
10. Anti-corruption Agencies are independent of the party in power.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
11. Anti-corruption Agencies are likely to discharge their duties 
without fear or favour. 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
12. Anti-corruption Agencies have committed political backing at the 
highest levels of the provincial government. 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
13. Anti-corruption Agencies have always retained their credibility.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
14. Anti-corruption Agencies lack transparency.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
15. Heads of Anti-corruption Agencies are hired on merit.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
16. Anti-corruption Agencies are free from political interference.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
17. Members of the public are free to complain to anti-corruption 
agencies without fear of recrimination. 
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LEGEND: 
 
1.           =          Strongly disagree 
2.           =          Disagree 
3.           =          Neutral 
4.           =          Agree 
5.           =          Strongly agree 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
18. Anti-corruption Agencies act within a reasonable time regarding 
corruption complaints.  
     
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
19. Anti-corruption Agencies independently initiate investigations.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
20. Anti-corruption Agency employees‘ enjoy independence from 
political interference in the discharge of their duties. 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
21. There are no ―no go‖ areas for certain investigations.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
22. Anti-corruption Agency employees‘ are adequately trained.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
23. Anti-corruption Agency employees‘ are adequately remunerated.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
24. Anti-corruption Agency employees‘ dealing with sensitive cases 
are subject to random integrity testing. 
     
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
25. There are arrangements to ensure that Anti-corruption Agencies 
do not themselves become corrupt. 
     
 
 
 1. 1. 3. 4. 5. 
26. Anti-corruption Agencies are accountable to parliament. 
 
     
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
27. I have blown the whistle on alleged corruption.      
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
28. I am too afraid to blow the whistle on alleged corruption. .      
 
 
 1. 1. 3. 4. 5. 
29. Government is taking the issue of corruption in the public sector      
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seriously. 
 
 
 
30. Please feel free to add any additional thoughts, information or comments in the 
space provided below: 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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ANNEXURE ―B‖ 
                                                                                                                                         
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEWS MEANT FOR 
HEADS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION UNITS IN THE OFFICES OF THE PREMIER 
 
The interviewee will be assured of anonymity and confidentiality of the contents of 
the interview. 
 
The interviewing schedule is composed of the following three major parts: the 
opening; the body; and the closing. The opening will make the interviewee feel 
welcomed and relaxed. It will also clearly indicate the objectives of the interview. 
Finally, the opening will indicate the expected length of the interview. 
 
The body of the interview schedule will list the topics to be covered and potential 
questions. The closing will maintain the tone set throughout the interview and will be 
brief but not abrupt. Interviewers will then thank the interviewee for his or her time. 
 
1. Opening 
 The purpose of the interview will be provided to the interviewees. (I would 
like to ask you some questions about corruption that when answered will 
allow an analysis of anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies 
in the province in dealing effectively with corruption). 
 Interviewees will be motivated by ensuring them that the information will 
be used to help improve the fight against corruption in our country. 
 Interviewees will also be informed of the estimated duration of the 
interview.  
 
(The interview will take about 30 minutes). Interviewees will then be asked if they 
understand, and requested to ask any question that they might be having.    
 
2. Interview Questions 
2.1 Provincial efforts in promoting good governance  
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a. Do you think citizens are able to complain to relevant anti-
corruption agencies without fear of recrimination?  
b. Describe the enforcement of anti-corruption law in this province. 
c. What do you think of the incorruptibility of the police force in the 
province? 
d. Do you think decisions taken and their enforcement are done in 
a manner that follows rules and regulations 
e. Do you think information is freely available and directly 
accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and 
their enforcement 
f. Do you think officials are held liable for committing corruption 
offences?  
 
2.2 Anti-corruption agencies in the provinces 
 
a. What is your experience about existence of anti-corruption 
agencies in the provinces? 
b. Are these agencies effective in carrying out their mandate? 
 
2.3 Anti-corruption officials 
a. What does your job entail?  
b. Are you free to execute your duties without interference? 
 
2.4 Is there anything else relating to corruption in your province that you might 
wish to add? 
 
3. Closing 
3.1 I appreciate the time you took out of your day for this interview.  
3.2 Thanks you again. 
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ANNEXURE ―C‖ 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEWS MEANT FOR 
HEADS OF SELECTED UNITS IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The interviewee will be assured of anonymity and confidentiality of the contents of 
the interview. 
 
The interviewing schedule is composed of the following three major parts: the 
opening; the body; and the closing. The opening will make the interviewee feel 
welcomed and relaxed. It will also clearly indicate the objectives of the interview. 
Finally, the opening will indicate the expected length of the interview. 
 
The body of the interview schedule will list the topics to be covered and potential 
questions. The closing will maintain the tone set throughout the interview and will be 
brief but not abrupt. Interviewers will then thank the interviewee for his or her time. 
 
4. Opening 
 The purpose of the interview will be provided to the interviewees. (I would 
like to ask you some questions about corruption that when answered will 
allow an analysis of anti-corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies 
in the province in dealing effectively with corruption). 
 Interviewees will be motivated by ensuring them that the information will 
be used to help improve the fight against corruption in our country. 
 Interviewees will also be informed of the estimated duration of the 
interview.  
 
(The interview will take about 30 minutes). Interviewees will then be asked if they 
understand, and requested to ask any question that they might be having.    
 
5. Interview Questions 
5.1 Provincial efforts in promoting good governance  
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g. Do you think citizens are able to complain to relevant anti-
corruption agencies without fear of recrimination?  
h. Describe the enforcement of anti-corruption law in this province. 
i. What do you think of the incorruptibility of the police force in the 
province? 
j. Do you think decisions taken and their enforcement are done in 
a manner that follows rules and regulations 
k. Do you think information is freely available and directly 
accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and 
their enforcement 
l. Do you think officials are held liable for committing corruption 
offences?  
 
5.2 Anti-corruption agencies in the provinces 
c. What is your experience about existence of anti-corruption 
agencies in the provinces? 
d. Are these agencies effective in carrying out their mandate? 
 
5.3 Anti-corruption officials 
a. Does your department have an anti-corruption unit or officials 
responsible for anti-corruption strategies? If yes, please explain. 
If no, why not?   
b. In your opinion are these units or officials able to execute their 
duties without interference? 
 
5.4 Is there anything else relating to corruption in your province that you might 
wish to add? 
 
6. Closing 
6.1 I appreciate the time you took out of your day for this interview.  
6.2 Thanks you again. 


